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This thesis explores the need for a Jewish voice in modern liberal arts education, from which it 
has been historically excluded. Liberal arts have developed from a tradition reaching back to 
ancient Greece, and yet are supposedly representative of Western Judeo-Christian culture. 
Due to an anti-Jewish attitude amongst the Church Fathers that has prevailed for most of 
church history, both Jews and their texts have been excluded from contributing to Western 
education. Great Jewish literature is almost entirely absent from the Great Books tradition, 
while Jewish thinkers have been left out of the university until only relatively recently. This 
study proposes to introduce the Jewish voice alongside the Western tradition, not in 
opposition, but as a peer, creating a dialogue between the two voices. Liberal arts begin with 
the literary arts, which can be defined as the written, spoken and thinking arts. Whilst there is 
no discrete liberal arts tradition in the Jewish world, the ancient biblical and post-biblical 
rabbinic texts address these arts in their own distinctive way. This thesis examines the written 
Jewish voice through the Great Jewish texts and an authentic way of reading them through the 
rabbinic method of midrash, as opposed to the Western grammatical tradition. Consideration 
of the spoken Jewish voice looks at rhetoric in the biblical tradition, and especially among the 
Hebrew Prophets, who not only spoke well – like their Western counterparts – but spoke up 
for the voiceless. Finally, an examination of the thinking Jewish voice reveals Wisdom 
personified, as distinct from Greek philosophy. It is a wisdom which is inseparable from right 
action, justice, love and awe. The Jewish voice provides counterbalance to the dominant 
Western tradition, and opens the door to a dialogue in the fields of reading, speaking and 
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Introduction: The need for a Jewish voice 
 
 
And Athens it is that has [honoured] eloquence, which all men crave and envy in its 
possessors; for she realized that this is the one endowment of our nature which singles 
us out from all living creatures, and that by using this advantage we have risen above 
them in all other respects as well; she saw that in other activities the fortunes of life 
are so capricious that in them often the wise fail and the foolish succeed, whereas 
beautiful and artistic speech is never allotted to ordinary men, but is the work of an 
intelligent mind, and that it is in this respect that those who are accounted wise and 
ignorant present the strongest contrast; and she knew, furthermore, that whether 
men have been liberally educated from their earliest years is not to be determined by 
their courage or their wealth or such advantages, but is made manifest most of all by 
their speech, and that this has proved itself to be the surest sign of culture in every 
one of us, and that those who are skilled in speech are not only men of power in their 
own cities but are also held in [honour] in other states’ (Isocrates, Panegyricus, 4.47-
49).1 
 
Both medieval and contemporary models of liberal arts education are essentially rooted in the 
ancient Greek and Roman educational traditions. The words of Isocrates above mention ‘men 
[who] have been liberally educated’ – perhaps one of the earliest references to the idea of a 
liberal education. His words also enshrine the Western voice: the voice of ‘eloquence’, 
‘beautiful and artistic speech’, ‘culture’ and ‘power’. Thus, the Western voice has dominated 
the liberal arts tradition. However, another ancient voice has been overlooked in liberal arts 
education – namely, the voice of the Jewish educational tradition. An explicitly Jewish form of 
liberal arts education has never existed historically, but the disciplines have all been addressed 
in the Jewish tradition. I propose that the Hebrew Bible and its subsequent Jewish exegesis 
from ancient times to the medieval period and into the present, forms an equally valid but 
very different approach to the disciplines involved in liberal arts education. The absence of 
these sources impoverishes the potential for any modern liberal arts education to truly 
address these disciplines beyond the limits of a Western monologue. The inclusion of the 
Jewish voice, however, opens a dialogue between the traditions. In time this dialogue may 
open further to include voices from other traditions. 
                                                 
1
 Isocrates, Isocrates with an English Translation in three volumes, trans. George Norlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press; London: William Heinemann, 1980) 
<www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D4%3Asection%3D47> 
[accessed 30 June 2014]. I have anglicised American spellings in square brackets throughout this work. 
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Defining Liberal Arts Education 
 
It will help at the outset to try and define a liberal arts education. Paul Axelrod claims that 
liberal arts education is ‘the most enduring and changeable of academic traditions’: ‘Its roots 
are in the intellectual culture of ancient Greece and Rome, and it continues, at least ideally, to 
embrace some core ideals from that period.’2 Bruce Kimball, likewise, traces the origins of the 
liberal arts back to the ancient Greek tradition, where reason and speech form the basis: ‘it is 
helpful to contrast a tradition that has privileged “reason” – including its various denotations 
of a rationale, a faculty of thinking, and an act of thinking – with a tradition that has privileged 
“speech” with all its meanings – the pronouncing of words, the faculty of talking, and a formal 
act of communication. These are the two semantic branches of the Greek term logos, which 
was thought to define the nature of civilization and of a civilized human being.’3 David Conway 
argues that the liberal arts began to take more definite shape through Roman development: 
‘In late Roman times, the three linguistic arts of grammar, rhetoric and logic, became 
collectively known as the trivium.’4 However, James Muir contests this view, with a much later 
dating: ‘…the liberal arts were not divided into the trivium and quadrivium by “the Greeks” or 
by “the Romans”, but by medieval African and European educators’.5 Muir credits the naming 
and numbering of seven arts (grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, music and 
astronomy) to the medieval North African educator Martianus Capella (c. fifth century CE).6 
Yet, he does maintain that the tradition of liberal arts education derives from ancient Greece, 
and specifically from Isocrates.7 The division of grammar, rhetoric and logic into the trivium, he 
dates to the Carolingian Renaissance of the eighth century CE; whilst the ‘term quadrivium 
originates with Boethius’ in the sixth century CE.8 
The Jewish tradition deals with all seven arts, although not necessarily as discrete 
subjects. For the purpose of this study I will focus on the disciplines of the trivium, as the 
preliminary and foundational studies in liberal arts education that still shape modern 
expressions. Specifically, grammar has influenced the Great Books tradition and how we read; 
rhetoric is still practised as the art of speaking well; and logic can be seen in the study of 
thinking skills and philosophy. Indeed, what Richard Hare described as an education for 
                                                 
2
 Paul Axelrod, Values in Conflict: The University, the Marketplace and the Trials of liberal Education (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), p. 8. 
3
 Bruce A. Kimball, The Condition of American liberal Education: Pragmatism and a Changing Tradition (New York: 
College Entrance Examination Board, 1995), p. 3. 
4
 David Conway, liberal Education and the National Curriculum (London: Civitas, 2010), p. 82. 
5
 James R. Muir, ‘Is our history of educational philosophy mostly wrong? The case of Isocrates’, Theory and Research 
in Education, 3.2 (2005), pp. 165-195 (p. 180). 
6
 Muir, ‘Is our history’, pp. 180-181. 
7




philosophers,9 Andrew Chrucky ‘would describe as a liberal arts education’.10 In America, 
where liberal arts education has a history stretching back well over two-hundred years, 
interest continues despite criticisms and changing educational trends and developments in 
recent decades.11 This can be witnessed in the ever-popular Great Books undergraduate 
program at St. Johns College in Annapolis and Santa Fe.12 Other American institutions where 
liberal arts programs include specific reference to grammar, rhetoric and logic (or similar 
terms) include, for example, Smith College, Northampton and Thomas Aquinas College, 
California.13 In Europe, and especially in the United Kingdom, there has been a resurgence of 
interest in the liberal arts and a revival of liberal arts educational programmes, which include 
reference to the Trivium. In mainland Europe, examples include Bard College in Berlin and the 
University of Gothenburg in Sweden.14 In the United Kingdom, examples of this resurgent 
interest include liberal arts programs from the Benedictus College of the Liberal Arts in 
London; King’s College London; and the University of Winchester in Hampshire.15 Moreover, in 
recent years there has been a remarkable interest in the liberal arts coming from Asia, for 
example, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Seoul National University in South Korea, 
Waseda University in Japan, and the National University of Singapore;16 as well as the Middle 
East, with the opening of the Shalem College in Israel.17 
The three disciplines of grammar, rhetoric and logic in the Western tradition form 
what I will term as the written voice, the spoken voice, and the thinking voice of liberal arts 
education. This thesis proposes that these voices exist in the Jewish tradition, but have been 
neglected or excluded. Axelrod underlines the case clearly: ‘Most published histories of the 
Western university begin with a discussion of the educational ideas of the Greek philosophers 
                                                 
9
 Richard M. Hare, ‘A School for Philosophers’, Ratio, 2.2 (1960). 
10
 Andrew Chrucky, ‘Philosophy of liberal Education’, Digital Text International, no date 
<www.ditext.com/libed/libed.html> [accessed 13 September 2014]. 
11
 For an overview, see, for example, American Council Of Learned Societies, Liberal Arts Colleges in American 
Higher Education: Challenges and Opportunities, ACLS Occasional Paper,  59 (2005). 
12
 See St. Johns College, Undergraduate Program <www.sjc.edu/academic-programs/undergraduate/liberal-arts/> 
[accessed 15 April 2015].  
13
 See Smith College, Academic Programs: The Liberal Arts <www.smith.edu/acad_prog_liberalarts.php> [accessed 
15 April 2015]; and Thomas Aquinas College, The Liberal Arts and Sciences <thomasaquinas.edu/a-liberating-
education/liberal-arts-sciences> [accessed 15 April 2015]. 
14
 See Bard College, Humanities, the Arts, and Social Thought <www.berlin.bard.edu/academics/humanities-the-
arts-and-social-thought/> [accessed 15 April 2015]; and Göteborgs universitet, Liberal Arts, kandidatprogram, 180 
hp <flov.gu.se/utbildning/grundniva/liberal-arts> [accessed 15 April 2015]. 
15
 See Benedictus College of the Liberal Arts, The Origin of the Liberal Arts 
<www.benedictus.org.uk/page.php?nav=liberal> [accessed 15 April 2015]; King’s College London, Liberal Arts 
<www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/depts/liberal/index.aspx> [accessed 15 April 2015]; and the University of Winchester, 
Modern Liberal Arts: The seven Liberal Arts <mla.winchester.ac.uk/?page_id=216> [accessed 15 April 2015]. For a 
more developed explanation of the relationship between the traditional liberal arts in relation to modern programs, 
see Nigel Tubbs, Philosophy and Modern Liberal Arts Education: Freedom is to Learn (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014); and ‘The Value of the Arts’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 47.3 (2013), pp. 441-456. Tubbs is 
Programme Leader for Modern Liberal Arts and Professor of Philosophical and Educational Thought at the 
University of Winchester. 
16
 See Pericles Lewis, ‘Asia Invests in Liberal Arts’, Harvard International Review, 35.1 (2013), pp. 36-39. 
17
 See Shalem College, A Great Books College <shalem.ac.il/en/core-curriculum/a-great-books-college/> [accessed 
15 April 2015]. 
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Socrates and Plato in fifth-century BC and quickly make their way to the founding of Europe’s 
first universities in the twelfth century AD … But higher learning itself has an even longer – and 
seldom acknowledged – history in the Middle East and Far East.’18 Axelrod notes that ‘the 
Hebrews … stressed the importance of morality and the centrality of the Law of God, which 
was recorded and interpreted by scribes and scholars’.19 However, his acknowledgement, 
whilst welcome, only scratches at the surface of what the Jewish voice (as well as other voices) 
has to offer liberal arts education. It offers us not only an alternative approach to the arts of 
reading, speaking and thinking well but, moreover, it offers a unique and valuable perspective 
that will enrich liberal arts education, alongside the Western tradition. 
 
The Silence of Jerusalem 
 
Within the study of the liberal arts and Great Books in the Western tradition, all but a very few 
Jewish sources are acknowledged. What happened, then, to the Jewish voice? Why has 
Jerusalem been so silent? I believe there are at least two major factors responsible. Firstly, 
anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, especially as it manifested in the works of the Church Fathers 
in early to late Antiquity and the medieval period, created a disdain for Jewish exegesis. 
Secondly, a Christian theology divorced from its Hebraic origins and shaped instead by 
Hellenistic philosophy sought to establish its superiority over Judaism.20 The patristic period 
produced almost a unitary voice in expressing anti-Judaic and anti-Semitic views, whether from 
Greek Fathers such as John Chrysostom or Latin Fathers such as Augustine.21 Despite Paula 
Fredriksen’s recent defense of Augustine as a misunderstood protector of the Jews,22 he 
stands, nonetheless, as a main architect of supersessionist theology.23 This meant that during 
the period of early to late Antiquity the seeds of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism were sown 
deep into Christian thinking. Christians were taught to have nothing to do with Jews or their 
texts. The Latin Catholic church began its anti-Talmudic campaign through Pope Gregory IX and 
his ‘Office of the Inquisition’ in the 1230s, culminating in the ‘trial’ of the Talmud in Paris.24 The 
result of the trial was that 24 cartloads of Jewish texts were burnt. Thereafter, the Talmud was 
                                                 
18




 Gavin I. Langmuir, ‘Majority History and Post-Biblical Jews’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 27.3 (1966), pp. 343-
364 (pp. 347-348). 
21
 See James Parkes, The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue; a Study in the Origins of Antisemitism (London: 
The Soncino press, 1934); and Rosemary Radford Ruether, Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-
Semitism (New York: Seabury Press, 1974). 
22
 Paula Fredriksen, Augustine and the Jews: A Christian Defense of Jews and Judaism (New York: Doubleday, 2008). 
23
 For Augustine and supersessionism see Ronald E. Diprose, Israel and the Church: The Origins and Effects of 
Replacement Theology (Waynesboro, GA: Authentic Media, 2004). 
24
 See Steven Bowman, ‘Jewish Responses to Byzantine Polemics from the Ninth through the Eleventh Centuries’, 
Shofar, 28.3 (2010), pp. 103-115 (p. 113). 
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regularly confiscated, burnt or censored throughout medieval Christian Europe.25 In 1233 
Dominican inquisitors burnt copies of Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed at Montpellier.26 
The Reformation brought little change. Luther’s early warmth towards the Jews 
eventually gave way to the latent anti-Semitism which had shaped his pre-Reformation world. 
His 1543 publication, On the Jews and their Lies, called for severe measures, including the 
confiscation of rabbinical texts, forbidding rabbis to teach, and burning down synagogues and 
Jewish homes, so that ‘Judaism’s falsehood could no longer be taught’.27 There was no 
mistaking his view of the Jewish writings: ‘I advise that all their prayer books and Talmudic 
writings, in which such idolatry, lies, cursing and blasphemy are taught, be taken from them.’28 
Both Catholic and Protestant messages were clear: Jewish texts were inferior to Christian texts, 
and worse still, they were cursed. Thus, they posed a spiritual danger to those who might be 
tempted to delve into them. 
Concerning the rabbinic texts, Geoffrey Hartman comments on the recent and older 
hostility: ‘I cannot forget how these writings were slandered, and how public ignorance 
abetted such slander in the Nazi era. Jews were demonised at a time when Talmud and 
Midrash were available yet remained a closed book even to the educated. And for centuries 
before that, theological anti-Semitism had misrepresented the spirit of Jewish law: non-Jews 
were taught to see only a crass and stubborn literalism, a mean-spirited, materialistic frame of 
mind … That era of prejudice and ignorance should be approaching its end.’29 Hopefully, he is 
right; and prejudice or ignorance will give way to a welcoming of the Jewish voice in liberal arts 
education. 
 
The Excluded Jew and the University 
 
Not only were Jewish texts absent during the formative period of the ‘Great Conversation’, but 
Jews themselves were physically excluded from the dialogue. The silencing of Jewish voices is 
extraordinary. Charles Murray notes that only two examples of great Jewish accomplishment 
emerge between 800 BCE and the first millennium of the Common Era, namely the Hebrew 
Bible and the New Testament. However, the apparent absence of Jews in the fields of science, 
                                                 
25
 See Anna Sapir Abulafia, ‘Talmud trials’ in Edward Kessler and Neil Wenborn (eds.), A Dictionary of Jewish-
Christian Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 417-418.  
26
 See Margaret Brearley, ‘Dominicans’ in Edward Kessler and Neil Wenborn (eds.), A Dictionary of Jewish-Christian 
Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 130-131. 
27
 See Alice L. Eckardt, ‘Luther’ in Edward Kessler and Neil Wenborn (eds.), A Dictionary of Jewish-Christian Relations 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 279-280. 
28
 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, Volume 47: Christian in Society IV, ed. Franklin Sherman (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1971), p. 269. 
29
 Geoffrey H. Hartman, ’Midrash as Law and Literature’ in Geoffrey H. Hartman and Daniel T. O'Hara (eds.), The 
Geoffrey Hartman Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh, University Press, 2004), pp. 205-222 (p. 205). 
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philosophy, mathematics or the arts does not signify inactivity during this period.30 No Jewish 
scientists are mentioned in medieval histories of science, but George Sarton’s monumental 
work: Introduction to the History of Science31 found that out of all the known scientists working 
in all the known world between 1150 and 1300, fifteen percent (95 out of 626) were Jews, 
which as Murray points out, was ‘far out of proportion to the Jewish population.’ From 
medieval times to beyond the Renaissance, most Jewish voices, including philosophers, poets, 
religious thinkers, scholars, physicians, and rabbis, were obscured to all but those within the 
Jewish world. Murray could only find seven Jews between the years 1200 and 1800 among the 
inventories of significant figures in arts and sciences. This systematic exclusion and 
discrimination, ‘both by legal restrictions on the occupations they could enter and by savage 
social discrimination’, accounts for the under-representation of Jews during the ‘flowering’ of 
the European liberal arts.32 The Jews have always been ‘people of the Book’, educated, literate 
and textual. Murray tracks this back deep into their ancient history, and this leads him to ask a 
powerful question: ‘Why should one particular tribe at the time of Moses, living in the same 
environment as other nomadic and agricultural peoples of the Middle East, have already 
evolved elevated intelligence when the others did not?’33 
Walter Ong argues that the development of the modern European and American 
universities can be traced back historically to a ‘common starting point’ – the early medieval 
universities of Europe.34 By the thirteenth century the University of Paris had established a 
faculty of arts (including the study of Latin and philosophy), and higher faculties of medicine, 
law and theology. However, the medieval Latin word ‘universitas’ meant ‘corporation’ or 
‘guild’ rather than a centre for learning. Alongside universities of scholars, there were 
universities of ‘butchers and barbers’. The universities of Paris or Bologna were actually guilds 
of teachers. Admission into the guild was by means of an apprenticeship whereby one became 
a bachelor and then master of arts, medicine, law or theology, mirroring the process for a 
master butcher or a master carpenter. The university faculties formed separate guilds with 
separate admission. Herein lay the problem for Jewish participation in the university. In 
medieval Christian thinking Jews epitomised the ‘classic stranger’ and, in the words of Steven 
Epstein, they became ‘a fixture of the outside world in many regions of Europe and a potential 
challenge to the spiritual and economic basis of the guild’.35 Jews were forbidden admission to 
                                                 
30
 Charles Murray, ‘Jewish Genius’, Commentary (April 2007), pp. 29-35 (p. 29). 
31
 George Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science, Volumes 1-3 (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1927-1947). 
32
 Murray, ‘Jewish Genius’, pp. 29-30. 
33
 Murray, ‘Jewish Genius’, p. 35. 
34
 See Walter J. Ong, ‘Educationists and the Tradition of Learning’, The Journal of Higher Education, 29.2 (1958), pp. 
59-69 (p. 61). 
35
 Steven A. Epstein, Wage Labour and Guilds in Medieval Europe (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1991), p. 169. 
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the guilds, and as the conferral of degrees was granted by the Catholic Church, they were also 
denied any hope of gaining qualification. 
Alfred Jospe notes that ‘contacts between the Jews and the European universities 
were sporadic and tenuous’, and although occasionally a few Jews were granted permission to 
study science, medicine or Hebrew in the medieval university, this was rare.36 There was little 
change in the situation until the nineteenth century, but restrictive admission policies 
remained in Europe and America and were only really challenged after World War Two.37 
Effectively, a Jewish presence was kept out of the university from its medieval beginnings and 
thereby Jews were excluded from the crucial formative stages and subsequent development of 
the liberal arts curricula. Whilst Jewish voices may fully participate in modern academia, 
contemporary Jewish philosophers have had to join the conversation long after the boundaries 
of discourse were set, and where the Greek philosophical world-view dominates. Moreover, 
Jewish texts are still omitted, for the most part, from liberal arts programmes and Great Books 
study. 
This omission of the Jewish voice is endemic in American and European liberal arts 
programmes. Indeed, it is the default inheritance from the ancient and medieval liberal arts 
tradition. Thus, any European institution wishing to revive the study of liberal arts revives with 
it the exclusion and, albeit inadvertently, any associated bias, discrimination, anti-Semitism 
and anti-Judaism that has favoured the one and excluded the other. Whilst at this point, one 
might rehearse again Martha Nussbaum’s argument over the canon38 and ask why not 
consider, for example, ancient Chinese, Buddhist or Islamic texts, the liberal arts are 
traditionally meant to be representative of a Western world-view, and specifically one that 
claims to be Judeo-Christian.39 On that basis, it is time liberal arts education providers at least 




Beyond the physical exclusion of Jews and the refusal to read Jewish texts, there has been a 
philosophical refusal to accommodate Jerusalem. Ariella Atzmon believes ‘the disparity 
between Athens and Jerusalem is ingrained in the primordial split between the tiller of the soil 
                                                 
36
 See Alfred Jospe, ‘Universities’, Jewish Virtual Library (2008) 
<www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0020_0_20217.html> [accessed 22/06/12]. For the 
exceptional acceptance of Jews as doctors and surgeons by Christians in Medieval Europe, see Joseph Shatzmiller, 
Jews, Medicine, and Medieval Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). 
37
 Jospe, ‘Universities’. See also Anne H. Stevens, ‘The Philosophy of General Education and its Contradictions: The 
Influence of Hutchins’, The Journal of General Education, 50.3 (2001), pp. 165-191 (pp. 174-175). 
38 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Undemocratic Vistas’, The New York Review of Books, 34.17 (1987), pp. 20-26. 
39
 For an example of non-Western models, see Reed College in Portland, Oregon, and especially their 
interdisciplinary studies: <http://www.reed.edu/academics.html> [accessed 10/04/15]. 
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and the wandering shepherd. It is the biblical rivalry between Cain the dweller, signified by the 
craving for rootedness, and Abel the wanderer’.40 Of course, Cain put Abel to death, and the 
Bible’s first murder victim is also the first shepherd. As the story of the Hebrew Bible unfolds 
we meet shepherd after shepherd: Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and his twelve sons, Moses and 
David. Moreover, God is made known to us as a shepherd in the Twenty-Third Psalm. Yet, from 
early on in Scripture the position of the shepherd is lowly and despised. When Joseph is 
reunited with his father and his brothers in Egypt, he informs them that ‘every shepherd is an 
abomination to the Egyptians’ (Genesis 46:34). Interestingly, Peter Schäfer detects an ‘anti-
Jewish bais’ in the earliest Greek account of the Exodus – Hecataeus of Abdera’s Aegyptiaca – 
which dates back to around 300 years before the Christian era.41 Manetho wrote his version of 
the Exodus not long after Hecataeus, and it appears in two versions that exhibit even stronger 
anti-Jewish tendencies.42 In both versions the Jews are referred to disparagingly as ‘Shepherds’. 




The flourishing of Jewish thought over the centuries can be likened to a tree, with rabbinic 
branches, medieval branches, Enlightenment branches, and so on. However, to borrow from 
the Apostle Paul, the branches do not support the root, but the root supports the branches.43 
Thus, I have deliberately focused on ancient biblical and rabbinic texts from the Jewish 
tradition in this study, because they form the root or the foundation upon which the Jewish 
voices of the medieval period and beyond have been built.44 Even today Jewish voices draw on 
the biblical foundation.45 The liberal arts developed out of the ancient Greek and Roman 
traditions, forming the genesis of Great Books and liberal arts curricula. This is not to diminish 
the importance or place of post-biblical Jewish voices – far from it – but without a return to 
and recovery of the foundation any conversation between Athens and Jerusalem will be 
imbalanced. To begin with the ancient Jewish voice establishes a meaningful context for 
further encounter in later ages. Moreover, the later developments in Jewish writing, speaking 
and thinking will make less sense and have far less grounding without laying the foundations of 
                                                 
40
 Ariella Atzmon, Athens or Jerusalem: Or the story of Cain and Abel Revisited (2007) <arielaatoz.blogspot.com> 
[accessed 22/06/12]. 
41
 Peter Schäfer, Judeophobia: Attitudes towards the Jews in the Ancient World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), pp. 15-17. 
42
 Schäfer, Judeophobia, pp. 17-21. 
43
 The full quotation from Paul is ‘… do not be arrogant toward the branches. If you are, remember it is not you who 
support the root, but the root that supports you’ (Romans 11:18, ESV). 
44
 The Talmudic and Midrashic texts and Maimonides are predicated on the Hebrew Scriptures. 
45
 See, for example, Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures (London: Athlone Press, 
1994); and more recently Shmuel Trigano, Philosophy of the Law: The Political in the Torah (Jerusalem: Shalem 
Press, 2011) and Yoram Hazony, The Philosophy of the Hebrew Scripture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
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Jewish ‘first principles’. For example, the inclusion of a few biblical texts inserted into a liberal 
arts programme after preliminary studies in ancient Western philosophy, gives the impression 
that these biblical texts are not rooted in a tradition of their own. Thus, a book such as Exodus 
may be sandwiched between Plato and Augustine. Worse still, it may be presented as a 
Christian text mediated through a Western bias – yes, the Hebrew Scriptures are texts that 
belong to Christians as well as Jews, but they are not originally Christian, it is not their first 
authentic context. Even the New Testament texts and early Christian church history have a 
Jewish genesis, despite losing that identity within the first two centuries. The Jewish voice 
needs to be heard in its proper context, as a worthy counterpart to the Western classical 
tradition and able to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with it. Hence, the focus of this study is on 
the foundational Jewish texts of Scripture and the Jewish interpreters who first commented on 
them. 
This study shares the view taken by Louis Feldman that there was no significant Greek 
influence on Jewish society and culture in Israel and no significant Jewish influence on Greek 
society and culture, before the Hasmonean period, and therefore no significant cross 
influences on either the texts of the Hebrew Scriptures or the ancient Greek philosophers.46 On 
the authorship and dating of the Hebrew Scriptures, traditional Jewish and Christian views of 
the Torah ascribe the texts to Moses (c. 1400 BCE), whereas the view of nineteenth century 
historical criticism would consider the work to be a composite text redacted over a long period 
of time, and completed by around 500BCE.47 The authorship and dating of the Wisdom 
Literature is also unclear, with traditional views ascribing most of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and 
the Song of Solomon to Israel’s King Solomon (c. 1000 BCE); most of the Psalms to his father, 
King David (c. 1041 BCE); and while the author of Job is anonymous, the traditional view dates 
it to the time of the Patriarchs. Again, the historical critical view takes issue with all the 
traditional dating and authorship of Wisdom Literature, so that at the other extreme, some 
view Ecclesiastes as a post-exilic composition.48 Prophets, such as Isaiah and Amos are 
traditionally viewed as contemporaries, writing in the eighth century BCE, whilst the critical 
view places them in the exilic period (c. 540 BCE).49 Axelrod is correct, therefore, to speak of an 
‘even longer – and seldom acknowledged – history’, because even the latest dates place the 
Scriptures in an earlier timeframe than the Western tradition. The rabbinic texts are 
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anonymous works of early to late Antiquity (first to sixth century CE), and are contemporary 
with the patristic writings of the Greek and Latin Church Fathers. 
Thus, this study pairs the art of grammar with rabbinic exegesis, for example, not 
because they correspond in time (although the patristic grammar does generally correspond to 
the period of the rabbinic work) but because they correspond in interest – namely, correctly 
reading the Scriptures. Likewise, the Hebrew Prophets pre-date Aristotle and Cicero, but all 
three traditions represented are concerned with the forms and delivery of speech. This is not 
to suggest that because one tradition pre-dates another it is automatically superior or more 
worthy of our attention. Rather, this is an attempt to see how the Jewish tradition might 
enhance the Western, especially – as is the case here – when the latter has dominated the 
former, and the former has been overlooked or even intentionally ignored. As a consequence 
of the Western domination, this work is intentionally and unequally weighted in favour of 
Jerusalem; I have given more time and attention to the Jewish voice – as the excluded tradition 
– rather than the Western classical voice. 
I have also intentionally excluded the study of New Testament texts, not because they 
are necessarily irrelevant – indeed, I consider the New Testament to be essentially Jewish, for 
the most part – but because they have played a greater part in the Western tradition through 
patristic exegesis, in particular. Because of their misappropriation by the Church Fathers, the 
New Testament writings have become very much Western texts in a Western canon, and have 
been used throughout church history in anti-Judaic and anti-Semitic polemic.50 Whilst the New 
Testament expresses Jewish ideas and quotes extensively from the Hebrew Scriptures, it is 
nonetheless a Greek language text. The focus of this work is the need for a Jewish voice in 
modern liberal arts education, beginning primarily with the ancient Hebrew Scriptures and to a 
lesser extent the post-biblical rabbinic texts. For the same reason I have given relatively little 
attention to the Septuagint, Philo and Josephus. Moreover, all of these Greek language sources 
themselves depend directly or indirectly on the original Hebrew foundation of the Scriptures – 
they are interpreting the Jewish voice. Conversely, I have included some development of 
grammar, rhetoric and reason in the rabbinic texts of Talmud and Midrash, simply because the 
Rabbis represent an interpretive voice that is distinctly Jewish rather than the Greco-Roman 
influence which pervades the commentaries of their patristic counterparts. The rabbinic 
commentary on the Jewish texts developed out of the scribal, prophetic and Wisdom 
traditions, rather than a Platonic or Aristotelian worldview. Likewise, I have included some 
limited reference to the Masorite approach to grammar in Late Antiquity; as further examples 
                                                 
50
 By misappropriation I mean a patristic exegesis that relies heavily on the Greco-Roman grammatical tradition and 
Platonic or Aristotelian thinking, rather than an authentic contextual understanding (something that became 
virtually impossible when the Church Fathers rejected the Jewish identity of the New Testament and the First 
Century Church).   
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of pre-medieval developments in the art of Jewish reading. The decision not to go further than 
the period of Late Antiquity is based partly on the view that the medieval Jewish 
commentators such as Saadia Gaon and Maimonides represent the beginnings of a Jewish 
synthysis between the Western and Jewish traditions, where the Jewish voice becomes less 
distinct. The decision is also based on the pragmatic need to limit the scope of study 
somewhat; and, as has been already stated, the focus on the Hebrew Scriptures and their 
earliest Jewish commentators creates a starting point in the recovery of the Jewish voice, and 
lays a necessary foundation for later periods. 
 
Outline of Content 
 
In ‘Chapter 1: The Written Jewish Voice’, the Great Books tradition will be examined in the light 
of Great Jewish texts and an appropriate way of reading them – an authentic Jewish reading 
using Midrash (both the exegetical compilations and the method). Early Jewish scribal and later 
rabbinic traditions will be considered in an attempt to demonstrate that they possess a 
sophisticated and distinct grammatical approach to the written text, alongside the Western 
grammatical art of reading and writing. The rabbinic method of midrash, including the layered 
exegesis of Pardes, will be specifically considered as a uniquely Jewish approach to the biblical 
text, in contrast to Augustine and Isidore of Seville’s contemporaneous Christian grammar. 
In ‘Chapter 2: The Spoken Jewish voice’, the art of rhetoric in the Greek tradition and 
oratory in the Roman tradition (represented by Aristotle and Cicero respectively) will be 
compared with the rhetoric of the Scriptures and, in particular, the Hebrew Prophets: Amos 
and Isaiah. Where the Western tradition emphasises the art of speaking well, the Jewish 
tradition emphasises speaking up (for those without a voice) – it is the rhetoric of the prophetic 
outsider, as opposed to the insider expediency of ancient Greece and Rome. 
‘Chapter 3: The Jewish Thinking Voice’ focuses on ancient Western philosophy – 
particularly the Socratic Method – and contrasts this with the Wisdom tradition in the Hebrew 
Scriptures, particularly the Wisdom literature of Proverbs, Job and Ecclesiastes. Hebrew 
cosmology is also considered in its essential and elemental relationship to Wisdom, and the 
idea of the Hebrew word hevel in Ecclesiastes is explored through its various English 
translations into ‘vanity’, ‘transience’, ‘incomprehensible’ and ‘breath’. The Hebrew word for 
wisdom, hokmah, as distinct from the Greek sophia, is wisdom expressed in humble love and 
awe, and this will be examined in light of the personification of wisdom as a woman in the 
Book of Proverbs. 
Finally, in the ‘Conclusion’ I will address the idea of the Jewish voice as the ‘stranger’; 
the distinction of Athens with Jerusalem, as opposed to Athens and Jerusalem; the limitations 
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of this work and where future study might address the other arts; and where Jerusalem might 






























Chapter 1: The Written Jewish Voice
 
 
The liberal arts, in both their historic and modern forms, have placed much emphasis on the 
reading of ‘Great Books’.1 In this chapter I will argue that the ‘Great Books’ tradition in the 
liberal arts has omitted not just great Jewish books, but has also failed to read the 
foundational texts of the Judeo-Christian tradition in their rightful context. The scarcity of 
Jewish texts amongst the Great Books suggests, at the very least, they have been overlooked. 
At worst, it is the innate fruit of the long history of anti-Semitism and Anti-Judaism rife in 
Western culture from ancient times to modernity. Either way, the Great Books and the liberal 
arts, and their students, are impoverished by the absence of the Jewish written voice. Instead 
of an authentic Jewish way of reading – such as using the rabbinic method of midrash – a few 
texts from the Hebrew Scriptures and New Testament canon are read through a Greco-Roman 
lens. Yet, to read a text midrashically, for example, opens an understanding that is absent in 
the Western grammatical tradition. In order for the liberal arts to pursue the reading of truly 
Great Books, then the Hebrew Scriptures (the Tanakh), and rabbinic works of Talmud and 
Midrash must be read alongside Homer, Plato, and the Great classical works, with an 
appropriate interpretive way of reading – only then can a fully developed and balanced Judeo-
Christian reading emerge. 
In this chapter, I will consider the Great Books tradition and Jewish Great Books. It is 
beyond the scope of this work to give exhaustive accounts of either the Western or Hebrew 
traditions, so I will briefly review the development of grammar as the art of reading, from its 
ancient Greek and Jewish beginnings. As the first of the seven liberal arts in the Roman 
tradition, I will contrast its culmination in the works of Augustine and Isidore of Seville (two of 
the Church Fathers who utilised grammar as the means for specifically reading and 
interpreting the Bible); alongside the Hebrew tradition, which will focus on the biblical scribes 
and culminate with the rabbinic midrashic exegesis of Antiquity.2 These patristic and rabbinic 
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 For examples of the importance of Great Books in liberal arts education see Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer 
Adler (eds.) Great Books of the Western World, 54 Vols. (Chicago: William Benton, 1952); Thomas J. Tomcho, John C. 
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42:167 (1884), pp. 450-477; Hartwig Hirschfeld, Literary History of Hebrew Grammarians and Lexicographers: 
Accompanied by Unpublished Texts (London: Oxford University Press/Humphrey Milford, 1926); William Chomsky, 
‘How the Study of Hebrew Grammar Began and Developed’, The Jewish Quarterly Review, 35.3 (1945), pp. 281-301; 
 22 
works are approximately contemporaneous, and reflect a time when for both Christians and 
Jews the primary academic task was the exposition and exegesis of Scripture – the Book 
amongst books to be read and understood. The province of Hebrew grammarians usually falls 
into the medieval period, when the influence of Arabic writers and the appropriation of 
Aristotle by Maimonides are felt. However, the ancient periods of the pre- and postexilic 
scribes, and the Rabbis of Antiquity are often overlooked, and the principles of scribal and 
midrashic interpretations are not equated with the work of grammarians, because its focal 
point is seen as purely biblical exegesis. Yet, Augustine and especially Isidore’s influence 
arguably overshadowed the medieval period with regard to grammar and their ultimate aim 
was to produce a grammar in the service of Scripture. The aims of Jewish exegetes were not so 
different, but as Jewish interpreters of a Jewish text their voice has an authenticity lost in the 
Western tradition. Not only are the Great Jewish Books worthy of our attention, so is the 
Jewish way of reading them, which potentially provides another way – a more authentic way – 
of approaching the text. 
 
The Genesis of Great Books 
 
Marijk van der Wende has well highlighted the similarities and differences between the long-
established liberal arts programmes in the USA and the more recent developments in Europe.3 
Whilst European and American models differ in many regards, they can both be traced back to 
a common beginning with ancient Greek philosophy and the medieval European university. 
European and American models both appear to omit Jewish sources and a good example of 
this omission can be found in Great Books curricula. The Great Books were initially introduced 
at St. John’s College, Annapolis, in 1937 by Stringfellow Barr and Scott Buchanan, from a list 
based on John Erskine’s 1916 Colombia College program, and a revision by Chicago’s 
Committee on the Liberal arts.4 The list of books chosen were themselves based on the classic 
liberal arts ‘trivium’ of grammar, logic and rhetoric; and ‘quadrivium’ of arithmetic, geometry, 
music and astronomy. St. John’s has kept fairly true to the original list despite Buchanan’s 
belief that it should be continually amended. 
Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler edited a 54-volume collection entitled Great 
Books of the Western World, which was published in 1952. They believed that the best liberal 
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 See Thomas J. Tomcho, John C. Norcross and Christopher J. Correia, ‘Great Books Curricula: What is Being Read?’, 
The Journal of General Education, 43.2 (1994), 90-101; and Gerald Grant and David Riesman, ‘St. John’s and the 
Great Books’, Change, 6.4 (1974), pp. 28-34, 36, 62-63. 
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education was to be achieved through ‘the greatest works the West has produced’, where the 
‘voices of the Great Conversation’ would address society’s problems with the ‘wisdom that lies 
in the works of its greatest thinkers’.5 In Volume 1, The Great Conversation: The Substance of a 
Liberal Education, Hutchins states: ‘Readers who are startled to find the Bible omitted from the 
set will be reassured to learn that this was done only because Bibles are already widely 
distributed’.6 His reassurance is presumably for his American Christian audience, yet the 
widespread availability of Shakespeare did not stop Hutchins and Adler from including all his 
plays. Hutchins cannot praise enough the Western tradition: 
The tradition of the West is embodied in the Great Conversation that began in the 
dawn of history and that continues to the present day. Whatever the merits of other 
civilizations in other respects, no civilization is like that of the West in this respect. No 
other civilization can claim that its defining characteristic is a dialogue of this sort. No 
dialogue in any other civilization can compare with that of the West in the number of 
great works of the mind that have contributed to this dialogue. The goal toward which 
Western society moves is the Civilization of the Dialogue. The spirit of Western 
civilization is the spirit of inquiry.7 
Cleary, Hutchins and Adler had very set parameters when defining ‘Western’, and despite the 
Western indebtedness to Judaeo-Christianity, the ‘Judaeo’ did not make the list. Hutchins 
dedicates a whole chapter to the omission of ‘great books of the East’ (Chapter 9: ‘East and 
West’), in which he essentially argues that in order to ever understand the great books of the 
East, we must first understand the Great Books of the West. It was not, in his opinion, 
beneficial to study both simultaneously, as America lacked sufficient teachers to proficiently 
lead the West through Eastern texts. However, he envisioned a day when ‘all the purposes that 
validate the publication of great books lead logically to Great Books of the World’.8 To date, 
there is still no such publication.9 Norman Davies rightly critiqued Hutchins and Adler’s 
collection for its narrowness: ‘the prejudices and preferences are manifest. Of the 151 authors 
on the amended list, 49 are English or American, 27 French, 20 German, 15 Classical Greek, 9 
Classical Latin, 6 Russian, 4 Scandinavians, 3 Spanish, 3 early Italians, 3 Irish, 3 Scots and 3 East 
Europeans.’10 Anne Stevens points out that in the early 1900s the Great Books ideal really 
equated to an ‘Americanization’ program and, unfortunately, Americanization ‘became 
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institutional anti-Semitism’ amongst ‘Harvard, Columbia, and Chicago [who] all claimed to 
have a “Jewish problem” vis-à-vis admissions quotas’.11 
In 1994 Thomas Tomcho, John Norcross and Christopher Correia appropriately asked, 
which books are ‘Great Books’? Who chooses them and who reads them? Two years earlier 
they approached 77 American colleges and universities that were identified as offering Great 
Books type curricula to try and answer these questions. The survey revealed that little had 
changed since 1952 and that the lists contained ‘very few women, racial minorities or non-
Western contributors’.12 Among the most frequently assigned authors were Plato, 
Shakespeare, Aristotle and Homer. With the exception of a small number of biblical texts, the 
Great Books curricula are founded on essentially ancient Greek literature. Thereafter, the 
periods of Antiquity and Medieval history are virtually silent with regard to Jewish voices. 
There is no mention of the Talmud or the Midrashim.13 
A number of liberal arts colleges and universities developed ‘Jewish Studies’ courses, 
where Jewish history, culture and literature are taught as discrete subjects.14 However, 
according to Daniel Goffman, this tends to create a polarisation rather than an integration, 
whereby Jewish Studies attracts mainly Jewish students, and leaves non-Jewish students 
feeling intimidated and ostracised. Jewish Studies programs, he argues, ‘too easily become 
ghettoized’ instead of building ‘cultural bridges by cultivating the non-Jewish student’.15 This 
approach still leaves the Jewish voice on the outside. It designates Jewish texts as elective or a 
specialisation, rather than including Jewish voices within the ‘Great Conversation’. Likewise, 
parts of the Bible may be presented within a ‘Biblical Studies’ elective in some liberal arts 
programmes, but devoid of an authoritatively Jewish context.16 
 
The Greek Foundations of the Great Conversation 
 
According to Arthur Hafner, the Great Books are ‘humanity’s great conversation about the 
most important questions in life … that began in the dawn of history and continues to the 
present day’: 
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The most basic questions … involve subjects such as the existence of God, the nature 
of love and justice, the possibility of immortality, and the achievement of freedom … 
These questions remain important for every human being. An awareness of the 
conversation that has occurred prior to one’s own existence is essential to the 
introduction of new ideas and concepts into that conversation.17 
If Hafner is correct, then where are the Jewish voices in this conversation? They surely address 
these most basic questions – the existence of God is addressed throughout the Hebrew 
Scriptures, not least in the Torah and in Job. The nature of love and justice is treated by the 
books of the Prophets and in Wisdom Literature. The possibility of immortality is more than 
hinted at in the books of Job, David and Daniel. The achievement of freedom is the story of 
Exodus. Whilst a few biblical texts may appear in Liberal arts curricula, the rightful interpreters 
of those texts are absent. When we claim to have built our Western societies on Judeo-
Christian foundations, what we really mean are Greco-Christian foundations. When we dig 
deeper, we discover that even the Christianity we are talking of is so far removed from its 
Jewishness, so unrecognisable in its authenticity, that we might just as well concede that our 
foundations are Greek. 
The Great Books tradition is immersed in the Greek world-view, and specifically a 
Platonic one. As Gerald Grant and David Riesman noted, regarding St. John’s:  
Plato is the overwhelming presence in the place: his work shapes St. John’s dialectical 
form, its ideal of governance, its vision of the good, its view of man. As the cofounder 
and first dean of the modern St. John’s, Scott Buchanan wrote: “In our critical age, the 
reading of Plato by a large number of people could make the difference between a 
century of folly and a century of wisdom for the world.”18 
Selections from the books of the Torah are included in the ‘Great Books Program’ at St. John’s 
College in Annapolis and Santa Fe. In a 2010 address at the Harvard Graduate School of 
Education, Christopher B. Nelson, President of St. John’s, made the following appeal: 
Consider the Books of Moses. We hear that Genesis may date back between 2700 and 
3000 years, but it contains a story of origins that is contemporary to the ears of many 
today and speaks to the relationship between the natural and the divine. The book 
gives us examples of love and betrayal, sibling rivalries, men’s and women’s 
relationship to the Almighty, and their duties to fellow human beings, all of which raise 
questions that have a remarkably contemporary sound to them.19 
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Nelson clearly appreciates the value of the Pentateuch for modern education, but the 
introduction to their ‘Reading List’ makes no mention of a Jewish contribution: ‘The first year is 
devoted to Greek authors and their pioneering understanding of the liberal arts; the second 
year contains books from the Roman, Medieval, and Renaissance periods; the third year has 
books of the 17th and 18th centuries, most of which were written in modern languages; the 
fourth year brings the reading into the 19th and 20th centuries.’20 
Allan Bloom claimed that ‘Only in the Western nations, i.e., those influenced by Greek 
philosophy, is there some willingness to doubt the identification of the good with one’s own 
way.’21 Martha Nussbaum challenged Bloom’s claim, objecting to its ‘startling ignorance of the 
critical and rationalist tradition’ evident in a variety of world-views, although she also failed to 
mention the Jewish tradition.22 Thus, if and when the Bible is read, it sits between ancient 
Greek texts and Augustine, and they create the lens through which it is interpreted. Typical of 
the Church Fathers, Augustine exegeted Scripture with a background in Manichaean 
gnosticism and neoplatonic philosophy, and Aquinas followed with his Aristotelian 
predilection. The patristic doctrine of supersessionism consciously strove to expunge all Jewish 
traces from the Christian faith and sever Christianity from its Hebraic origins.23 However, an 
authentic reading of the Hebrew Scriptures needs a Jewish exegetical lens – an authentic 
Jewish voice. 
The Bible is a Hebrew text, but it has been mediated through a Greek world-view. 
Worse still, it is repeatedly strip-searched at the door by the ‘security’ of higher criticism 
before it is allowed to enter the ‘Great Conversation’.24 We can dissect a butterfly into its 
constituent parts, labelling the wings, thorax, head, legs, etc., but our butterfly no longer flies; 
it lies in pieces on glass plates for microscopic scrutiny. The beautiful colouring has all but 
rubbed off on clumsy fingertips and scalpel blades. But it no longer flies. And so it is that after 
we have dissected the sacred beauty of Scripture, we see the constituent parts – sources, 
redactions, pericopes, Sitz im Leben – but it no longer flies. Other Great Books enter in with VIP 
status, whilst the Bible is frisked with suspicion. No one seems to care about the authenticity 
of Plato or Aristotle’s works; no one seems bothered to trace the historical accuracy of 
Socrates’ life as presented by Plato. The Liberal arts are far more concerned with what these 
Great Books have to say. Not so with the Bible. Indeed, it now stands in danger of being 
ushered out of the Conversation altogether. Peter Hawkins warns us that 
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…the Bible is on the endangered species list. This is most obviously a cause for alarm 
among those who venerate the sacred text “as a lamp unto my feet and a light unto 
my path” (Ps. 119.105). But it must also trouble the more secular minded who see the 
Good Book as the cornerstone of The Great Books.25 
The future for the Bible then – the only ancient Jewish text in Great Books curricula – does not 
bode well unless the need for the Jewish written voice is recognised.  
Why is the written Jewish voice needful? Having a different world-view invites us to 
approach a text from a different position with a different angle, placing us somewhere else as 
the viewer and changing our relationship and position to the text in view. Thus, introducing 
Jewish voices which come from a distinctly different place will give us an alternative viewpoint 
in the Great Conversation. Sometimes the differences may compliment, sometimes they may 
challenge. It is not just what Jewish voices say of themselves, but what they tell us about the 
other. Thus, having another viewpoint can help to minimise our blind spots. 
 
Great Jewish Books 
 
Jonah Cohen has proposed a Jewish Great Books curriculum for Jewish day schools, drawing on 
the Great Books model: 
My thesis is that an ideal integrated Jewish education starts with universal human 
concerns, which is to say, with those bedrock problems that all thinking men and 
women must grapple. What is the good life? How do we define human nature? What 
is man’s relationship to the earth? How should we organize society? Can we trust 
deduction and induction to give us certainty? What is the meaning of logic, of science, 
of God? And so on. By organizing the curricula around these kinds of elemental 
questions, by making them central to the culture of the school, we can obviously bring 
into conversation a large variety of great thinkers and artists from both the Jewish and 
non-Jewish worlds, as well as from the various Jewish denominations. What do Plato, 
Einstein and Levinas have to say about scientific methods? In what ways is scientific 
thinking similar to Talmudic exegesis and reasoning? How do Kant and Soloveitchik 
understand God? How might Euclidian and non-Euclidian geometries help us 
understand the kabbalistic thought of Steinsaltz or the abstract expressionism of 
Rothko? We can approach these thinkers, rabbis and artists as fellow journeymen 
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sharing a common pursuit of truth, and, like Talmudic scholars, we can compare, 
discuss and analyze their various perspectives on humanity’s fundamental concerns.26 
Cohen seeks to ‘borrow’ aspects of the Great Books tradition, whereby students grapple with 
the primary sources: ‘What better way to develop an appreciation of mathematics, logic, 
science, history, art, music, philosophy and literature than by studying the actual works of the 
geniuses who made those subjects important and stimulating in the first place.’27 The 
distinction is that ‘contributions to these fields by the great Jewish thinkers’ are put ‘into 
dialogue with the thoughts of eminent non-Jewish intellectuals who are struggling with the 
same questions’. He notes that the Great Books programs at St. John’s and Thomas Aquinas 
College are biased towards ‘authors of a non-Jewish background’, but that this is a result of a 
‘methodological flaw in their selection of readings’ rather than bigotry. The flaw is that 
Hutchins and Adler’s selection emphasised texts written before the twentieth century, when 
Jews were prohibited from fully participating in Western civilization. Here, Cohen is generous 
because Hutchins and Adler cannot have been ignorant of the Talmud, the Midrashim or even 
Maimonides. 
However, he does question their ‘decision to enshrine Chaucer’s “The Prioress’s Tale” 
as part of the great works of Western civilization, while excluding far worthier and loftier texts 
of Medieval Jewish poets’.28 It is not just Chaucer’s work, however, that is questionable. Gavin 
Langmuir also reminds us of an easily overlooked fact about Western literature: ‘Even when 
Jews were least important or were physically absent, they have been part of the mythology of 
the West: The Jew of Malta and The Merchant of Venice were written in and for a society in 
which the residence of Jews had been illegal for three hundred years.’29 
Jewish Great Books would, according to Cohen, ‘have to highlight the explosion of 
Jewish genius after 1900’ and ‘restore to Jewish consciousness a number of ignored but 
influential ancient and Medieval authors – Philo of Alexandria, Ibn Gabirol, Leone Ebreo and 
other superb thinkers and poets who were translated into European languages, plagiarized, 
appropriated, and their names sometimes erased from the Western canon, all because they 
were Jewish and presumably fair game’. But why should these ancient and Medieval Jewish 
treasures be restored only to Jewish consciousness, why not introduce them to all students of 
Great Books? ‘Those who contend that Western civilization rests on the struggle between 
Athens and Jerusalem,’ Cohen argues, ‘ignore how vigorously the sons and daughters of 
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Jerusalem have embraced and contributed to the rational, empirical and artistic traditions of 
Athens’. Regrettably, the same cannot yet be said for Athens’ sons and daughters. 
 
The Origins of Greek and Hebrew Grammar 
 
In the Western tradition, the trivium, in its ancient and medieval form, begins with grammar; 
and this is principally the art connected to reading and writing – the primary textual art. 
Grammar concerned itself with letters, its own etymology coming from the Greek grammatike 
tekhne (‘art of letters’), from the word gramma (‘letter’), stemming from graphein (‘to draw or 
write’).30 According to Casper de Jonge and Johannes van Ophuijsen, the ‘most influential 
linguistic doctrine to survive from antiquity is that of the μέρη λόγου “parts of speech”’, in 
which ancient grammarians ‘traditionally distinguished eight word classes: noun (ὄνομα), verb 
(ῥῆμα), participle (μετοχή), article (ἄρϑρον), pronoun (ἀντωνυμία), preposition (πρόθεσις), 
adverb (ἐπίρρημα), and conjunction (σύνδεσμος).’31 These classes are ‘central to ancient 
grammatical treatises’, but their origins go back to the ‘much earlier philosophical interest in 
λόγος and its parts’ and the ‘result of a long development beginning with … Plato, Aristotle, 
and the Stoics’, who were interested in the ‘analysis of the minimal unit of speech called λόγος 
as the potential truth-bearer’. 32 Indeed, for Andreas Schmidhauser, the ‘most important figure 
in the prehistory of grammar’ is Plato (c. 427-347 BCE): ‘On every linguistic level – element, 
syllable, word, sentence – the distinctions he draws, the terms he introduces, the arguments 
he advances (and also those he thinks he refutes) have left their imprint…’33 As words were 
seen as potential truth-bearers, so early grammar began to focus on interpreting and 
understanding text. Rita Copeland notes that in the work of Aristotle (c. 384-322 BCE) ‘we 
often find ideas about language, but always in the service of his local philosophical interests’.34 
She gives the example of his ‘logical study of propositions’ in De interpretatione, which begins 
with an analysis of the ‘linguistic elements that will feed into the construction of the 
proposition’. Whilst it became ‘arguably … the most influential passage in the history of 
linguistics, it did not start out as linguistics’.35 Moreover, in Rhetoric, Aristotle’s interest is in 
the analysis of persuasion and prose style; and in Poetics he considers language as ‘the 
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instrument of poetry’ (1456b–1457a, section 20).36 Thus, prose and poetry are distinguished as 
styles of text for grammatical study, focusing on textual structure as well as content. 
Starting in the ‘fourth century BCE, when γραμματικός first appears, it is used to 
describe someone who knows the “letters”: a person versed in grammar, that is, knows how to 
read and write, can set apart vowels, consonants, and semiconsonants, and such’. Then in the 
‘third century BCE, γραμματική comes to be used for what one now would call philology and 
criticism’: 
Thus the oeuvre of Aristarchus of Samothrace (fl. 160 BCE) – ὁ γραμματικώτατος “the 
most grammatical” to some (Ath. 15.12.2) – consists in editions of and commentaries 
on Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Alcman, Pindar, Herodotus, and others, as well as in a 
number of critical treatises on Homeric questions.37 
Grammar, then, as we can see, is already concerning itself with Great Greek Texts and how 
they should be read, interpreted and understood – emerging as the Western written voice. 
Ernest Brehaut notes that ‘Alexandrian scholars began to compare the idiom of Homer 
with that of their own day’.38 Grammarians were students of ‘textual criticism or mythology’, 
of ‘literature at large’ and studied ‘for the purpose of elucidating the poets’.39 So it was, claims 
Copeland, that grammar ‘embraced not only language and linguistic thought but literature and 
the analysis of literary texts’.40 Indeed, Filippomaria Pontani adds that ‘the place of Homer in 
the Greek grammatical tradition is an extremely important one, both at its outset – when the 
problems connected with the constitution of his text catalyse the philosophical inputs of Stoic 
and Peripatetic thinkers and precipitate them towards the creation of a new techne – and at its 
peak, when he contributes vital, if partial, elements to the creation of a new linguistic 
standard, and thus remains perfectly integrated as a pillar of Greek linguistic consciousness for 
centuries.’41 Thus, the works of Homer became the literary benchmark – the required reading 
amongst Great Greek Texts. 
Marcus Kalisch began his survey of Hebrew grammatical history with the following 
statement: ‘Except in the etymology of proper nouns, the Hebrew Scriptures exhibit no trace 
of grammatical or linguistic enquiry among the ancient Israelites; although patriots and public 
teachers exhorted them to watch over the preservation and purity of their language.’42 As an 
example of a patriotic and public teacher, he references (in a footnote), Nehemiah (fl. fifth 
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century BCE) berating the state of Jerusalem where he found Jews who had intermarried with 
women from the surrounding nations, and whose progeny were unable to speak Hebrew: 
In those days also I saw the Jews who had married women of Ashdod, Ammon, 
and Moab. And half of their children spoke the language of Ashdod, and they could not 
speak the language of Judah, but only the language of each people (Nehemiah 13:23-
24). 
However, Kalisch’s view is totally countered by Jonathan Kearney, who, in one of several 
examples, demonstrates that the Hebrew Scriptures do indeed exhibit grammatical and 
linguistic enquiry: 
The Hebrew Bible itself displays an interest in the workings of language in several 
places. The Volksetymologien of Genesis offer several examples of this phenomenon. 
For instance, at Gen. 21.6 the meaning of the name ִיְצָחק yiṣḥåq ‘Isaac’ is explained in 
terms of its relationship to the verb ָצַחק ṣåḥaq ‘to laugh’.43 
Kalisch’s brusque assessment also overlooks some interesting linguistic and grammatical 
elements in the ancient Hebrew Script that denote a borrowing of elements from 
contemporaneous linguistic systems. Nili Shupak has found striking parallels between the 
Torah texts and contemporary Egyptian language: ‘Even non-expert readers who know little 
about ancient Egypt can discern Egyptian elements integrated into the Hebrew text of the 
biblical story of Israel in Egypt.’44 Shupak identifies Egyptian terms transliterated into Hebrew, 
and which are now translated into English as ‘Pharaoh’, ‘magicians’, ‘the Nile’, ‘basket’, ‘reeds’, 
and ‘papyrus’. She also identifies the transliterated Egyptian personal names: ‘Moses’, 
‘Pinchas’ and ‘Miriam’; and the place names: ‘Ramesses’ and ‘Pithom’.45 In addition to the 
transliterated terms, personal names and place names, Shupak adds Egyptian idioms that have 
been translated into Hebrew rather than transliterated: 
To these elements should be added certain typical Egyptian idioms that, rather than 
being transliterated in the biblical text like those in the first three groups above, were 
translated into Hebrew, making it difficult at times to discern their foreign origin. 
Examples include the expressions “a mighty hand”; “an outstretched arm”; “an 
abomination to the Egyptians”; and the three Hebrew terms that refer to the 
“hardening” of Pharaoh’s heart: kbd, ḥzq, and qšh.’46 
Shupak argues that the Egyptian origins of these terms, names and idioms support an earlier 
dating of the Torah texts, however, her explanation of their usage demonstrates that among 
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the authors of the Hebrew Scriptures, even in the earliest texts and sources, there was a 
familiarity with Egyptian semantics and an intentional use of the language that reveals a 
sophisticated knowledge of linguistics and grammar. When we consider that Aramaic also 
appears explicitly within the Hebrew text (the place name Jegar-sahadutha in Genesis 15:1; 
the verse: ‘Thus shall you say to them: “The gods who did not make the heavens and the earth 
shall perish from the earth and from under the heavens”’ in Jeremiah 10:11, a lengthy passage 
in Daniel 2:4b–7:28; and two written letters in Ezra 4:8–6:18 and 7:12–26), we see that the use 
of Egyptian is not unique and further demonstrates an ease of exchange between languages 
and grammatical systems to serve a variety of purposes. 
Extraordinarily, the name of Israel’s great leader, Moses ( משה), has deeper 
significance beyond the title given him by Pharaoh’s daughter when she rescued him from the 
Nile, which has traditionally been explained as sounding like the Hebrew for ‘draw out’ 
 to draw’, see Exodus 2:10). According to Shupak, Moses was an‘ משה from the root משיתהו)
‘Egyptian theophoric name in which the verb msi (“to give birth”) originally was joined to the 
name of an Egyptian god’: 
This type of name was common in Egypt in the period of the New Kingdom (the 
fifteenth through eleventh centuries BCE); examples include Thutmose (i.e., born of 
the god of wisdom, Thut) and Ramesses (i.e., born of the god Re). Until recently, 
proponents of this etymology explained the sobriquet “Moses” as a tendentiously 
shortened form of the original Egyptian name, from which the element of the foreign 
god’s name was expunged by the biblical author. However, this explanation is no 
longer necessary, now that it has become apparent that the Egyptians themselves 
often shortened names of this kind by leaving out their second element. We know of 
at least three people called “Ms” from the Ramesside period (the thirteenth century 
BCE).47 
The sophistication in borrowing from the Egyptian and Aramaic reveals that the authors of 
Scripture were not only conversant in multiple languages and the use of idioms, terminology, 
and the etymology of names, but they knew their readers to be likewise trained and skilled in 
understanding. 
Jewish and Christian tradition both ascribe the authorship of the Torah to Moses, but 
regardless of whether this was the case or it is the work of a later redactor (or a plurality of 
redactors), the Egyptian idioms appear across the books of the Torah, beginning with Genesis. 
Shupak gives a striking example of this with the expression ‘mouth’, which represented the 
‘sovereign’ in Egyptian, appearing first in Genesis 41:40 when Pharaoh appoints Joseph as his 
second-in-command: ‘You shall be over my house, and all my people shall order themselves as 
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you command. Only as regards the throne will I be greater than you.’ The word translated into 
English as ‘command’ (or ‘your word’) is פיך (pika) in Hebrew, from פה (peh) meaning ‘mouth’: 
The term appears in Egyptian literature as a title designating the holder of a high 
office, that of the king’s counsel. The full title is “Mouth of the King of Upper Egypt” or 
“the Mouth that quiets the whole land, to its farthest reaches.” This designation was 
used frequently in the period of the New Kingdom, and it remained in use up to the 
Late Period (the seventh and sixth centuries BCE). The Hebrew narrator thus makes 
use of an expression ubiquitous in Egyptian court language in order to convey that 
Aaron would serve as a “mouth” to Moses in the same sense that an Egyptian high 
official served as the “mouth” of his sovereign [Exodus 4:14-16]. In so doing, he raised 
Moses to the status of Pharaoh, the Egyptian God-King.48 
Thus, the term ‘mouth’ is just one example of an idiom that carries over from Genesis into 
Exodus, and continues to appear throughout the Hebrew Scriptures with the same sense (for 
example, see Joshua 1:18, Job 39:27 and Ezekiel 3:27). This not only has a unifying effect but, 
moreover, it suggests that these idioms and terms were recognisable as signs and symbols to 
the reader. 
 
Greek Grammar Schools and Hebrew Scribal Training 
 
The first ‘Greek school grammar’ was written by Dionysius Thrax (c. 170–90 BCE). It appeared 
in about 80 BCE and was ‘destined to be the basis of all the school grammars of antiquity’.49 
For Thrax, the purpose of grammar was simple: ‘Grammar is a practical knowledge of the 
usages of language as generally current among poets and prose writers.’ His understanding of 
grammar was as follows: ‘It is divided into six parts: (1) trained reading with due regard to 
prosody; (2) explanation according to poetical figures; (3) ready statement of dialectical 
peculiarities and allusions; (4) discovery of etymology; (5) an accurate account of analogies; (6) 
criticism of poetical productions, which is the noblest part of grammatic art.’50 Thus, the 
grammar schools began to standardise the concepts of grammar; and as David Conway states: 
‘All who undertook any such course would be made to follow a roughly similar programme of 
studies.’ 51 Their studies included an expectation to ‘become familiar with the entire corpus of 
Homeric myth and other epic Greek literature’, which was ‘considered necessary to gain 
acquaintance with instances of good style as well as [to] learn about heroism and virtue’.52 
Conway concludes that this reading became part of the grammar curriculum: ‘All such literary 
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knowledge and skill came to be subsumed under the term “grammar”.’53 Robert Kaster also 
observes that as well as the study of language – at the very outset – the Greek grammarian 
had a literary focus, which could even shape the identity of the reader:  
One of our earliest witnesses to the grammarian's role is an inscription from the Ionian 
city of Priene [honouring] a local benefactor, dating to sometime after 84 B.C. Among 
the man’s services is noted his subsidy for a grammarian to instruct the youth of 
Priene in language and literature (φιλολογια), “through which souls progress toward 
excellence [ἀρετή] and the condition proper to humanity [πάθος ἀνθρώπινον]” … the 
statement reflects the belief that excellence and humanity not only could be derived 
from the literary education but could even be defined by it.54 
Grammar enabled an ‘analysis in ancient texts of all genres – from rhetoric and philosophy, to 
medicine and theology’, with an influence exceeding the Greek-speaking world. Thus, ‘Latin, in 
the late second century BCE, became the first language to which the Greek system was 
adapted; and for the next 600 years Latin grammarians continued to be inspired by their Greek 
homologues.’55 
Perhaps Kalisch’s view that the Hebrew Scriptures ‘exhibit no trace of grammatical or 
linguistic enquiry among the ancient Israelites’ was, in part, informed by the argument that 
because there is no mention of ‘schools’ in the Hebrew Bible, they did not, therefore, exist.56 
Countering this argument, Christopher Rollston’s research has led him to rightly conclude that: 
Ultimately, I would contend that the precision, meticulousness, and consistency of the 
Old Hebrew script (and its marked and consistent differences with the Phoenician and 
Aramaic scripts) are features that reflect formal, standardized scribal education. Such 
features are certainly not consistent with an absence of formal, standardized 
education. Furthermore, the orthographic conventions of Old Hebrew also reflect 
synchronic consistency (and diachronic development).57 
In other words, the actual writing and copying of the Scriptures, throughout the generations in 
ancient Israel, is evidenced in a uniformity that necessitates some system of grammatical and 
linguistic knowledge and training, both amongst the writers and the readers. Supporting 
Rollston’s counterargument, Karel van der Toorn, places Israel in a wider context: 
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The scholars of the ancient Near East had by definition received a scribal training; they 
were scribes in the sense of scholars. The scholars of Israel were no exception to the 
common pattern: they were scribes who had specialized in the classic texts, which in 
their case made them scholars of the Torah.’58 
Indeed, Bernhard Pick considered that, in its relationship to other ancient Semitic languages, 
Hebrew ‘retained the stamp of high antiquity, originality, and greater simplicity and purity of 
forms’.59 Pick highlights the linguistic and structural precision that is evident in the earliest 
texts and confirms an underlying system of formal grammatical and linguistic knowledge: ‘In its 
earliest written state it exhibits, in the writings of Moses, a perfection of structure which was 
never surpassed.’60 Ironically, rather than the ancient Hebrew language evolving and 
developing with greater style and sophistication over the passing of time, it appears that it fell 
into decay as it began to come under the influence of Aramaic: 
Not only did the intrusion of this powerful Aramaic element greatly tarnish the purity 
of the Hebrew words and their grammatical formation, older ones having been altered 
and supplanted by newer ones which are Aramaic for the most part; it also obscured 
the understanding of the old language, and it enfeebled its instinctive operations until 
at length it stifled them. The consequence was that the capacity of observing 
grammatical niceties in the old pure Hebrew was entirely lost; the distinction of prose 
and poetical diction was partly forgotten; and finally, as the later writers went back to 
the Pentateuch and other older compositions, many elements which had already died 
out of the language were reproduced as archaisms.61 
Thus, the older Hebrew represented a more pure and highly formed language – ‘perfection’ in 
Pick’s view – replete with prose, poetry, and grammatical detail. If Pick is correct, then ancient 
Hebrew had a refined grammar running through its core from the outset, and not as a later 
development. However, the decay in Hebrew that the Aramaic influence brought about, led to 
a new era of interpretation in reading and understanding the biblical texts: 
This decline of the popular knowledge of pure Hebrew gave occasion to the 
appointment of an order of interpreters – meturgemanin – in the synagogue for the 
explication of the Scriptures in this more current dialect, as can be seen from 
Nehemiah viii. 8, where we read, “They (the priests and Levites) read in the book, in 
the law of God ְמֹפָרׁש and appended thereto the sense, and caused them to 
understand the reading,” where the word means, “with an explanation subjoined,” i.e. 
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with an interpretation added, with an explanation in Chaldee, the vulgar tongue, as 
appears from the context and by a comparison of Ezra iv. 18, and verse 7.62 
The Hebrew word מפרש (meparash) is translated into English as ‘distinctly’ or ‘clearly’, so 
these interpreters began to give clarification to the meaning of the text, and with שכל (sekel), 
translated as ‘the sense’ or ‘insight’, they helped the community understand the reading. In 
this way, their function was not so dissimilar to the role that the monks and bishops in Isidore 
of Seville’s community would take on, as we shall see, a thousand years later. 
Michael Fishbane notes that the ‘technical’ title, ‘scribe’ סופר (sofer), ‘first appears in 
connection with the royal council established by King David at the outset of the United 
Monarchy (2 Sam. 8:16-18 ∼20:23-5)’. It then reappears in ‘similar listings preserved for the 
dynasties of King Solomon (1 Kg. 4:1-6), King Joash (2 Chron. 24:11-12), and King Hezekiah (2 
Kg. 18:18, 37). Thus the סופר appears as a stable component of the high royal bureaucracy for 
at least 300 years, from the beginning of the tenth to the seventh century BCE.’63 Additionally, 
Emanuel Tov points out that other scribes are mentioned in the Scriptures at various locations 
(some anonymous and some not): ‘Qiryat Sefer, literally “the city of the book” (i.a., Josh 15:15; 
the site where an archive was kept?), the earlier name of Debir, may have been the site where 
many such scribes lived.’64 He suggests that the reference in ‘1 Chr 2:55, “the families of 
soferim who lived at Jabez,” refers to family-like guilds of scribes.’ With regard to individual 
scribes, ‘1 Chr 24:6 mentions Shemayah son of Netanel, הסופר מ "הלוי, “the scribe, who was of 
the Levites”, whilst the ‘best known scribe in Scripture is Ezra, named סופר מהיר (a skilled 
scribe) in Ezra 7:6 and, similar to Shemayah, deriving from a priestly family (his direct lineage 
from Aaron is specified in Ezra 7:1-4).’65 Fishbane correctly identifies that Ezra’s acclamation 
was genuine: ‘The fact that Ezra's title already occurs in Ps. 45:2 as a frozen idiom suggests that 
this designation was known in the pre-exilic period as well, and was not simply a contemporary 
title conferred upon him by later historians.’66 
Toorn reminds us of our debt to the scribes for the transmission of the Scriptures: ‘The 
books of the Bible would not have seen the light in the oral culture of Israel if it were not for 
the professional scribes. They are the main figures behind biblical literature; we owe the Bible 
entirely to them.’67 It is a debt not just for Jews, Christians and Muslims, but for everyone who 
appreciates the value (literary, spiritual, philosophical or otherwise) of the Hebrew Scriptures. 
Toorn believes that the scribal school of Jerusalem (‘more a pedagogical than an architectural 
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concept’) was inextricably linked to the temple, because of the school’s role as the heart of 
‘text production’: 
In the ancient Near East, the men who taught others to read texts were also the men 
who wrote texts themselves. All over the Near East, schools were not merely [centres] 
of text transmission but also of text composition. While the temple scribes in Israel 
were responsible for teaching the scribal craft, they were also the ones who created 
the bulk of the biblical literature.68 
This scribal craft must have included a cohesive understanding of literary grammar, teaching 
‘students to be conversant with the technical language of all activities for which writing might 
be needed’.69 The training in grammar would include an understanding of the ‘idiom of 
particular professions and written genres’, as well as ‘mastery of one or more foreign 
languages’: 
Around 700, the officials of King Hezekiah were able to conduct a conversation in 
Aramaic, which to the common people was incomprehensible (2 Kings 18:26). In 
addition to Aramaic, the scribal program may have taught other languages as well, 
such as Egyptian and, later, Greek. In the words of Ben Sira, the accomplished scribe 
“will travel through the lands of foreign nations” to increase his knowledge (Sir 39:4).70 
These examples lead Toorn to rightly conclude that ‘training in foreign languages was part of 
the scribal education’. It is possible, therefore, that the scribes had a working knowledge of 
grammatical schemas from several languages, which may, in turn, have influenced their 
exegesis.71 
Toorn identifies a ‘secondary phase of the scribal program … devoted to the study of 
the classics’. He draws on the work of André Lemaire, who ‘advances the hypothesis that the 
books of the Bible were preserved and canonized by virtue of the fact that they were on the 
curriculum of the scribal schools’.72 Toorn believes that the allusion to the ‘books of the 
fathers’ in the prologue of Ben Sira is an explicit reference to the use of the Scriptures for 
scribal instruction.73 Moreover, he makes a fascinating argument that the library of Qumran 
provides a clue to the identity of the most eminent ‘classics’ in the scribal curriculum: 
About 25 percent of the Dead Sea Scrolls are scriptural. Except for the Scroll of Esther, 
all books of the Hebrew Bible are represented by at least one copy. The three books 
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represented by the most manuscripts are Psalms (thirty-nine in total, including twenty-
two manuscripts from Cave 4), Deuteronomy (thirty-one, including twenty-one from 
Cave 4), and Isaiah (twenty-two, including eighteen from Cave 4).74 
Toorn quotes from Eugene Ulrich’s reflection on these statistics: ‘It is interesting, but not 
surprising, that these three books are also the most frequently quoted in the New Testament’; 
as further support for their currency as the ‘Great Books’ of ancient Israel.75 The argument is 
all the more compelling because Toorn links the role of the Levites as overseers of scribal 
education in the Persian period with their influence upon the ‘shaping’ of Deuteronomy, 
Isaiah, and Psalms – it is, he claims, ‘corroborating evidence for the use of these books in the 
training of scribes’. Thus, they became the scribal ‘textbooks’, each with a specific purpose: 
The scribes taught the Torah to the people; the Book of Deuteronomy provided them 
with a textbook. The scribes assisted worshippers in their devotional duties, including 
the recitation of prayers and, if need be, the composition in writing of songs of 
thanksgiving; the Book of Psalms was the handbook for these liturgists. The Book of 
Isaiah, finally, taught the scribes ways in which to construe the past, the present, and 
the future; it provided them with a means of dealing with history and its vicissitudes.76 
Trainee scribes were devoted to the study of the classics, and underwent ‘immersion’ or 
‘enculturation’ by chanting texts, copying dictated texts and memorising texts. Toorn sees 
evidence of this in the New Testament, the Pseudepigrapha, and the non-biblical writings from 
Qumran; and the way in which these ‘secondary’ texts quote from, allude to and stylistically 
resemble the classics, revealing a common ‘thorough knowledge of the written tradition’.77 
The education of scribes necessitated that teachers explained the biblical texts to the 
trainee. Toorn gives a number of examples of this tradition of scribal exegesis emerging from 
the Scriptures: 
If scribes were to elucidate the sense of the scriptures (Neh 8:8; Dan 11:33), they had 
to receive exegetical training themselves. An example is found at Neh 8:13–18, which 
contains a halakhic ruling on the various types of branches to be used for the 
construction of booths for Sukkoth. A prophecy by Haggai contains an echo of the 
question-and-answer commentary on rules of purity and contagion (Hag 2:11–13). And 
Qohelet’s counsel against rash vows (Qoh 5:1–6) reads like a commentary on Deut 
23:22–24.78 
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If Toorn is correct, then it would appear that all of Scripture – the Torah, the Prophets and the 
Writings – had value in scribal training. Furthermore, even individual elements of exegesis – 
grammatical semantics – are laid out by Ben Sira, the Psalms and the Book of Daniel: 
Ben Sira emphasizes that the scribe has privileged access to the “subtleties” 
(strophais), “hidden meanings” (apokrypha), “obscurities” (ainigmasi), and “secrets” 
(apokryphois) of the scriptures (Sir 39:1–8). The protagonist of Psalm 119, held out as 
an example to apprentice scribes, immerses himself in the Torah in order to penetrate 
its “mysteries” (niplā’ôt, Ps 119:18, 27). Like Daniel, the scribe sits down to consult the 
books and discover their meaning (Dan 9:2) … For the scribe, reading is a source of 
revelation.79 
Adding to and corroborating Toorn’s curriculum, Sonja Schoeman claims that scribal training 
involved the use of ‘metaphors, parables, idioms, epigrams, dictums, chanting, counter-
questions, debates, allegories, riddles, stories, word association and mnemonic, whilst 
references to concrete things served to elucidate certain life principles to the students’.80 This 
technical training in interpretive skills was essential for the young scribe: 
From earliest times it was necessary for prospective scribes to receive special 
professional training. Those who were called upon daily to declare and administer the 
Law must possess not merely a superior knowledge of the Law itself, they must know 
all possible interpretations, methods of interpretation and the precedents created by 
former decisions and applications.81 
Thus, for the scribe it was reading to understand, and understanding to explicate. Tov affirms 
the view that the scribes were well-educated and well-read, leading to their reputation in 
‘religious literature’, as he refers to it, as being wise.82 
Like Toorn, Pick also quotes from Ben Sira, the Greek text of the Book of Sirach 
(Ecclesiasticus, written c. 290-280 BCE), which mentions the paramount importance of the 
study of the Hebrew Scripture by the scribes. The Greek word used here for scribes is 
γραμματεύς (grammateus), and their work was considered, to use Pick’s words, ‘the chief and 
fairest occupation’: διανοουμένου ἐν νόμῳ Ὑψίστου, σοφίαν πάντων ἀρχαίων ἐκζητήσει καὶ ἐν 
προφητείαις ἀσχοληθήσεται (Ecclesiasticus 39.1, Pick’s translation in footnote: ‘But he that 
giveth his mind to the law of the Most High, and meditateth thereon, will seek out the wisdom 
of all the elders and be occupied with prophecies’).83 The scribes of the postexilic period were, 
therefore, early grammarians of Scripture, reading and expositing the biblical genres of Law, 
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Wisdom and the Prophets. This postexilic period also gave rise to the scribal schools and 
academies, of which Jerusalem held primacy until the Roman destruction of the Jewish capital 
(70 CE), when the academic centre moved to Jamnia, on the coastal plain south of Jaffa, under 
Jochanan ben Saccai. Under Rabban Gamaliel (fl. third century CE), son of Judah the Prince, the 
seat of learning moved to Tiberias, and shortly after to Babylonia, where ‘the schools at certain 
cities on the Euphrates, Sora, Pumbaditha, and Nehardea, attained, with reference to 
[scriptural erudition], pre-eminently to high esteem’.84 The scribes formed the bridge between 
the biblical and Talmudic periods – from scribe to rabbi –emerging from the postexilic period 
into the Second Temple period and beyond. 
 
Rome, Augustine, the Talmud and the Masoretes 
 
Martin Bloomer defines the Roman understanding of grammar as ‘the rules for correct 
reading, writing, and speaking, and as the first presentation of literature … the formative stage 
in literate education’.85 A typically educated adult ‘started by reading Homer and Virgil, could 
quote from memory passages of verse, and shared a particular academic training in how to 
comment upon poetry’.86 Quintilian (c. 35–100CE), although principally a rhetorician, wrote 
extensively on grammar in his Institutio Oratoria, devoting five chapters to the subject in the 
first book. He deals with practical issues such as the grammatical mistakes of barbarisms and 
solecisms, as well as analogy and etymology.87 Francis Colson claims that the ‘five chapters 
which Quintilian has devoted to “Grammatica” are in many ways the most valuable discussion 
of the subject which we possess’; being ‘older than any other surviving account, except the 
remains of Varro De lingua Latina and the grammar of Dionysius Thrax, and this last, though 
far more complete than Quintilian in its examination of the parts of speech, has nothing that 
compares with the other chapters on analogy, etymology, etc., nor does it give so clear a view 
of ‘grammatica’ as a whole’. 88 Of the grammarian (Grammaticus), which Harold Butler 
translated as ‘teacher of literature’, Quintilian wrote: ‘Whether he speak of style or expound 
disputed passages, explain stories or paraphrase poems, everyone who hears him will profit by 
his teaching’ (I.II.14).89 He believed that ‘correct reading proceeds interpretation’, and he did 
not limit this to poetry alone, ‘every kind of writer must be carefully studied, not merely for 
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the subject matter, but for the vocabulary; for words often acquire authority from their use by 
a particular author’ (I.IV.3-4).90 His ‘golden rule’ was that the reader ‘must understand what he 
reads’ (I.VIII.2).91 For Quintilian grammar was a necessary prerequisite to the study of rhetoric, 
music, astronomy and philosophy; and, as such, was not to be trivialised:  
Unless the foundations of oratory are well and truly laid by the teaching of literature, 
the superstructure will collapse. The study of literature is a necessity … the sweet 
companion of our privacy and the sole branch of study which has more solid substance 
than display. The elementary stages of the teaching of literature must not therefore be 
despised as trivial … as the pupil gradually approaches the inner shrine of the sacred 
place, he will come to realise the intricacy of the subject … not merely to sharpen the 
wits … but to exercise even the most profound knowledge and erudition (I.IV.4-6).92 
The Latin grammar textbook of Priscian (fl. 500 CE) was, likewise, influencial. One of his 
distinctions, according to Jeffrey Huntsman, is that in his Institutiones grammaticae he utilised 
the ‘Latin classics as examples of literary and grammatical excellence’, especially Virgil.93 
Indeed, Keith Allan notes that all through Institutiones Priscian ‘makes very extensive use of 
literary examples from a range of Greek and Latin authors; most of the last 100 pages of Book 
XVIII consist of quotations from literature: literature was his corpus’.94 
Percival Cole identifies the grammatici as ‘critics as well as grammarians,’ emending 
texts, discriminating between meanings and compiling critical notes, but doing little ‘beyond 
the imitation of the Greeks’.95 The grammatici taught etymology and grammar, and also 
mythology ‘borrowed from Greece’.96 However, Han-Liang Chang argues that it is in the period 
from late Roman to the early Middle Ages that the seven liberal arts are truly formulated, 
especially in the work of Martianus Capella (c. fifth century CE) in his De Nuptiis Philologiae et 
Mercurii; and in the writings of Boethius (c. 470-524/5 CE): ‘his commentaries on or 
adaptations of Aristotle, Nicomachus, Porphyry, Euclid, Ptolemy, and Cicero.’97 Martianus 
elaborately personifies each of the arts, so that they form the characters in his allegorical tale 
wherein Mercury and philology wed. The seven arts appear as maids given to philology. The 
character of grammar explains her role, noting the changes in her historical development: ‘My 
duty in the early stages was to read and write correctly; but now there is the added duty of 
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understanding and criticizing knowledgeably.’ Reading and writing she designates as ‘active’ 
functions, whereas understanding and the ability to ‘assess what has been written’ she 
designates as ‘contemplative’ – when ‘we are engaged in the contemplation of the result’.98 
Martianus characterises grammar’s relationship to poetry and speech: ‘Letters are what I 
teach, literature is I who teach, the man of letters is the person whom I have taught, and 
literary style is the skill of a person whom I form. I claim to speak also about the nature and 
practice of poetry.’99 Moreover, grammar holds sway amongst the arts, with ‘authority in 
poetry, rhetoric, philosophy, history, mathematics, and music, all of which contribute to the 
explication of texts’.100 
Among the Church Fathers, Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) was a champion of the 
liberal arts in his day, having taught them before his conversion to Christianity, and continuing 
to do so thereafter. He unsuccessfully attempted to write a series of treatises on the liberal 
arts which included an unfinished part of his De grammatica, which he claimed to be lost.101 In 
his work, De Doctrina Christiana (On Christian Doctrine), he argued that the biblical writers 
made more use of figurative devices than can be found in the Greek tradition or anywhere else 
outside of Scripture: 
…the authors of our Scriptures use all those forms of expression which grammarians 
call by the Greek name tropes, and use them more freely and in greater variety than 
people who are unacquainted with the Scriptures, and have learnt these figures of 
speech from other writings, can imagine or believe. Nevertheless those who know 
these tropes recognize them in Scripture, and are very much assisted by their 
knowledge of them in understanding Scripture.102 
However, Augustine’s ‘treatment’ of the Scriptures in the first three books of this work has, 
according to Catherine Chin, ‘much in common with late ancient grammatical textual 
analysis’.103 She argues that Augustine ‘uses the decontextualizing and dislocating techniques 
of ancient grammatical writing to produce the opposing concepts of Christianity and paganism, 
and to locate the educated Christian subject in relation to them’.104 He advises that the use of 
tropes be learnt by the biblically ‘illiterate’, as a necessary part of learning language. Whilst 
                                                 
98
 Martianus Capella, Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal arts, Volume II: Marriage of Philology and Mercury, 
trans. William H. Stahl, Richard Johnson and Evan L. Burge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 67-68. 
99
 Capella, Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal arts, p. 68. 
100
 Catherine M. Chin, ‘The Grammarian's Spoils: De Doctrina Christiana and the Contexts of Literary Education’ in 
Karla Pollmann and Mark Vessey (eds.), Augustine and the Disciplines: From Cassiciacum to Confessions (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2007), pp. 167-183 (p. 174). 
101
 See James J. O'Donnell, Augustine, Selected Bibliography 
<www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/twayne/twaynebib.html> [accessed 13 January 2014]. For a discussion on 
Augustine’s Ars grammatica as ‘lost’, see Vivien Law, ‘St. Augustine’s “De Grammatica”: Lost and Found?’, 
Recherches augustiniennes, 19 (1984) p. 155-183. 
102
 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 3.29.40, trans. James F. Shaw (1887) 
<www.ccel.org/ccel/augustine/doctrine.xxx_2.html> [accessed 14 October 2013]. 
103
 Chin, ‘The Grammarian's Spoils’, pp. 168-169. 
104
 Chin, ‘The Grammarian's Spoils’, p. 168. 
 43
enumerating ‘allegory, enigma, and parable’ among the types of biblical trope, Augustine 
notes that they are not the sole purview of ‘liberal education’, but ‘are found even in the 
ordinary speech of men who have learnt no grammar, but are content to use the vulgar 
idiom’.105 Using the biblical story of the Israelites plundering the Egyptians as they left Egypt 
(Exodus 12), Augustine sought to utilise the liberal arts in the service of God, and grammar in 
the service of Scripture.106 Diomedes, a grammarian and contemporary of Augustine, defined 
grammar’s work as ‘the understanding of the poets’, and similarly Augustine saw it as the 
understanding of Scripture.107 Words were the ‘pre-eminent’ form of signs for Augustine: 
…since words are signs ‘whose whole use is to signify. No one uses words except to 
signify’ (1. 2. 2). Nouns, verbs, conjunctions, and the other parts of speech are the 
things that, as words, ‘have gained supremacy in signifying’; ‘all other signs are scant in 
comparison to words’ (2. 3. 4.).108 
Letters, too, were signs. On one level, letters were a necessity invented whereby ‘we can speak 
to those who are absent’.109 However, beyond this practical necessity, letters were a link in the 
manifestation of thought: ‘the letters are the signs of words, while the words themselves in 
our speech are signs of the things of which we are thinking’.110 
Brian Stock has highlighted Augustine’s interest in reading the pagan classics, going as 
far as to say that this interest gave birth to the ‘West’s first developed theory of reading’.111 In 
this regard, grammar acts as a means of interpreting the written text, as Stock demonstrates 
through an argument in Augustine’s Soliloquies: 
‘Grammar is a science which is the guardian and moderatrix of articulate speech: 
whose profession involves the necessity of collecting even all the figments of the 
human tongue, which have been committed to memory and letters, not making them 
false, but teaching and enforcing concerning these certain principles of true 
interpretation’.112 
The ‘true interpretation’ which Augustine speaks of allows the Christian reader to recognise 
the ‘falseness of a story's content while focusing on the truth of the “grammatical” principles 
involved’.113 In the City of God, Augustine ‘frequently quotes from pagan authors: particularly 
Virgil, Cicero, Sallust and, above all, Varro’ and, according to Johannes van Oort, he quotes 
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them ‘with exceptional care’.114 Augustine’s early training in grammar served him as reader 
and writer: 
Thus the training in grammar and rhetoric exerted a profound influence on Augustine. 
Every word, every turn of phrase in a text had become important for him. This is 
particularly evident in the City of God with respect to the (Latin!) classical authors, but 
it is also apparent in the works that give an interpretation of Holy Scripture. The 
meaning of each and every word and phrase was closely traced.115 
Augustine emphasised the importance of learning the language of Scripture to apprehend its 
more shrouded meaning: ‘when we have made ourselves to a certain extent familiar with the 
language of Scripture, we may proceed to open up and investigate the obscure passages, and 
in doing so draw examples from the plainer expressions to throw light upon the more obscure, 
and use the evidence of passages about which there is no doubt to remove all hesitation in 
regard to the doubtful passages’.116 In this regard, grammar is a necessary part of reading in 
Augustine’s exegesis. Chin underlines this necessity: ‘The reading practices that Augustine 
advocates for the resolution of verbal ambiguity, for example (language study, appropriate 
word division, and familiarity with a wide variety of word usages), obviously come out of the 
grammatical tradition.’117 Augustine relates the close similarity between the grammar of 
reading and the interpretation and exposition of Scripture: 
…the man who lays down rules for interpretation is like one who teaches reading, that 
is, shows others how to read for themselves. So that, just as he who knows how to 
read is not dependent on some one else, when he finds a book, to tell him what is 
written in it, so the man who is in possession of the rules which I here attempt to lay 
down, if he meet with an obscure passage in the books which he reads, will not need 
an interpreter to lay open the secret to him, but, holding fast by certain rules, and 
following up certain indications, will arrive at the hidden sense without any error, or at 
least without falling into any gross absurdity.118 
Indeed, Augustine’s checklist for the expositor of Scripture requires not only spiritual 
assistance, but also linguistic and grammatical knowledge and skill: 
The man who fears God seeks diligently in Holy Scripture for a knowledge of His will. 
And when he has become meek through piety, so as to have no love of strife; when 
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furnished also with a knowledge of languages, so as not to be stopped by unknown 
words and forms of speech, and with the knowledge of certain necessary objects, so as 
not to be ignorant of the force and nature of those which are used figuratively; and 
assisted, besides, by accuracy in the texts, which has been secured by skill and care in 
the matter of correction; – when thus prepared, let him proceed to the examination 
and solution of the ambiguities of Scripture.119 
The role accorded to grammar in the correct exposition of Scripture led Martin Irvine to call 
Augustine’s De doctrina christiana nothing less than a ‘Christian ars grammatica’.120 Moreover, 
Mark Vessey claims that grammar for Augustine ‘becomes both an engine for subverting prior 
disciplinary formations and a self-constituting divine instrument, mediating between human 
readers and the object of their desire – thus homologous (if not identical?) with Scripture, and 
with Christ.’121 Grammar was thus the reading tool for Augustine and those that followed in his 
steps. However, Augustine’s grammar is clearly informed by the Greco-Roman tradition, which 
he applies to the interpretation of Scripture. In keeping with the vast majority of patristic 
writers, he does not embrace a Jewish approach to interpretation.  
Meanwhile, the Jewish schools of Babylonia, alongside, in particular, the school of 
Tiberius and other schools in Roman Palestine, contributed to the Babylonian and Jerusalem 
Talmuds respectively.122 The period of the Talmudic schools runs from the second to the sixth 
centuries CE.123 After the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem the role of the scribes 
diminishes and fades and, in the field of exegesis, it is replaced by the sages and rabbis, the 
teachers whose influence steadily increases. Most of the works produced in this period fall into 
two main categories of legal and non-legal texts, as Alexander Samely clearly explains: 
Works mainly devoted to legal themes are called halakhic, the word halakhah meaning 
‘conduct’, and literally ‘walking’. Documents mainly concerned with nonlegal matters 
are called aggadic. While the Hebrew term aggadah means ‘tale’ or ‘telling’, the 
aggadic works are not narratives. Rather, they tend to have the format of Bible 
commentary engaging with biblical narrative.124 
The period itself also falls into two main categories, and again Samely clearly defines them for 
us: 
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Rabbinic texts are also divided according to the period of the rabbinic masters quoted 
in them. All documents which, like the Mishnah, only mention rabbinic teachers who 
lived approximately between the first and the middle of the third century CE, are 
called Tannaitic. The masters themselves are referred to as Tannaim (singular Tanna). 
All works which also mention later rabbis are referred to as Amoraic, and those 
masters are called Amoraim (singular Amora).125 
The most important works of the Amoraic period, according to Samely, are the Babylonian and 
the Jerusalem Gemaras – both arranged as commentaries on the Mishnah. The Mishnah and 
Gemara texts are ‘interlaced’, and together they form the Talmud. The Babylonian and the 
Jerusalem Talmuds both ‘share basically the same Mishnah text (with some important 
variations), but have different Gemaras.’126 
Unlike the patristic authors who shared the same historical period, and of whom we 
know so much, the compilers, authors and redactors of the Talmuds were anonymous, and 
known collectively as the Rabbis (capitalised for identity). Whilst many individual rabbis are 
named and quoted in the text, the composers of the text are not. This creates a few 
difficulties: ‘Many single statements are presented as speech of a named rabbi (‘R. X says:…’), 
but may have been reformulated by the editors; other statements are not marked as 
quotations at all. The same passage can appear in more than one work, but will often be 
adapted to fit its new literary surroundings.’127 
When Kalisch turns to the Talmud, he has only a little more to say regarding grammar 
than with the biblical period: ‘In the Talmud, grammatical disquisitions are exceedingly rare, 
though the very letters of the different Books of the Bible were counted, the various readings 
collected, and the Keri and Kethiv [the differences between what is read and what is written] 
in a great measure established.’128 Again, as was the case with the Hebrew Scriptures, there 
appears to be more evidence of grammatical discussion in the Talmud than Kalisch was aware 
of. Countering Kalisch’s conclusion, William Chomsky notes that ‘grammatical observations are 
to be found already in the Talmud’ and he gives examples from Tractate Yebamoth and 
Tractate Gittin in the Babylonian Talmud:129 
R. Nehemiah said, 'In the case of every word which requires a ‘lamed’ [ל] at the 
beginning [to indicate direction] Scripture has placed a ‘he’ [ה ] at the end; and at the 
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School of R. Ishmael the following examples were given: Elim, Elimah; Mahanayim, 
Mahanayimah; Mizrayim, Mizraimah; Dibelathaimah; Yerushalaimah; midbarah (Yeb. 
13b). 
It is indicated in the dictum of Resh Lakish, who said that [the particle] ki [ִּכי] has four 
meanings – ‘if’, ‘perhaps’, ‘but’, ‘because’ (Git. 90a). 
These examples illustrate an interest in word forms and meanings amongst the Rabbis, and the 
presentation of the forms with accompanying models is clearly didactic. David Stern offers 
another example, focusing on the use and abuse of verbal analogy (gezerah shavah): 
…in such passages as yPes 6.1 (33a), which retells the story of Hillel’s legendary 
encounter with the Bne Beterah, one observes a new studied interest in – and 
ambivalence toward – the use of gezerah shavah. This passage is the source of the 
famous rabbinic cautionary formulation, “An individual may not draw a verbal analogy 
on his own initiative,” that is, without having a prior tradition as to the authenticity of 
the verbal analogy. The very fact that the Talmud feels it necessary to caution against 
its overuse is an all but certain indication that too many individuals were drawing 
verbal analogies of this kind on their own.130 
Again, the inclusion of this illustrative story and caution points to the purpose of instructive 
grammar for the benefit of the reader. Moreover, Steven Katz notes the dual development of 
the rabbinic ‘codification of the canon of the Bible,’ and the ‘hermeneutic principles of 
interpreting it’.131 Thus, the ‘grammatological history and Jewish exegesis coincide: the … 
“standardization” of the Torah and interpretation of the Square Hebrew letters seems to have 
occurred somewhat simultaneously’.132 The Rabbis were choosing their Great Jewish Books 
and honing the art of reading them. 
The period of the Masoretic schools effectively follows on from the Talmudic period, 
running from the sixth to the ninth century CE.133 It is with the Masoretic period that Kalisch 
has more to say regarding Hebrew grammar. He believes that scholarly activity in Late 
Antiquity had ‘no other aim than scrupulously to maintain the text as it had been handed 
down to them by the latest compilers of the Old Canon’, and this was done ‘admirably’ by the 
Masorites: ‘They fixed, with the minutest care, the letters, or consonants, of the sacred 
writings … added the vowels, the accents, and the other signs.’134 This work began in the 
Babylonian schools, but also developed in the Palestinian schools too, especially in Tiberias, 
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and according to Kalisch, with ‘greater vigour and success’. The result was two distinct systems 
of vocalisation: the Babylonia and the Tiberias, and both were reportedly in use from between 
the beginning of the sixth century CE and before the end of the seventh.135 Like the 
anonymous Rabbis, Stern laments that we have ‘little exact knowledge’ about the identities or 
the history of the Masorites as an identifiable group: ‘Unfortunately, the only school for which 
we possess explicit evidence is that of Tiberias, and that because their system ultimately won 
out over the others and is represented in virtually all surviving Masoretic Bibles.’136  
Stern notes that all of the earliest surviving Hebrew codices contain ‘vocalized texts … 
with cantillation marks and the scribal notes known as the masorah’.137 Thus, the codices have 
become known as Masoretic Bibles. In the same way that the postexilic scribal tradition had an 
ancient, pre-exilic biblical history, so the ‘extraordinary scribal sophistication’ of the Masoretic 
texts demonstrates that ‘they were clearly products of a tradition of codex-production that 
must have begun centuries earlier … around the beginning of the eighth century, the date that 
scholars have given to some of the earliest undated Hebrew codices’.138 According to Stern, 
this marks a ‘watershed moment in the history of Jewish reading and its technology; indeed, 
they are our first evidence for “professional” Jewish readers of the Bible’.139 Prior to these 
codices the Torah scrolls were unpunctuated, unmarked texts, ‘however, the Hebrew text in 
the codex contains both vowels and the cantillation notes that, aside from indicating the 
liturgical chant for the text, also mark punctuation and accentuation.’140 
The most famous representative of the Tiberias system was Rabbi Aaron ben Moshe 
ben Asher (commonly Ben Asher, fl. c. 900 CE), whose work, for Pick, was the ‘connecting link’ 
between the Masoretes and the medieval Hebrew grammarians that would follow.141 
Commenting on this connection between the Masoretic schools and ‘the beginnings of 
systematic Hebrew grammar’, Stern adds that Ben Asher ‘in the early tenth century wrote 
what was probably the first Hebrew grammatical work, Sefer dikduke te‘amim, a book of rules 
concerning vocalization and accentuation deriving from masoretic notes but with the goal of 
describing a more general grammar of the language.’142 At a time when Isidore of Seville’s 
Etymologiae was entrenched as the grammar textbook of the medieval Christian world, the 
Masorete scholar, Ben Asher, produced a grammar textbook for the medieval Jewish world. 
The connecting link between the Masoretic schools and a discrete Hebrew grammar is so 
strong that they are all but synonymous with each other: ‘Indeed, before grammar had fully 
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established itself as a separate and independent discipline in the late tenth century, the two – 
masorah and grammar – may have been all but indistinguishable.’143 For Stern, the 
contribution of the Masoretes to exegesis and the art of reading cannot be emphasised 
enough: ‘they are codifying the reading tradition and its practice, but they are also reading the 
biblical text, and reading it in a new way that has no precedent in Jewish culture’.144 The 
Masorites provided a visual aid to reading, by literally marking the way for the reading and 
guiding the reader through the text. If there had been an emphasis on hearing the Scriptures, 
the synagogue recitation, the scribal preclusion, then the Masoretic Bible provided a key back 
into reading. 
 
The Etymologiae of Isidore and Rabbinic Midrash 
 
Isidore of Seville (c. 560–636 CE) produced one of the most influential works on the liberal arts 
in the medieval period, the Etymologiae sive origins; of which grammar, his primary interest, 
accounted for over forty per cent.145 Indeed, the Etymologiae was, according to Stephen 
Barney, et al, ‘arguably the most influential book, after the Bible, in the learned world of the 
Latin West for nearly a thousand years’.146 His text is essentially derived from Donatus,147 but 
Brehaut believes it likely that his ‘working library contained works of the following authors: 
Lactantius, Tertullian, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Orosius, Cassiodorus, Suetonius, Pliny, 
Solinus, Hyginus, Sallust, Hegesippus, the abridger of Vitruvius, Servius, the scholia on Lucan, 
and Justinus’.148 Irvine places Isidore in a ‘self-conscious textual community which defined 
itself with the methodology of grammatica’.149 His work was not only widely read, but it 
realised the aspirations of Augustine two centuries before him, for grammar in the service of 
God: 
Isidore was the last polymath of the Hellenistic-Roman grammatical tradition, fulfilling 
Augustine's prescription in De doctrina christiana that an exegete should be a Christian 
Varro, applying an encyclopedic textual knowledge to the study of the Scriptures and 
Christian literature. He was able to apply the Augustinian model of grammatica as the 
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discipline devoted to language and texts at every level from elementary literacy to 
exegesis to the needs of the textual community of the monastery and cathedral.150 
What was this textual community? Isidore’s audience, according to Irvine, was ‘a community of 
exegetes, scribes and readers that require training in the main divisions of grammatica – lectio, 
emendatio, enarratio – as the foundation of monastic lectio and exegesis’.151 
For Isidore, grammar was the ‘source and foundation of literature’.152 He placed great 
import on the ‘common letters of the alphabet’; they were the ‘primary elements of the art of 
grammar’.153 Letters were representative: ‘tokens of things, the signs of words, and they have 
so much force that the utterances of those who are absent speak to us without a voice, [for 
they present words through the eyes, not through the ears]’.154 They also had a mnemonic 
property: 
The use of letters was invented for the sake of remembering things, which are bound 
by letters lest they slip away into oblivion. With so great a variety of information, not 
everything could be learned by hearing, nor retained in the memory.155 
Letters and words, therefore, were indispensable to memory and history. They were the 
means by which the past could be recounted, not just in the personal history of days (diarium), 
months (kalendarium) and years (annales), but in the epic histories of peoples and nations too: 
Indeed, among the ancients no one would write a history unless he had been present 
and had seen what was to be written down, for we grasp with our eyes things that 
occur better than what we gather with our hearing, since what is seen is revealed 
without falsehood. This discipline has to do with Grammar, because whatever is 
worthy of remembrance is committed to writing. And for this reason, histories are 
called ‘monuments’ (monumentum), because they grant a remembrance (memoria) of 
deeds that have been done.156 
History was an important part of literature and learning in Isidore’s schema, and not to be 
looked down upon in the genres of reading: 
Histories of peoples are no impediment to those who wish to read useful works, for 
many wise people have imparted the past deeds of humankind in histories for the 
instruction of the living. Through history they handle a final reckoning back through 
seasons and years, and they investigate many indispensable matters through the 
succession of consuls and kings.157 
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Isidore has in mind here national and royal histories, both pagan and Christian, with Moses 
taking pre-eminence amongst the historians, as the chronicler of creation itself.158 
Isidore  subdivided grammar into thirty groups: ‘namely, eight parts of speech, the 
articulate voice, the letter, the syllable, metrical feet, accent, marks of punctuation, signs and 
abbreviations, orthography, analogy, etymology, glosses, synonyms, barbarisms, solecisms, 
[other] faults, metaplasms, schemata, tropes, prose, metres, fables, histories’.159 However, as a 
Christian theologian and biblicist, Isidore located the origins of language in the Hebrew of the 
Scriptures: 
Latin and Greek letters have evidently come from the Hebrew. For among the latter 
aleph was first so named; then [judging] by the similarity of sound it was transmitted 
to the Greeks as alpha; likewise to the Latins as a. For the borrower fashioned the 
letter of the second language according to similarity of sound, so that we can know 
that the Hebrew language is the mother of all languages and alphabets.160 
Marcel Simon notes that the Spanish patristic authors, such as Isidore, distinguish themselves 
‘from the rest of the Western literature of this type by the more accurate knowledge they 
display, not only of Judaism and its institutions but of the Hebrew language’.161 This would 
account for Isidore’s familiarity with the Hebrew alphabet, and perhaps why he gives it the 
ascendancy over Greek and Latin. In the sixth book of the Etymologiae, Isidore shows off his 
extensive knowledge of the Hebrew Scriptures, Jewish feasts and practices with in-depth 
analysis of the canon, transliterated words and traditions. Günter Stemberger rightly argues 
that as a later patristic writer, Isidore’s evident knowledge of Jewish interpretation would have 
depended principally upon Jerome, and his higher view of Hebrew.162 
Letters were imbued with hidden symbolic and instructive meaning – the very word 
littera was itself a prime example, concealed within it is iter (a road), because letters ‘provide a 
road’ for the reader. 163 Individual letters had their own story to tell. Isidore recounts the 
origins and significance of the Pythagorean ϒ, which was representative of ‘human life’, the 
‘lower stem signifies the first stage of life, an uncertain age indeed, which has not yet given 
itself to vices or to virtues’, whilst the ‘branching into two, which is above, begins with 
adolescence: the right part of it is arduous, but leads toward a blessed life; the left is easier, 
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but leads to death and destruction’.164 Whilst his interpretation closely parallels the parable of 
the narrow and wide gates in the Gospel of Matthew (7:13-14), Isidore turns to the Roman 
Stoic Persius to underline the moral point: ‘Concerning this Persius (Satires 3.56) speaks thus: 
And where the letter has spread out into Samian branches it has shown you the way that rises 
by means of the right-hand path.’165 
ϒ, signifying human life, was the first of ‘five mystical letters among the Greeks’, 
according to Isidore. The second (standing as the antithesis of the first) is Θ, signifying death, 
because ‘the judges used to put this same letter down against the names of those whom they 
were sentencing to execution’. Its name ‘theta’ derives from ‘the term Θάνατος, that is, 
“death” … [having] a spear through the middle, that is, a sign of death’.166 Signs appear to 
transcend particular alphabets and languages, as Isidore attempts to demonstrate with the 
third mystical letter: 
The third, Τ, shows the figure of the cross of the Lord, whence it is also interpreted as a 
symbol in Hebrew. Concerning this letter, it was said to an angel in Ezekiel (9:4): “Go 
through the midst of Jerusalem, and mark a thau upon the foreheads of the men that 
sigh, and mourn.”167 
Here, the letter ‘thau’ is used in the Latin Vulgate translation from the Hebrew word for ‘mark’, 
 ,taw).168 Interestingly) ת ,taw), corresponding with the final letter of the Hebrew alphabet) תו
however, the Greek Septuagint translated the Hebrew word for ‘mark’ with the Greek word 
σημειον (shmeion),169 rather than use the letter thau. Theology and grammar intertwine, as 
Isidore gives Christological significance to both the Latin and Hebrew alphabets. 
With the other two mystical letters, Isidore continues the Christological theme, 
drawing specifically from the self-appellations which Christ uses in the Book of Revelation: 
The remaining two mystical letters, the first and the last, Christ claims for himself; 
himself the beginning, himself the end, he says (Apocalypse 22:13): “I am Alpha and 
Omega,” for by moving towards each other in turn, Α rolls on all the way to Ω, and Ω 
bends back to Α, so that the Lord might show in himself both the movement of the 
beginning to the end, and the movement of the end to the beginning.170 
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These examples add Greek to the Latin and Hebrew, as languages and alphabets that have 
divinely mystical properties. Isidore reinforces this view in the ninth book of the Etymologiae: 
There are three sacred languages – Hebrew, Greek, and Latin – which are preeminent 
throughout the world. On the cross of the Lord the charge laid against him was written 
at Pilate’s command in these three languages (John 19:20). Hence – and because of 
the obscurity of the Sacred Scriptures – a knowledge of these three languages is 
necessary, so that, whenever the wording of one of the languages presents any doubt 
about a name or an interpretation, recourse may be had to another language.171 
Thus, these sacred languages add an extra deeper level of significance to words and texts as 
the reader encounters them. 
Isidore notes that the Greek alphabet has a numerical value assigned to each of the 
letters: ‘they use the letter alpha as the number ‘one’ … when they write beta, they mean 
‘two’; when they write gamma, they mean ‘three’ … when they write delta, they mean ‘four’ in 
their numbers – and so every letter corresponds to a number for the Greeks.172 However, he 
points out that Latin does not follow suit: ‘Latin speakers, however, do not assign numbers to 
the letters, but only use them to form words, with the exception of the letters I, and X, which 
both signifies the cross by its shape, and stands for the number ten.’173 Again, Isidore finds 
theological significance in the Latin letter X, remarking on its cross-like shape while giving its 
numerical value. Ben Tilghman warns against any understanding of Isidore’s interpretations as 
being widespread or common: ‘Isidore’s text should not be taken for some sort of an 
iconographic handbook for interpreting the shapes of letters: I do not know of any examples of 
the ϒ or Θ used in the manner he describes.’174 Nevertheless, the uses of Τ and X were 
common in medieval representations of the cross and the crucifixion of Christ, both as signs 
and in art.175 
In the seventh book of Etymologiae, Isidore gives the interpretation and etymological 
meaning of Hebrew names for God and for many of the characters within the Hebrew 
Scriptures (as well as New Testament characters). Likewise, he frequently draws upon the 
Hebrew biblical canon, alongside the Greek classics, to illustrate grammatical parts of speech. 
For example, he uses the Book of Judges to differentiate between riddles and allegories: 
A riddle (aenigma) is an obscure question that is difficult to solve unless it is explained, 
as this (Judges 14:14): “Out of the eater came forth food, and out of the strong came 
forth sweetness,” meaning that a honeycomb was taken from the mouth of a (dead) 
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lion. Between allegory and the riddle there is this difference, that the force of allegory 
is twofold and figuratively indicates one subject under the guise of other subjects, 
while a riddle merely has an obscure meaning, and its solution is hinted at through 
certain images.176 
Isidore’s grammar is set in a literary context, so that not only is one meant to be able to 
differentiate between the technical aspects of riddle and allegory, and understand their 
function abstractly; but one is also able to differentiate between them and understand their 
function when encountering them in the text, as the reader. 
In the first book, he lists and describes various tropes or ‘modes of speech’, including 
metaphor (metaphora, ‘an adopted transference of some word ... veiled in figural garb with 
respect to what should be understood, so that they may exercise the reader’s 
understanding’);177 allegory (allegoria, ‘“other-speech” … for it literally says one thing, and 
another thing is understood’); proverb (paroemia, ‘a proverb appropriate to the subject or 
situation’); and similitude (homoeosis, ‘that by which the description of some less known thing 
is made clear by something better known which is similar to it’).178 Whilst the tropes are part 
of a theoretical, technical grammar, they also serve in the literary context. Metaphors, 
allegories, proverbs, parables and similitudes play no small part in Isidore’s reading – whether 
in Scripture or the Greek classics. This he demonstrates in dealing with the genre of fable: 
…there are fables with a moral, as in Horace a mouse speaks to a mouse, and a weasel 
to a little fox, so that through an imaginary story a true meaning may be applied to the 
story’s action. Whence also Aesop’s fables are the kind told for the purpose of a moral, 
just as in … Judges (9:8) the trees seek a king for themselves and speak to the olive 
tree, the fig tree, the grape vine, and the bramble-bush. The whole story is made up 
especially for the moral, so that we arrive at the matter that is intended with the true 
meaning, though, to be sure, by means of a made-up narrative.179 
Aesop and the Book of Judges sit side-by-side in Isidore’s literary world, sharing the same 
space to illustrate how the moral fable works. Ancient pagan and Hebrew stories are fused 
effortlessly, as if brought to heel by the Christian Isidore.180 Indeed, he quotes from one 
hundred and fifty-four authors in the Etymologiae: alongside Aesop, Christian and biblical 
sources, we find ‘Anacreon, Apuleius, Aristotle, Boëthius, Caesar, Cato, Catullus, Celsus, Cicero, 
Demosthenes, Ennius, Herodotus, Hesiod, Homer, Horace, Juvenal, Livy, Lucan, Lucretius, 
Martial, Ovid, Persius, Pindar, Plato, Plautus, Pliny, Quintilian, Sallust, Suetonius, Terence, 
                                                 
176
 Isidore, The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, p. 63. 
177
 Isidore, The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, p. 60. 
178
 Isidore, The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, pp. 63-64. 
179
 Isidore, The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, p. 67. 
180
 For a discussion on Isidore’s use of Aesop’s Fables see Edward Wheatley, Mastering Aesop: Medieval Education, 
Chaucer, and His Followers (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2000) pp. 40-41, 49. 
 55
Varro, Virgil’.181 Whilst the Greek and Roman classics are freely called upon, the biblical 
sources have the majority say amongst the theologian’s authorities, even in the realm of 
grammar, as John Henderson, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, points out: 
…verse is celebrated in a detailed roll-call of types and associated genres, before 
Moses (in Deuteronomy) wins the competition for overall (viz. hexametric) primacy, 
then David, Solomon, Jeremiah, and Proba wife of Adelphus win their special events. 
Moses (Genesis) will win the prize for prose, too, but not before the poets have been 
tarred with Fabulation, whether for fun, for picturing reality, or for telling morals, as in 
Aesop (and in the Book of Judges).182 
Henderson is referring to Isidore’s preference for the ‘heroic’ hexametric meter, which he 
considers to be the earliest and most important (recounting the ‘deeds of heroes’): 
Moses is shown to have composed this meter first in his song in Deuteronomy 
(Deuteronomy 32–33) long before Pherecydes and Homer. Whence it appears that the 
practice of poetry is more ancient among the Hebrews than among the pagans, seeing 
that Job, a contemporary of Moses, also took up hexameter verse, with its dactyl and 
spondee.183 
Moses is followed by David, and is given the accolade of first hymn writer: ‘It is clear that David 
the prophet first composed and sang hymns (hymnus) in praise of God.’184 David’s son, 
Solomon, is then credited as being the first composer of wedding songs (epithalamium), with 
his Song of Songs, which was then appropriated by the pagans. Isidore follows Christian 
tradition in ascribing the Book of Lamentations to the prophet Jeremiah, the first to compose 
‘the threnody (threnos), which is called ‘lament’ (lamentum) in Latin’.185 
In Isidore’s grammar, we see an interdependent relationship between the written and 
read language, between the texts and the techniques – the texts provide the instances 
whereby he endeavours to demonstrate the modes of speech, whilst the techniques (the 
operational modes) help the reader understand what is written before them. It is not so 
surprising that Isidore’s grammar was ‘the source and foundation of literature’ when we 
consider that Isidore’s life was so focused on text, as Irvine correctly points out:  
The thoroughly textual function of grammatica for Isidore's community of monks and 
fellow bishops is indicated throughout Isidore’s works. The monastic life was based on 
reading (lectiones) and discussions (disputationes) or conferences (collationes) with 
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other members of the community. In the monastic rule he wrote for Seville, Isidore 
prescribes three hours of reading per day as well as a period when the community 
would meet to discuss problems posed by divina lectio, and the abbot was to explain 
difficult passages for everyone.186 
Indeed, Irvine makes a strong argument that Isidore’s grammatica in Etymologiae is not ‘the 
science of speaking correctly’, as Isidore defines it, but the grammatica of texts and textual 
language.187 In this context, therefore, grammar was inseparable from the reading of the word, 
especially the book which Isidore considered the Word. Whilst Isidore arguably comes closest 
amongst the Church fathers to an appreciation of Hebrew in his grammar, like Augustine, he 
gave no place to Jewish interpretive techniques or tradition. Instead, these influential patristic 
writers helped shape Christian reading and exegesis – and its resultant theology – in Late 
Antiquity, drawing on the Western classical tradition: the voices of Athens and Rome without 
Jerusalem. 
Whilst the exegesis of the Church Fathers drew upon Greco-Roman influences, the 
exegesis of the Rabbis was expressed through midrash. The semantic development of midrash 
within the Hebrew Scriptures begins, according to Craig Evans, with the verb daras or drash 
 as it (מדרש) to seek or inquire, e.g. 1 Samuel 9:9; 1 Kings 22:8). It changes to midrash ,דרש)
appears in 2 Chronicles 13:22 (‘written in the Midrash of the Prophet Iddo’) and 24:27 (‘written 
in the Midrash of the Book of the Kings’), where the emphasis is on seeking or inquiring 
scripturally by means of a ‘story’ or ‘commentary’.188 He notes that from Ezra’s ‘searching’ of 
the Law (Ezra 7:10), it is ‘only a small step’ to the subsequent, and unambiguous references to 
exegetical midrash.189 In Antiquity, midrash became the name for both a body of rabbinic 
commentaries on the Scriptures (a genre) and a method of rabbinic hermeneutics (an 
approach). Whilst both meanings are connected – the hermeneutics appear in the 
commentaries – they are also independent of one another (the commentaries are closed 
historically, whereas the midrashic method is still employed by exegetes). Usually with a 
capitalised first letter, Midrash is used to denote a commentary (Midrashim in the plural). 
Combined, there are well over thirty halakhik (essentially legal) and aggadic (essentially 
nonlegal) Midrashim (over two thirds are aggadic). Many are exegetical commentaries on 
specific books of Scripture, including Mekilta (Exodus); Sifra to Leviticus; Sifre to Numbers; 
Sifre to Deuteronomy; Bereshit Rabbah (Genesis); Ekah Rabbati (Lamentations); Shir ha-Shirim 
Rabbah (Song of Songs); Ruth Rabbah; Ḳohelet Rabbah (Ecclesiastes); and Esther Rabbah. Both 
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meanings of Midrash are vast in the areas they cover, and so for the purpose of this study each 
will be treated separately but briefly, beginning with the Midrashim. 
As with the Talmudic texts, there is a question mark hanging over the date and 
authorship of the Midrashim – they were not preserved as homogeneous texts. Günter 
Stemberger raises the issues of dating rabbinic writings and ascribing authorship. The relevant 
criteria are, for the most part, subjective, and so dating becomes a hypothetical pursuit.190 
Thus, it is only possible to attempt the dating of final redactions of rabbinic writings rather 
than the traditions they contain, which may or may not predate the written text.191 
Stemberger rightly argues that any ‘notion of authorship’ is by and large inadequate when 
dealing with rabbinic writings, because they ‘tend to be composite works, incorporating earlier 
texts which are normally edited before being re-used’.192 Recognising quotation is also 
problematic when the names ascribed to rabbinic writings vary significantly during the period 
of Late Antiquity and beyond. One name could be assigned to different writings, or quotations 
may have come from similar but different sources.193 A single text may contain ‘different 
linguistic layers’ or even an intentionally archaic style.194 However, a solution to these 
problems can be found in the final redaction: ‘the personality of the redactor can primarily be 
perceived in the selection, order and treatment of the citations … the redactor assembles the 
citations to correspond to his own objective, and argues with them as though they were his 
own words.’195 Stemberger also highlights the puzzle created by the use of rabbis’ names in 
rabbinic texts. For example, pseudepigraphy is ‘more acute the later a narrative or dictum first 
appears: very different reasons may account for putting certain words into a rabbi’s mouth 
after the event’.196 In addition, it was not unusual for several rabbis to share the same name, 
especially where there is no reference to the father’s name.197 The Rabbis’ biographies were 
not accurate firsthand accounts, but rather most were written much later for the purpose of 
teaching and encouraging, or for the partisan support of patriarchates or political 
institutions.198 It is difficult to ascribe an accurate authorship and date to the Midrashim, there 
is the problem of attributions. The texts could be the result of collaboration over an 
indeterminate period of time. The authorship of the Midrashim remains essentially 
anonymous, but they are likely to have been redacted by one or more editors. 
                                                 
190
 Günter Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 2
nd








 Stemberger, Introduction, p. 47. 
195
 Stemberger, Introduction, p. 55. 
196




 Stemberger, Introduction, p. 61. 
 58 
Jacob Neusner, however, takes a different view from Stemberger. He defines 
Midrashim as compilations of rabbinic exegesis from the first six centuries C.E.199 He does not 
believe that the Midrashim were redacted compilations of an immense body of pre-existent 
materials which evenly covered the biblical text. Instead, he argues that the decision by the 
compilers to assemble a Midrash preceded the actual compilation process: ‘only then, did they 
collect, borrow, and also determine to make up appropriate materials’.200 Neusner concludes 
that the ‘compositors wanted to say some one thing in response to the one book they selected 
for their agglutinative pretext … a single theme and a single message concerning that 
theme’.201 However, Catherine Hezser rightly takes issue with Neusner’s belief in a singular 
theme: ‘rabbinic literature must be seen as a collective rather than an authorial literature, 
transmitting a wide variety of partly divergent and contradictory views and teachings’.202 She 
finds fault with Neusner’s refusal to follow a tradition’s transmissional history to see where 
editorial changes took place: 
It is reasonable to assume that the traditions incorporated into rabbinic documents 
underwent a number of stages of transmission and that the editors consciously 
reworked and adapted earlier material to the respective literary contexts … one 
cannot simply dismiss the question of transmissional and redactional changes, even if 
the ‘original’ form of a tradition is irrecoverable.203 
Irving Jacobs also argues that the Midrashim developed out of a redaction process: ‘Although it 
is generally accepted that the material preserved in our extant midrashic works is derived from 
homilies and expositions which were actually delivered to live audiences in the ancient 
synagogues and study houses of the Holy Land, it is extremely unlikely that these have been 
preserved in an unedited form.’204 Thus, the traditions in the Midrashim may have begun as 
oral traditions spoken, heard and learnt in the synagogue and Beit Midrash (the house of 
learning). Charlotte Fonrobert and Martin Jaffee bring together the perspectives of 
Stemberger, Hezser and Jacobs, to form an articulate consensus view: 
There is virtually no passage in the rabbinic corpus of which we can confidently state 
that “it was written in such and such a year, in such and such a place, by such and such 
an individual.” At best, individual passages of rabbinic literature can be dated, on the 
basis of redactional-critical and tradition-critical criteria, in a merely relative sense … 
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To complicate matters, most texts have a prehistory as orally circulated texts, and may 
have been edited orally.205 
Moreover, even the methods behind the production of the extant copies of rabbinic texts 
remain uncertain: ‘We know next to nothing about the last generation(s) of sages who edited 
the vast quantities of textual material and gave it the approximate shape in which the 
manuscripts have come down to us’, because they ‘successfully blurred the historical traces of 
their production’.206 Thus, the Midrashim of Late Antiquity are the product of anonymous 
editing. 
Gary Porton distinguishes between midrashic and nonmidrashic statements amongst 
the writings of the Rabbis. Thus, the first collection of rabbinic teachings in the first and second 
centuries CE, the Mishnah, contains a good deal of material based on the Hebrew Scriptures 
and he is in ‘no doubt that the framers of Mishnah knew [Scripture] and believed that they 
were producing a document that somehow was based on it’. However, the difference is that 
the ‘Mishnah seldom explicitly refers to the biblical verse upon which its statements are based 
or to the scriptural text from which its laws are derived’ and is, therefore mostly nonmidrashic. 
Indeed, most of the Mishnah’s statements ‘seem to consciously avoid drawing a clear 
relationship between themselves and the Bible’.207 Context, therefore, determines whether a 
statement is midrashic or nonmidrashic. Mishnaic remarks that do not refer to a biblical verse 
or passage are nonmidrashic, but if the same remarks in the same form appear in a Midrash, 
‘juxtaposed to a specific biblical verse,’ the remarks become midrashic: ‘The defining 
characteristic of a midrashic statement is its explicit relationship (real or constructed) and 
formal juxtaposition to the biblical text’.208 
Porton helpfully breaks down the structure of the Midrashim. Each Midrash – each 
individual commentary – is a collection of ‘independent units whose sequential or thematic 
arrangements are the work of the editors’. Each independent unit – each individual pericope 
or statement – is unlikely to have been part of a ‘consecutive’ biblical commentary. Each 
biblical unit – each verse – often has ‘more than one comment’; thus, ‘Several synonymous, 
complementary, or contradictory remarks may appear in connection with a single verse, word, 
or letter.’209 The exegetes of the Midrashim employed grammatical, logical and rhetorical 
techniques, however they did so in much the same way that Augustine and Isidore did, in the 
service to God’s divine revelation: 
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Because the rabbis believed that the Bible was the accurate and complete public 
record of a direct revelation from the One, Only, and Perfect God to His people, 
nothing in the Bible could be frivolous. Every element of the text – every letter, every 
verse, every phrase – was important and written as it was for specific reasons. The 
Bible contained no needless expressions, no “mere” repetitions, and no superfluous 
words or phrases. If something appeared to be superfluous, repetitious, or needless, it 
had to be explained and interpreted in order to demonstrate that this was not the 
case.210 
In this way, Scripture is broken down into almost elemental properties to extract every 
potency of significance. As Samely rightly states, ‘fragments or segments of Scripture are 
treated as if they could contain the divine author's meaning to the same degree as the whole 
of Scripture’.211 Each word of God alone is imbued with the same energy as all the words of 
God together. The divine nature of the words keeps them from losing potency when separated 
from the context of the sentence or passage. Where we might think of a coal taken from the 
fire soon losing its heat and turning cold, while the fire continues to roar; the divine word 
taken from its context continues to glow and burn undiminished, with all of the heat and light 
of the fire from which it came. Thus, Samely asserts that ‘[even] if a verse is separated from its 
context, and thereby given a new topic, it is seen as retaining its power to reveal’. 
The midrashic segment or fragment or element of Scripture – the divine coal – forms 
what Samely calls a ‘micro-Scripture’. These preserve the ‘authority and veracity of the word of 
God’: 
Indeed, the segments are created as if they were so many divine answers to individual 
rabbinic questions, or divine turn-takings in a conversation with the rabbis. The licence 
to create micro-Scripture includes all linguistic levels, from the individual letter, word, 
phrase, clause, to a whole verse. Letters can be combined to new words, or given a 
new vocalization.’212 
The micro-Scripture allows for both uniqueness and polyvalence in the semantics of grammar, 
so that signs, words, sentences and stories can all be considered in isolation, or can be given 
multiple meanings, multiple contexts and multiple connections. 
As a result, the biblical text as a continuum of graphic (and other) signs becomes, 
strictly speaking, inexhaustible. Some rabbis express this as the ‘seventy faces of 
Torah’, or by saying: ‘Turn it [i.e. Torah] and turn it, for all is in it’ (Mishnah Avot 
5:22).’213 
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Stern, likewise, locates the primary focus of midrashic exegesis in verses and, moreover, in 
‘details in verses, rather than … passages or chapters or continuous narratives or other larger 
literary units’.214 For the Rabbis then, God, it seems, and not the devil, is in the detail. 
Stern claims that ‘the most famous feature’ of Midrash is ‘polysemy, the midrashic 
predilection for offering multiple interpretations of a single verse or phrase,’ and he suggests 
that this may be a result of the ‘aural reception of the text’ – in other words, the result of 
multiple hearings. To support this suggestion, he offers a rabbinic explanation: 
Abbaye said: The verse says: “Once (aḥat) God has spoken, but twice (shetayim) I have 
heard” (Ps. 62:12) [which Abbaye understands as saying, “One thing God has spoken 
but two I have heard,” thus meaning:] A single verse has several senses, but no two 
verses ever hold the same meaning. (bSan 34a)’215 
Samely and Stern give us two possible reasons for the polysemy in Midrash – for Samely it is 
the divine nature of words that give multiple meaning and interpretation, whilst for Stern, it is 
the multiple hearings which give rise to the diversity of meaning. In truly midrashic style, it is 
possible to say that both of these reasons are valid and not mutually exclusive. The one 
difference, however, that comes to mind, and which may have swayed the Rabbis towards the 
first reason, is that the capacity for multiple hearings is ultimately finite (twice in Abbaye’s 
reckoning), whereas the divine nature of words is not. Even if a rabbi were granted eternity to 
listen to the multiple hearings, he would still be limited to one at a time. The divine nature 
knows no such limits, the multiple meanings are free to emanate one at a time and/or 
simultaneously. 
Saul Lieberman addresses the intertextual nature of midrashic interpretation, whereby 
the Rabbis explained the ‘Bible by the Bible’. This enabled them to establish the meaning of 
one text from another or, where a word has different meanings in different texts, they could 
select one meaning over another, carrying that meaning over to other contexts where the 
word appears. Lieberman demonstrates with the following example: 
Indeed the verb פסח [pacach, Exod. 12:23] certainly means to step over, to skip, but 
from the Prophets [Isa. 31:5] the Rabbis proved that it also signified to protect … Since 
the word has two meanings, they preferred the one which suited the context best.216 
The idea of interpreting the Bible by the Bible has a parallel in the Western grammatical 
tradition too, used by the Rabbis’ Christian patristic counterparts. For example, Origen often 
used the intertextual principle referred to as ‘Homer interpreting Homer’ and ‘Aristotle 
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interpreting Aristotle’.217 William Yarchin also highlights midrashic intertextual interpretations 
in the Psalms of David, as well as in ‘texts from all the scriptural authors’, rendering ‘the whole 
of the biblical canon … as a self-interpreting text through intertextual illumination’: 
Midrash … almost always involved the establishing of connections between biblical 
texts by any of a number of linkages: philological, paronomastic, thematic, numeric, 
historical – almost any basis could be employed to shed light from one biblical text 
upon another. As the supremely abiding gift from God to Israel, the midrashically 
interpreted Torah was so fully infused with teaching potential that combinations of its 
elements could endlessly yield insight and understanding.’218 
The endless nature of interpretation in the Midrashim creates problems for those who seek 
closure in their exegesis, especially in worldviews that demand resolution through singular, 
linear or monochromatic outcomes (e.g. the historical-grammatical method). The Midrashim 
fly in the face of such demands, as Yarchin clearly states: ‘Classical Jewish interpretation 
repudiates the notion that understanding is coterminous with final graspability and synthesis. 
Rather, understanding the Bible more authentically resides, perhaps strangely, in the 
uncertainty of its interpretation, never fully finished.’219 
One final characteristic of the Midrashim (though there are many more) is that the 
Rabbis turn the central characters of Scripture into midrashic exegetes. Yarchin gives the 
example of Solomon, who, ‘as (traditionally) the author of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song 
of Songs, appears in rabbinic discussion as not only a writer of Scripture but also an inspired 
authority who in his biblical writings interprets the Torah’. Yarchin quotes from the Midrash to 
the Song of Songs: 
He [Solomon] pondered the words of the Torah and investigated [the meaning of] the 
words of the Torah. He made handles to the Torah … R. Jose said: Imagine a big basket 
full of produce without any handle, so that it could not be lifted, till one clever man 
came and made handles to it, and then it began to be carried by the handles. So till 
Solomon arose no one could properly understand the words of the Torah, but when 
Solomon arose, all began to comprehend the Torah (Song of Songs Rabbah 1.1.8).220 
In the example given, the Rabbis transform Solomon, in the words of Daniel Boyarin, into a 
‘sort of protorabbi’.221 Obviously, transforming the biblical characters into exegetes adds 
greater authority to the work of the midrashist, whilst creating a back-story to the tradition. 
Whilst it may potentially blur the lines between the classic texts and the interpreters of those 
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texts, it perhaps establishes more parity between the Rabbis and the scribes of old (who had 
their models – their proto-scribes – in the likes of Ezra and Daniel). 
 
Midrash as a Reading Method 
  
With regard to midrash as an exegetical method, it is a fitting and comprehensive term, 
literally meaning ‘search’ and ‘inquiry’.222 Isaac Gottlieb states that the ‘foremost task’ of 
midrash is to interpret the text of the Scriptures: ‘Generally, the explication of difficult words 
lies at the root of these interpretations.’ He believes that these midrashic word explanations 
‘can be found in the writings of the earliest grammarians’.223 However, Porton rightly cautions 
against a too simplistic definition, arguing that ‘[even] to those familiar with Hebrew 
terminology, the word “midrash” has a variety of connotations’, having ‘been used to describe 
biblical interpretations or exegesis, sermons, and haggadic (nonlegal) discussions’.224 Thus, to 
try and understand the methodology of midrash, as a technique, requires cautious treading, 
and this survey of the method will be far from complete. 
Neusner divides midrash into three categories: paraphrase, prophecy and parable. In 
paraphrasing Scripture, the interpreter would revise the meaning of the text, bringing new 
significance through additional words or phrases; as prophecy, Scripture was used to interpret 
imminent events; and as parable, Scripture was read in other terms than those spoken by the 
scriptural writer.225 Through the mediums of paraphrase, prophecy and parable the ‘sages 
mediated between God’s Word and their own world’, whilst ‘equally and reciprocally invoking 
the one as a metaphor for the other’.226 Thus, by interpreting the Hebrew Scriptures in this 
way, the midrashist purposed to discover a ‘pertinent rule or theological truth’.227 As a result, 
Neusner argues that midrash works in three dimensions: ‘as explanation of meaning imputed 
to particular verses of Scripture; …as a mode of stating important propositions, syllogisms of 
thought, in conversation with verses or sustained passages of Scripture; and, …as a way of 
retelling scriptural stories that imparts new immediacy to those stories’.228 
To consider midrash from a grammatical perspective it may be helpful to look at a 
number of maxims, followed by some sets of rules or middot, that have been laid down by the 
Rabbis. Samely notes a ‘metahermeneutic’ maxim credited to R. Ishmael (fl. second century 
CE): ‘“The Torah speaks (like) the [ordinary] language of man” (Sifre Numbers § 112). This looks 
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like a general principle, but is capable of a number of interpretations’.229 Samely’s comment 
immediately demonstrates the complexity of midrash – is it accessible to all, can anyone 
become a midrashist? Or is it that the work of the true midrashist speaks to all comers? Is this 
an invitation to all to read Torah? Or is it an invitation to hear Torah? Samely follows this with 
another example: ‘Even more obscure is the maxim, “A [biblical] verse does not lose its 
peshat” (e.g. Bavli Shabbat 63a).’ Samely’s comments on the maxim are as follows: 
The term peshat, when used of biblical words, could perhaps be literally rendered as 
‘flat meaning’. So far as we can tell, it seems to have referred to the ‘traditionally 
accepted meaning’ rather than the ‘plain/literal meaning’. In any case, it is unknown 
how the maxim relates historically to the vast number of actual rabbinic 
interpretations.230 
These maxims appear to be getting at something, but as Samely’s comments reveal, what 
exactly they are getting at is not so clear. If he is correct in defining the Rabbis’ use of peshat 
as representing the ‘traditionally accepted meaning’, then the maxim is less helpful without 
knowledge of the traditionally acceptable and, of course, that tradition is subject to change 
and variance through the time, space and experience of historically vast numbers of rabbinic 
exegetes. If peshat stands for the alternative, the plain/literal meaning, then it is perhaps 
slightly more helpful – there is a greater possibility for consensus as to what constitutes literal 
– as a biblical verse cannot be divorced from its literal meaning. However, the experience of 
thousands of years of Judeo-Christian exegesis tells us that many verses are often divorced 
from their literal meanings, quite acrimoniously and irreconcilably. Yarchin, commenting on 
the latter maxim, notes that most Jewish interpreters, ‘particularly in the haggadic or homiletic 
traditions but also in halakic or legal exegesis as well’, were less concerned with the peshat, 
focusing their attention instead on the ‘derived meaning (derash, from the same root as for 
midrash)’.231 
As well as the hermeneutical maxims (which may or may not have been that helpful), 
there were three lists of interpretive rules (also known as middot) from the rabbinic period. In 
chronological order, the first list of seven middot is ascribed to Hillel (c. 32 BCE – 7 CE) and 
appears within Tosefta Sanhedrin (7: 11); whilst the second list of thirteen middot is ascribed 
to R. Ishmael (he of the first maxim above), and appears in the preface to Sifra. The third and 
most extensive list – the thirty-two middot – is ascribed to R. Eliezer b. Jose ha-Gelili (c. second 
century CE), but is ‘probably from a much later date’.232 Hillel’s list of seven, reads as follows: 
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Seven rules of interpretation did the elder Hillel expound before the elders of Bethyra: 
the argument a fortiori, the analogy of expressions, the generalization from one 
instance, the generalization from two instances, universal and particular terms, 
analogy drawn from another passage, and the conclusion to be drawn from the 
context. These seven rules did the elder Hillel expound before the elders of Bethyra 
(Tosefta Sanhedrin 7: 11).233 
Whilst somewhat pithy, it is hard to grasp the full import of what Hillel meant. Thankfully, at 
the turn of the 1900s, Wilhelm Bacher and Jacob Lauterbach contributed entries for each of 
the lists with Hebrew transliterations and explanatory notes, in the monumental work, The 
Jewish Encyclopedia. Following is the entry for Hillel’s list:  
Rules given to the sons of Bathyra by Hillel I. as the chief guides for the interpretation 
of the Scriptures and for the deduction of laws from them (Tosef., Sanh. vii.; the 
introduction to the Sifra, ed. Weiss, p. 3a, end; Ab. R. N. xxxvii.). They are as follows: 1. 
Ḳal (ḳol) wa-ḥomer: “Argumentum a minori ad majus” or “a majori ad minus”; 
corresponding to the scholastic proof a fortiori. 2. Gezerah shawah: Argument from 
analogy. Biblical passages containing synonyms or homonyms are subject, however 
much they differ in other respects, to identical definitions and applications. 3. Binyan 
ab mi-katub eḥad: Application of a provision found in one passage only to passages 
which are related to the first in content but do not contain the provision in question. 4. 
Binyan ab mi-shene ketubim: The same as the preceding, except that the provision is 
generalized from two Biblical passages. 5. Kelal u-Peraṭ and Peraṭ u-kelal: Definition of 
the general by the particular, and of the particular by the general. 6. Ka-yoẓe bo mi-
maḳom aḥer: Similarity in content to another Scriptural passage. 7. Dabar ha-lamed 
me-‘inyano: Interpretation deduced from the context.234 
The first middot is explained using the Latin logic of Argumentum a minori ad majus, a majori 
ad minus and a fortiori (arguments from less to greater, greater to less, and with stronger 
reason). Suddenly, the rules for interpretation are explicitly grammatical, with reference to 
analogy, synonyms, homonyms, definitions, comparisons, and context-based interpretation. 
These are interpretive rules for Scripture employing technical grammar. 
Bacher and Lauterbach’s entry for R. Ishmael’s list of thirteen is no less clear, and 
additionally (and most helpfully), they have indicated exactly where R. Ishmael has followed 
the seven middot of Hillel: 
Thirteen rules compiled by Rabbi Ishmael b. Elisha for the elucidation of the Torah and 
for making halakic deductions from it. They are, strictly speaking, mere amplifications 
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of the seven Rules of Hillel, and are collected in the Baraita of R. Ishmael, forming the 
introduction to the Sifra and reading as follows: 1. Ḳal wa-ḥomer: Identical with the 
first rule of Hillel. 2. Gezerah shawah: Identical with the second rule of Hillel. 3. Binyan 
ab: Rules deduced from a single passage of Scripture and rules deduced from two 
passages. This rule is a combination of the third and fourth rules of Hillel. 4. Kelal u-
Peraṭ: The general and the particular. 5. u-Peraṭ u-kelal: The particular and the 
general. 6. Kelal u-Peraṭ u-kelal: The general, the particular, and the general. 7. The 
general which requires elucidation by the particular, and the particular which requires 
elucidation by the general. 8. The particular implied in the general and excepted from 
it for pedagogic purposes elucidates the general as well as the particular. 9. The 
particular implied in the general and excepted from it on account of the special 
regulation which corresponds in concept to the general, is thus isolated to decrease 
rather than to increase the rigidity of its application. 10. The particular implied in the 
general and excepted from it on account of some other special regulation which does 
not correspond in concept to the general, is thus isolated either to decrease or to 
increase the rigidity of its application. 11. The particular implied in the general and 
excepted from it on account of a new and reversed decision can be referred to the 
general only in case the passage under consideration makes an explicit reference to it. 
12. Deduction from the context. 13. When two Biblical passages contradict each other 
the contradiction in question must be solved by reference to a third passage. Rules 
seven to eleven are formed by a subdivision of the fifth rule of Hillel; rule twelve 
corresponds to the seventh rule of Hillel, but is amplified in certain particulars; rule 
thirteen does not occur in Hillel, while, on the other hand, the sixth rule of Hillel is 
omitted by Ishmael.235 
In their own comments, Bacher and Lauterbach state that R. Ishmael’s list is ‘strictly speaking, 
[a] mere amplifications of the seven Rules of Hillel’. Be that as it may, it is interesting to see 
how the list has so quickly grown and developed, mirroring (in a smaller way) the development 
of the grammar textbooks in the Western tradition. Noticeably, R. Ishmael’s list emphasises a 
variety of rules for elucidating texts using particular and general examples. 
Bacher and Lauterbach’s entry for R. Eliezer b. Jose ha-Gelili’s thirty-two middot, also 
helpfully cross-references Hillel’ seven and R. Ishmael’s thirteen middot: 
Rules laid down by R. Eliezer b. Jose ha-Gelili for haggadic exegesis, many of them 
being applied also to halakic interpretation. 1. Ribbuy (extension): The particles “et,” 
“gam,” and “af,” which are superfluous, indicate that something which is not explicitly 
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stated must be regarded as included in the passage under consideration, or that some 
teaching is implied thereby. 2. Mi‘uṭ (limitation): The particles “ak,” “raḳ” and “min” 
indicate that something implied by the concept under consideration must be excluded 
in a specific case. 3. Ribbuy aḥar ribbuy (extension after extension): When one 
extension follows another it indicates that more must be regarded as implied. 4. Mi‘uṭ 
aḥar mi‘uṭ (limitation after limitation): A double limitation indicates that more is to be 
omitted. 5. Ḳal wa-ḥomer meforash: “Argumentum a minori ad majus,” or vice versa, 
and expressly so characterized in the text. 6. Ḳal wa-ḥomer satum: “Argumentum a 
minori ad majus,” or vice versa, but only implied, not explicitly declared to be one in 
the text. This and the preceding rule are contained in the Rules of Hillel, No. 1. Rules 7 
and 8 are identical with Rules 2 and 3 of Hillel. 9. Derek ḳeẓarah: Abbreviation is 
sometimes used in the text when the subject of discussion is self-explanatory. 10. 
Dabar shehu shanuy (repeated expression): Repetition implies a special meaning. 11. 
Siddur she-neḥlaḳ: Where in the text a clause or sentence not logically divisible is 
divided by the punctuation, the proper order and the division of the verses must be 
restored according to the logical connection. 12. Anything introduced as a comparison 
to illustrate and explain something else, itself receives in this way a better explanation 
and elucidation. 13. When the general is followed by the particular, the latter is 
specific to the former and merely defines it more exactly (comp. Rules of Hillel, No. 5). 
14. Something important is compared with something unimportant to elucidate it and 
render it more readily intelligible. 15. Same as Rule 13 of R. Ishmael. 16. Dabar 
meyuḥad bi-meḳomo: An expression which occurs in only one passage can be 
explained only by the context. This must have been the original meaning of the rule, 
although another explanation is given in the examples cited in the baraita. 17. A point 
which is not clearly explained in the main passage may be better elucidated in another 
passage. 18. A statement with regard to a part may imply the whole. 19. A statement 
concerning one thing may hold good with regard to another as well. 20. A statement 
concerning one thing may apply only to something else. 21. If one object is compared 
to two other objects, the best part of both the latter forms the tertium quid of 
comparison. 22. A passage may be supplemented and explained by a parallel passage. 
23. A passage serves to elucidate and supplement its parallel passage. 24. When the 
specific implied in the general is especially excepted from the general, it serves to 
emphasize some property characterizing the specific. 25. The specific implied in the 
general is frequently excepted from the general to elucidate some other specific 
property, and to develop some special teaching concerning it. 26. Mashal (parable). 
27. Mi-ma‘al: Interpretation through the preceding. 28. Mi-neged: Interpretation 
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through the opposite. 29. Gemaṭria: Interpretation according to the numerical value of 
the letters. 30. Noṭariḳon: Interpretation by dividing a word into two or more parts. 31. 
Postposition of the precedent. Many phrases which follow must be regarded as 
properly preceding, and must be interpreted accordingly in exegesis. 32. Many 
portions of the Bible refer to an earlier period than do the sections which precede 
them, and vice versa. These thirty-two rules are united in the so-called Baraita of R. 
Eliezer b. Jose ha-Gelili. In the introduction to the Midrash ha-Gadol (ed. Schechter, 
Cambridge, 1902), where this baraita is given, it contains thirty-three rules, Rule 29 
being divided into three, and Rule 27 (“Mi-ma‘al”) being omitted.236 
Clearly, as a later text, it is unsurprising that with the passing of time it has grown so much 
from the previous lists, as exegetes experimented with and built upon Hillel and R. Ishmael’s 
middot. Additional to the previous lists, however, there are middot dealing with the function of 
superfluous particles, extensions and limitations for indicating that more is to be implied or 
excluded; the use of abbreviations; the function of repetitions; punctuation; the use of 
parallels; the use and interpretation of mashal (parable); gemaṭria: interpretation according to 
the numerical value of the letters; noṭariḳon: interpretation by dividing a word into two or 
more parts; and the use of precedents. In analysing the three lists, Philip Alexander notes the 
aggadic emphasis in R. Eliezer b. Jose ha-Gelili’s thirty-two, and the more halakhic leanings in 
Hillel and R. Ishmael’s lists. However, this was by no means exclusive, as all three have been 
used for both aggadic and halakhic purposes. However, in legal matters, Hillel and Ishmael 
show a ‘discernible reluctance’ to use the more ‘fanciful’ aggadic techniques of gemaṭria 
(numerical exegesis), and noṭariḳon (acronymic exegesis), favouring instead a peshat approach 
in the majority of cases.237 
Beyond the maxims and middot, there is a midrashic schema called Pardes (meaning 
‘orchard’ in Hebrew, but also serving as an acronym), providing an alternative way of 
interpreting the biblical text in four successive stages: 
 [Remez] ֶרֶמז .Peshat] …simple, primary, or literal [the plain sense]; 2] ְפָּשׁט .1
…allegorical [hint]; 3. ְדַּרׁש [Derash] homiletic, or spiritual [exposition]; 4. סֹוד [Sod] 
recondite or mysterious sense [secret or symbolic], which was afterwards designated 
by the Pardes (פרדס – each letter representing one of the four rules).238 
This system begins with Peshat, establishing the plain meaning of the text as the first stage in 
all exegetical endeavours. The second stage, Remez, allows for an allegorical reading of the 
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text, but securely anchored to the first stage. The third stage, Derash (the etymological root of 
midrash), initiates exploratory exposition, breaking down the passage and the verse or verses 
in view. The final stage, the esoteric Sod, begins to penetrate words, letters, and numerical 
values. Pardes is usually seen as a much later medieval midrashic development, with the 
fourth stage verging on Cabbalistic exegesis.239 However, Pick interestingly places the origins of 
Pardes before Hillel, at the genesis of interpretive middot, arguing that the ‘fourfold mode of 
interpretation’ was insufficient: 
…since, according to an old saying, “the law can be interpreted in forty-nine different 
modes,” the necessity arose for laying down and fixing certain laws for the 
interpretation of the Scripture. This was done by Hillel the Great, who laid down seven 
rules. The seven rules of Hillel were enlarged by Ismael ben Elisa to thirteen, and these 
again to thirty-two by Elieser ben Jose the Galilean, of the second century.240 
Nevertheless, Pardes offers a completely different approach to midrash, an approach not 
really found in the lists of middot. 
Rather than offering rules for interpretation, Pardes offer instead lenses or ‘layers’,241 
through which one may read at increasingly deeper levels. Each stage represents a stronger 
lens. According to Fishbane, each of the layers is ‘distinct and privileged, but all variously 
interrelated or correlated’.242 Fishbane claims that Peshat is ‘derived from the textual given, in 
its received verbal and sentence units’; and is ‘concerned to know what the sentences mean in 
their interrelation and integration – and thus how the various verbal parts cohere in larger 
segments’.243 The relationship between verbs and sentences is sought out to discover a 
primary literal reading of the text. Of course, this attempt to find a universally agreed plain 
reading is fraught with difficulty and susceptible to the imposition of personal meanings, as 
Fishbane highlights:  
…the horizon of the plain sense is a neutral entity, distinct from the reader, until a 
reader tries to be in accord with its presumed sense. Indeed, the arch presumption of 
the Peshat level is that one may find the true ‘fit’ between oneself as a reader and the 
text itself … The presumption of ‘fit’ is the presumption of an accurate knowing, of a 
successful (or meaningful) conjunction between the mind of a reader and a text – all 
distance overcome.244 
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Nevertheless, the Peshat can yield a fruitful outcome for the reader, if this consideration is 
acknowledged and the reader proceeds without presuming finite absolutes in the text. Some 
distance will be unavoidable. 
Establishing the accuracy of the Peshat can be partly helped by the introduction of the 
third layer, Derash (Fishbane jumbles the acronym and calls this the second layer): 
Derash, refers to the particularities of rabbinic interpretation – both legal and 
homiletic Midrash. Hermeneutics works here at the level of culture and community, 
where the natural meaning of the Peshat, so to say, is understood in Jewish terms. 
Scripture is now a Jewish pedagogy – a kind of cultural paideia – instructing the faithful 
in the moral and theological features of Scripture, as understood by rabbinic tradition, 
or in the proper types of duty and practice.245 
Thus, the most fitting understanding of a text is found in a Jewish reading of it – it is the 
reading most appropriate to the text. The reading of Scripture finds its home in a Jewish 
cultural context not a Western one. The words and sentences of Scripture ‘are all inflected 
with deep rabbinic nuance and pertinence, from beginning to end’. 
Fishbane places Remez as the third level, where ‘allegorical “hints” … may be discerned 
in Scripture, with traces of a deeper or underlying content’.246 He equates this level to the 
Greek word huponoia (‘a thought or intention that lies below the surface’247): 
At this level, reading and knowing require a special knowing – not derived from the 
text in itself, but from some prior presumption of deeper philosophical or ethical 
value. One may suspect that the text is allegorical, and that its pattern of words hint at 
something else; but that ‘something else’ is derived from ‘somewhere else’ – perhaps 
the virtues of an Aristotle, or the mind-body tensions of a Plotinus, or even the 
valences of the Written and Oral Torah of the Sages.248 
Here, Fishbane demonstrates that Remez has the potential to draw on exegetical contexts 
both outside of as well as within the Jewish tradition – ‘some might say that one enters 
Scripture through Jerusalem and leaves it by Athens’ or that the ‘door of Athens swings on the 
hinge of Jerusalem’. The text must be read from ‘some other “species of knowledge”, which 
must then be appropriated and realized subjectively’. Yet, what Remez shows us is that it is a 
lens that can view and embrace Athens with Jerusalem. If Derash provides the natural Jewish 
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home for interpreting Scripture, then Remez is the exegetical journey from home to another 
place.  
The fourth level of Sod is, Fishbane argues, ‘the ultimate esoteric layer of meaning’.249 
If the previous layers have taken us from home to another place in earthly cultural contexts, 
then Sod takes us beyond the earthly in Fishbane’s understanding of Pardes: 
Hereby one reads Scripture as a vast symbolic thesaurus – its verbal meanings being 
saturated icons (or prismatic vectors) that flood the mind and heart with super-
significance. Thus, reading sequences of words in their received syntactic conjunctions 
induces a transcendent apperception of the deepest coordinates of meaning 
imaginable … The hermeneutics of distance and appropriation have no meaning here. 
The self is flooded by the verbal prisms, and appropriated by their ineffable 
immediacy.250 
Thus, the understanding of the reader focuses on the particles of light in the smallest parts of 
the written text; piercing the sentences to release the truth/light-bearing power with which 
each word is imbued. Here, there are infinite meanings, possibilities and interpretations of 
roots, words, phrases and sentences – Sod opens up the creative and imaginative – it is at the 
other end of Peshat and no ‘fit’ is sought. 
By reversing the order of the second and third parts of the acronym, Fishbane 
illustrates how the levels of Pardes can be manipulated and re-ordered in their progression, 
and still provide a useful method for reading.251 That method begins with Peshat – a simple 
approach to the text, looking for the most obvious and plain sense of meaning without looking 
beneath the words, beside them or above. Derash and Remez help us approach the text from a 
situated context – that of home and away – and perhaps Fishbane’s reversal is only significant 
with regard to where we decide to begin and end a reading journey. We can begin our journey 
from home (Jerusalem) and travel away (Athens); from the home context to the other. Or we 
may begin our journey away and travel home. Sod approaches the text from a totally other 
context, when we have read the text plainly and in a number of contexts, we can move beyond 
the earthly Jerusalem and Athens to a journey beyond the boundaries of context, where 
imagination and creativity engage with the text. Pardes offers a focus that not only deepens 
with each successive level, but also broadens. It accommodates a reading that is broad enough 
to include more than one worldview. 
However, there is no compulsion to use all four lenses in any one reading. One need 
only go as far as the peshat, if the plain sense is sufficient for a given reading or for a particular 
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circumstance (i.e. reading for worship/chant, reading for elucidation, or reading for deeper 
study). The more demanding the purpose in reading a text is, the stronger the lens to be 
employed. However, greater magnification is only achieved by adding lenses successively. In 
other words, employing sod without the first three stages will not circumvent the path to 
esoteric enlightenment; but is more likely to result in a confused or non-contextual eisegesis. 
 
A Jewish Reading Voice for a Jewish Text 
 
As readers, Copeland reminds us that ‘literature (not logic) was the oldest domain for the 
study of language, and … grammarians were not just “guardians of language” but “guardians of 
literature”’.252 The rich histories of the Western and Jewish traditions offer so much by way of 
help in reading, and this chapter has barely scratched the surface. Amongst the ancient 
Greeks, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics emphasised the power of the word to communicate – 
the λόγος as truth-bearer. This potential to convey so much in the most basic units of language 
is clearly at the heart of both traditions – the analytical tools of grammar and midrash offer 
many ways to uncover and receive the truth borne by a word and in a word. Both provide the 
means to analyse ancient texts of all genres. The two traditions also reveal a love for the classic 
texts, demonstrated by the myriad commentaries written to guide, assist and explain the 
works so highly esteemed. Whether it is Homer and Virgil in the Western tradition, or 
Deuteronomy, the Psalms and Isaiah in the Jewish, the classic texts were essential reading; 
they were inexhaustible primers to which one always returned. The classic texts illuminated 
the way for all that one might go on to read. In Rome, Quintilian’s golden rule that the reader 
must understand what they read meant that it was necessary for grammar to accompany the 
reader. Indeed, grammar personified, became the guide in all the arts, exercising authority in 
poetry, rhetoric, philosophy, history, mathematics and music, wherever it brought 
understanding to a text. 
The power of words was no less for Augustine; they were the pre-eminent form of 
signs. Even after his Christian conversion, Augustine’s interest in reading the pagan classics 
never waned, as could be seen in the frequent reference he made to Virgil, Cicero and Varro, 
amongst others. His love for Scripture and the pagan classics led to one of the first developed 
theories of reading, in which grammar acted as a means of interpreting the written text. For 
Augustine, however, grammar’s chief work was in the service of Scripture. In learning the 
language of Scripture one might apprehend its more shrouded and obscure meaning. The arts 
of reading and interpretation were inextricably linked, and to teach one to interpret was to 
teach them to read for themselves. 
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Isidore’s Etymologiae became arguably the most influential book, after the Scriptures, 
in the Western tradition for the best part of a thousand years. Isidore, like Augustine, believed 
that grammar’s place was in the service of God, but moreover it was the very source and 
foundation of literature. Isidore saw power not just in words, but in the very letters from 
which the words were composed. Letters were representatives, tokens and signs, infused with 
hidden meaning and a force so strong that they spoke without voices. Letters laid down a road 
for the reader to travel. Isidore employed etymology for interpreting and understanding nouns 
and verbs correctly, which he demonstrated through his explication of the divine Hebrew 
names and other aspects of the Scriptures. Isidore equipped the reader with explanations into 
the function of literary tropes, differentiating between riddles, allegories, metaphors, 
proverbs, parables, similitudes and fables. He drew extensively on the Scriptures and a 
multitude of pagan classics to furnish examples, producing a grammatica of texts and textual 
language. Yet neither Augustine nor Isidore employed a contextually authentic reading of 
Scripture, shunning the rich Jewish tradition that had developed around them in favour of 
Greek and Roman interlocutors as interpreters. 
Despite superficial readings of the Hebrew Scriptures that suggest it has little to say on 
grammar, a closer and more careful inspection reveals that it contains a sophisticated interest 
in the workings of language. These can be seen, for example, in the remarkable use of Egyptian 
language and idioms in the text of the Torah, and in its extraordinarily sophisticated structure. 
The text reflects a formal, standardized scribal tradition, which was responsible for the 
ongoing transmission of the Scriptures. Specific writings became the classics of the Hebrew 
tradition, to which the scribes devoted themselves. Systems developed that functioned in 
similar ways to the Western grammatical models, for interpreting and clarifying texts. Scribes 
pursued similar investigations into the hidden, secret and obscure elements of Scriptures. 
Metaphors, parables, allegories and riddles were likewise studied to elucidate meaning. 
Scribes read to understand, and understood to explicate. The postexilic scribes functioned as 
early grammarians of Scripture, reading and expositing the genres of Scripture, but within an 
authentic historical context. 
The work of the Masorites created a grammatical system to aid the reader of the 
biblical text, placing guiding marks around the words (like signposts on Isidore’s road). The 
rabbinic period produced midrash, an interpretive world of commentaries and hermeneutics. 
The midrashic exegetes used grammar in the service to God, no less than their Christian 
contemporaries, Augustine and Isidore. Words were powerful bearers of truth in the Western 
tradition, and for the Rabbis, each word of Scripture carried the full potency of God. Midrash 
provided the reader with maxims and interpretive rules that were explicitly grammatical, with 
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technical references to analogy, synonyms, homonyms, and the parts of speech we would 
easily associate with the ars grammatica and the textbooks of the Latin grammarians.  
In the Western tradition, the relationship between grammar and reading is summed 
up well by Copeland: ‘Through grammatical theory, ancient and medieval readers could move 
from questions of signification to questions of meaning, from signs to semantics, and 
ultimately to questions of literary representation, that is, the relationship of poetic language to 
different kinds of truth, including the possibilities that the poetic language of Scripture offered 
to speculative theology.’253 It is the language of Scripture especially that ties a common 
interest between the Western and Jewish traditions of reading. The Western grammatical 
tradition has exerted a great influence on the reading of Scripture, and continues to do so. Can 
the Jewish tradition of interpretation offer anything outside of its application to Scripture? 
Porton believes that rabbinic midrash has the potential to help the reader understand not just 
Scripture, but ‘other text-oriented religions in general’.254 One obvious example would have to 
be Christianity and the mostly Jewish-authored texts of the New Testament. Indeed, the 
parables of Jesus and the writings of Paul contain clear midrashic elements.255 Even the Gospel 
writers employ midrash, as can be seen in the Prologue to John’s Gospel. This text is so often 
interpreted along Philonic and Hellenistic lines of interpretation due to the author’s use of 
Λόγος (Logos): ‘In the beginning was the Word [Λόγος], and the Word [Λόγος] was with God, 
and the Word [Λόγος] was God’ (1:1).256 However, whilst the language of the New Testament 
is Greek, the contents are not. The opening passage of John far more reflects the opening of 
Genesis and, furthermore, the first three chapters of Genesis are mirrored in the first three 
chapters of John (for example, the relationship between the greater and lesser light is 
mirrored in the introduction of John the Baptist; Jesus sees Nathaniel under a fig tree which, in 
rabbinic thought, is the tree of knowledge257; there are ‘weddings’ in chapter two of both 
books; and a garden and a serpent appear in chapter three of both books). Moreover, the 
Gospel of John includes the seven ‘I am’ sayings of Jesus which invoke the Tetragrammaton 
 in Exodus 3:14-15. Like all the other New Testament writers, John quotes frequently and (יהוה)
directly from the Hebrew Scriptures, and the weight and implication of these quotes would be 
lost on a non-Hebraic audience. To this end, I believe a schema such as Pardes, with its series 
of deepening stages, provides an authentic and appropriate approach to reading not only the 
Hebrew Scriptures, but New Testament texts as well. 
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Omitting the Hebrew Scriptures from the Great Books is an extraordinary loss. 
Introducing whole books from the biblical canon would greatly enrich modern liberal arts. I am 
not suggesting that the whole body of Hebrew Scriptures be added to liberal arts reading lists 
(although a course that found the time over three or four years would be well rewarded), but 
at the very least representations of the Jewish voice from the Tanakh: the Torah, the Prophets 
and the Writings. For example, Genesis in its entirety would provide an understanding of 
Hebrew cosmology, and the beginnings of not just the universe and the earth, but also to 
God’s relationship with humanity, especially demonstrated in his relationship to the Patriarchs. 
Exodus continues the narrative of Israel from a family to a nation, their descent into slavery 
and their journey back into freedom. In the aftermath of their emancipation, Israel receives 
the Commandments – the covenant as prototype social contract, and the pillars of our 
Western Judeo-Christian legal and social order. From the Prophets, the books of Isaiah and 
Jeremiah provide an insight into the breakdown of social covenant, the repercussions of 
injustice, and the call towards restoration and return. The Minor Prophets such as Amos also 
illustrate powerful rhetoric in the cause of the oppressed. The Writings give us the history of 
kingship and ancient political successes and failures in the Book of Kings (divided into two 
books in the Christian Bible), and of course, the Wisdom literature of Proverbs, Job and 
Ecclesiastes cover an array of philosophical inquiries into the nature of wisdom, suffering and 
life. 
However, placing the Hebrew Scriptures somewhere between Plato and Augustine 
does not help the reader. Instead, these Great texts should be read in context with an eye on 
the Jewish exegetical tradition. I am not advocating a scribal education, but an awareness and 
an embracing of the ancient Jewish tradition. Indeed, the stages of Pardes, for example, can be 
easily applied to English translations of the biblical text. What can the Jewish voice add to the 
art of reading? To begin with it accompanies the Greek worldview – Athens with Jerusalem – 
providing a second voice, a non-Western outsider voice; thus creating a dialogue with the 
existent canon. Secondly, it provides authenticity to our understanding of who we are and 
where we come from in the context of our literary history. Our claim to a Judeo-Christian 
culture is seen in the literary history of our Western culture. For example, if we consider the 
works of Shakespeare (included in the Great Books), they reference the Bible more than 1200 
times.258 Surely, therefore, our appreciation of Shakespeare can only be greater if we 
familiarise ourselves with the Scriptures, and understand them in context – they provide a 
foundation upon which we can make sense of our Western canon. Consider the inclusion of 
Maimonides or Spinoza in some liberal arts courses – how can they be fully understood unless 
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the foundation is in place?259 We do not turn to medieval or seventeenth century writers to 
read Homer or Plato, we go to the source. The Hebrew Scriptures are a Great Source for liberal 
arts education, providing not just great reading and rich grammatical understanding, but also 
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Chapter 2: The Spoken Jewish Voice 
 
 
Having considered the written Jewish voice in biblical literature and rabbinic exegesis, we now 
turn to another expression of the Jewish voice: the spoken. The spoken voice in the Western 
classical tradition is exercised through the Greek art of rhetoric and the Roman counterpart of 
oratory, whereby one learns to speak well. Again, the Jewish tradition is overlooked, yet the 
spoken voice is clear in Scripture and the rabbinic literature – one learns not just to speak well, 
but more importantly, to speak up. Speaking up for the poor, the outsider, the unrepresented, 
the voiceless – this is the task of Jewish rhetoric, and it can be seen most distinctly in the 
writings of the Hebrew Prophets.
Oratory still plays an important part in liberal arts education, but the art of speaking 
well has a long history rivalling and eclipsing all the other arts, including the position of 
philosophy in classical education: ‘The history of liberal education is the story of a debate 
between orators and philosophers.’1 With these words Bruce Kimball began his history of the 
liberal arts, seeing a clear divide between the rhetorical and philosophical traditions, 
represented by Isocrates and Plato respectively, and where their schools held sway or clashed 
at different times. By the time the seven liberal arts had taken shape in ancient Roman 
education, rhetoric had come to dominate, and became the ‘first characteristic of the artes 
liberales … the goal of training the good citizen to lead society’.2 In following on from grammar, 
as the art of reading and writing, rhetoric follows naturally as the art of speaking, or as Henri 
Marrou states: ‘The rhetor took up where the grammarian had left off’.3 This chapter will focus 
on the Greek art of rhetoric and its development as oratory in ancient Rome, with specific 
attention given to Aristotle and Cicero, as respective representatives, and the influence they 
have had in shaping the art of speaking well. In the rhetoric of the Jewish tradition, 
consideration will be given to the Scriptures as a whole and the rabbinic texts, but highlighting 
the art of speaking up in the Hebrew Prophets, especially in the books of Amos and Isaiah. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to consider the development of rhetoric beyond the ancient 
period, and its rich history in medieval Christian education.4 
Gary Remer points to the origins of the interchangeable terms of rhetoric and oratory: 
‘Etymologically, the orator’s art – rhetoric or oratory – is derived from ancient Greek rhêtorikê, 
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from the more ancient Greek eirô, meaning “to say, speak, or tell”’.5 George Kennedy develops 
the etymological development from its earliest appearances: 
“Rhetoric,” and its cognates in other languages, is derived from the Greek word 
rhêkorikê, the art or technique of a rhêtôr, or public speaker. The word first appears in 
Plato's dialogue Gorgias, written in the second decade of the fourth century B.C., but 
dramatically set a generation earlier. In conversation with Socrates (453a2), Gorgias 
defines rhêkorikê as “the worker of persuasion.” “Persuasion” (peithô) was used in 
earlier Greek to describe what came to be called “rhetoric.” Another Greek word often 
used of rhetoric is logos, literally “word,” but also meaning “speech, argument, 
reason.”6 
In differentiating between oratory and rhetoric, Thomas Habinek defines oratory as ‘formal 
public speechmaking … the characteristic political act of ancient city-states and of later 
political entities that draw their inspiration from them’.7 Whereas, rhetoric is the ‘study of 
available means of persuasion … [which] came into being as a distinct intellectual and social 
enterprise because of the prevalence of oratory in classical antiquity’. Thus, rhetoric ‘analyzed 
successful instances of oratorical persuasion and derived from them principles that could be 
applied in new situations’. 8 The idea of public speechmaking is reinforced by Matthew Fox, 
who argues that: 
Rhetoric in the ancient world was experienced primarily in the context of a live 
performance, a form of communication that presupposes an interaction between 
speaker and audience. Literature, on the other hand, often revolved around a private 
act of reading.9 
Fox’s definition holds good for various rhetorical traditions, who share in common the 
speaker/audience relationship, and in comparing Western and Jewish traditions, this is 
especially true. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, literature in the ancient 
Jewish tradition included public acts of reading, as well as the private. 
Kennedy sees evidence of rhetoric in all human cultures and traditions, and even 
beyond the human: ‘Rhetoric in the sense of techniques of persuasion is a phenomenon of all 
human cultures, and analogies to it are also found in animal communication.’10 From this he 
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asserts that: ‘All communication involves rhetoric.’11 Commenting on the speaker/audience 
relationship, Kennedy argues: 
Every communication is rhetorical because it uses some technique to affect the beliefs, 
actions, or emotions of an audience. The simplest verbal techniques are pitch, volume, 
and repetition, as in “help, Help, HELP!”12 
Explicitly, however, rhetoric was ‘primarily an art of persuasion; it was primarily something 
used in civic life; it was primarily oral … it is an act not a text, though subsequently it can be 
treated as a text.’13 The conceptualising of rhetorical techniques, or the ‘synthesis of a 
metarhetoric’, appears in ‘sophisticated, literate societies in varying degrees depending on the 
practical need for rhetorical instruction, the extent to which the society is introspective, and 
the rhetorical values the society holds’.14 Kennedy gives some specific examples of early 
rhetorical instruction from the ancient world: 
The Instruction of Ptahhotep, written in Egypt in the early second millennium B.C., is 
sometimes regarded as the earliest handbook of public speaking. In third-century B.C. 
China, Han Fei-tzu wrote a work on power politics that includes discussion of ways to 
persuade, and about the same time Kautilya in India wrote an extensive discussion of 
politics and rhetoric that has features in common with Greek rhetorical theory.15 
However, Greek metarhetoric differed in that it was ‘developed largely for speakers in the 
lawcourts, whereas elsewhere judicial rhetoric is not a major consideration; and only in 
Greece, and thus in Western Europe, was rhetoric separated from political and ethical 
philosophy to form a specific discipline that became a feature of formal education’.16 Ancient 
Jewish rhetoric is not so distinctly laid out, yet it pervades every genre and category of biblical 
and post-biblical literature and tradition, and serves to be equally instructive. 
 
The Origins of Greek and Jewish Rhetoric 
 
David Cohen notes that oratory, though not yet specifically defined, played a ‘crucial role’ in 
the political deliberations of early Greek society – this is attested in the very earliest literary 
records of Greek civilization: 
Book 1 of [Homer’s] Iliad presents a public debate between Agamemnon and Achilles 
which sets in motion the plot of the epic, and on various other occasions speakers 
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address collective bodies. What is significant here is that on these occasions those who 
address the gathering do not just talk, they make speeches … Rhetoric, understood as 
a self-conscious art of oratorical persuasion, had not yet been invented in Homer’s 
world, but the ability to produce a reasoned and persuasive speech in a deliberative 
setting was highly prized.’17 
Indeed, Kennedy argues that ‘the attitude toward speech in the Iliad strongly influenced the 
conception of the orator … [because] the Greeks not only tolerated but admired open 
contention … Anger, retribution, and personal attacks were acceptable in public … evident in 
the spirited debates, even mud-slinging, between Agamemnon and Achilles’.18 Similarly, 
Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee point to the last book of the Iliad for another example of 
early rhetoric, where ‘Homer depicted the Trojan king, Priam, appealing to Achilles, the 
Achean hero, to return the body of his son, Hector’ [XXIV 485-506].19 Moreover, as John 
Sandys so clearly illustrated by extracting from the text of the Iliad: ‘Achilles is trained to be “a 
speaker of words, as well as a doer of deeds” (Il. ix 443); Nestor is the clear-voiced orator, from 
whose lips “sweeter than honey flowed the stream of speech” (i 249); Menelaus touches only 
on salient points “in words though few, yet clear” (iii 214); while Odysseus, though awkward in 
action, is beyond compare with his “deep voice” and with his “words that fall like flakes of 
wintry snow” (iii 222).’20 
Kennedy notes that the conscious study of Western rhetoric begins in Greece in the 
fifth century BCE. The emerging democracy of Athens was ‘based on the assumption that all 
citizens had an equal right and duty to participate in their own government’, and their 
effective participation required the ability to speak in public.21 Public policy was decided in 
assemblies of adult male citizens, in which all had the ‘right to speak’. According to Crowley 
and Hawhee, this right, ‘called isegoria (“equality in the agora” or assembly place)’, was 
exercised by very few citizens.22 Obviously, when hundreds of Athenian men gathered 
together, it was impractical for very many to participate, and few would have been adequately 
trained or ‘sufficiently informed about the issue at hand’ to participate effectively. Thus, the 
debates were led ‘by a small number of ambitious individuals called rhētores, who sought to 
channel the course of events in a direction they thought was best for the city’ or for their own 
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ends.23 These rhētores were especially trained orators, with ‘sufficient education to 
understand the issues, and who had the leisure to study the issues at hand’. By the fourth 
century BCE, within the course of just one century, the term rhetor transformed from a 
reference to ‘someone who introduced a resolution into the Assembly’, to a term meaning 
‘something like “an expert on politics.”’24 
With no professional lawyers in Greece, citizens needed to defend themselves when 
seeking legal justice and this gave rise to the need for rhetorical skills. In the legal courts men 
were expected to speak for themselves, while women were represented by male relatives. 
Friends or relatives could speak on behalf of a man that was ill or unable to speak for whatever 
reason, and so it ‘became possible to buy a speech from a logographer, or speechwriter, which 
the party involved would try to memorize’.25 In addition to legal oratory, addresses at public 
holidays, funerals and symposia also required speaking proficiency. It was believed that, while 
some citizens possessed a ‘natural gift for communication; others [could] develop these skills 
by studying the principles of speech and composition, by observing the method of successful 
speakers and writers, and by practice’.26 Education in public oratory was provided by teachers 
who were hired for a fee, and taught their students how to organise arguments, divide 
speeches into logical components, and select the most effective combination of words. 
Eileen Scallen suggests that Corax of Syracuse (c. 465 BCE) was the ‘first “theorist” of 
legal rhetoric’, whose theories developed in response to property disputes arising from the 
transition from a political dictatorship to democratic government in the Greek colony of 
Syracuse, on the island of Sicily: ‘These legal disputes increased the need for training in 
forensic rhetoric.’27 Corax and Tisias, his student, brought ‘instruction in the art of legal 
advocacy’ to Athens: 
…developing the argument from probability as the basis for forensic proof, in which 
matters of fact could not be demonstrated with absolute certainty. They encouraged 
their students to use probability to argue on either side of a case.28 
Alongside the legal rhetoric of Corax and Tisias, other orators emerged in the context of 
Athenian politics. Crowley and Hawhee highlight the careers of Pericles (c. 495-429 BCE) and, a 
century later, Demosthenes (c. 384-322 BCE), who ‘exemplify the close connection of oratory 
to politics’. Pericles is generally credited with the establishment of Athenian democracy: ‘His 
democratic ideal, wherein citizens rendered free and intelligent obedience to a fair system of 
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laws, is represented in the funeral oration attributed to him in Thucydides’ history of the 
Peloponnesian War.’29 Demosthenes, a contemporary of Aristotle, was famed for his oratory 
concerning ‘Athens's uneasy relations with the Macedonian king Philip and his son, Alexander 
the Great’. His many speeches against Philip attempted to warn the Athenians regarding the 
king's dangerous and ‘acquisitive’ intentions. Demosthenes was ‘widely regarded … as the 
greatest of the Greek orators’, and his work vindicating his political life, On the Crown, ‘is still 
read as an outstanding example of the persuasive power of rhetoric.’30 
Scallen believes that Corax and Tisias were ‘the forerunners of the class of teachers of 
rhetoric known as the sophists.’31 Their name derives from the Greek adjective sophos, 
meaning ‘wise’, and is best translated as a ‘teacher’ or ‘expert’, but ‘used for anyone who gave 
lessons in grammar, rhetoric, politics, ethics, or other subjects for pay’.32 The primary mode of 
delivery for the sophists was ‘by public or private epideixis, oral demonstrations that presented 
in a striking style their ideas and techniques of proof.’33 One of the earliest sophists, Gorgias, a 
teacher from Sicily, came to Athens in 427 BCE; and became famous for his ‘poetic style and 
paradoxical arguments’.34 His distinct and novel oratorical style struck the Athenians, ‘with its 
pointed antitheses, its symmetrical clauses, its parallelisms of structure and its rhyming 
endings’, which Sandys classified as αντιθεσις (contrast of sense), παρισωσις (parallelism of 
structure), and παρομοιωσις (parallelism of sound).35 Gorgias paved the way and, thereafter, 
various sophists began publishing short rhetorical theory handbooks, which demonstrated 
‘how a person with little or no experience could organize a speech for delivery in a court of law 
and how to argue on the basis of the probability of what someone might have done in a given 
situation’.36 
Crowley and Hawhee argue that some of the sophists ‘taught by example rather than 
precept’, preparing and delivering model speeches for their students to emulate: 
Some may have prepared lists of sample arguments, later called topics, that could be 
inserted into any speech for which they were appropriate. Such collections, if they 
existed, would have been called arts (technai) of rhetoric; that is, they would have 
been the rhetoric textbooks of the day.37 
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Kennedy believes the ‘characteristic form of rhetorical study’ – the ‘tradition of imitating a 
successful orator, without necessarily any conceptualization of the techniques involved’ – 
ultimately became ‘what may be called the “schools” of sophists’.38 
Habinek asks ‘What exactly did the handbooks teach?’ His comprehensive answer 
sheds light on the nature of their contents, and provides us with a complex curriculum, further 
supporting the idea of sophistic schools: 
 …the canonical division of rhetoric into five parts – invention, disposition, style, 
memory, and performance; the categorization of speeches as deliberative, judicial, or 
demonstrative; and the subdivision of the standard judicial speech into proem, 
narrative, division, refutation, argumentation, and peroration. Add to these the three 
goals of rhetoric (to teach, to move, to persuade), the need to match style, argument, 
performance, etc. to audience and situation (the doctrine of decorum), as well as 
meta-questions of the appropriate means of educating the orator in all of the above 
and of the ultimate role of oratory and rhetoric in society and you have a collective 
table of contents of the rhetorical treatises taken as a whole.39 
Donald Russell elucidates on the five parts or headings, beginning with the most important, 
invention (determining the problem: a question of fact, definition or the moral evaluation of a 
fact; and deciding the most effective arguments based on the speaker’s position, character, 
audience attitudes and opponent); arrangement (beginning and ending speeches while 
obscuring your weaknesses); verbal expression (the peculiarly ‘rhetorical’ element); delivery 
and memory (‘necessary technical skills’ to avoid speaking from a script). Russell also 
comments on some of the unusual terminology found in the handbooks which appear to draw 
parallels between the adversarial ‘skill of verbal combat’ in rhetoric and ancient Greek 
wrestling, as both share technical terms that meant ‘stand’, ‘hold’, or ‘grip’.40  
The Pseudo-Aristotelian text Rhetoric to Alexander included ‘topics for appealing to 
the emotions’ and the issue of ethos (meaning ‘character’). On the subject of emotions, it 
‘discussed appeals to friendliness, kindliness, and the like as a means urging an audience to act 
on behalf of the needy (1439b 15 ff.)’.41 With regard to the term ethos and its importance in 
oratory, the author ‘cautioned rhetors to be careful about their personal conduct, “because 
one’s manner of life contributes to one’s powers of persuasion as well as to the attainment of 
a good reputation” (1445b 30)’. Thus, the ‘rhetor’s ability to persuade is connected to [their] 
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moral habits’42 Despite this caution, some sophists appear to have damaged rhetoric’s 
reputation by showing a disregard for ethos and this, in turn, generated criticism.  
Chief amongst the critics was Plato (c. 427-347 BCE). ‘Unflattering portraits’ of the 
rhetors Gorgias and Protagoras appear in the dialogues Plato named after them. Crowley and 
Hawhee argue that because he was an Athenian aristocrat and an ‘enemy of democracy’, Plato 
‘opposed rhetoric on the ground that rhetoricians did not search for truth but aimed instead to 
persuade people to believe’.43 He presents Socrates as distrustful of the sophists and the 
‘handbook writers’, and in the Gorgias Socrates criticizes Athenian rhetoric as ‘essentially a 
form of flattery – morally irresponsible and not based on knowledge of truth or sound logic.’44 
Indeed, they ‘preferred the probable to the true and made the worse cause the better.’45 Plato 
voices his concern over the potential for rhetorical abuse in the Gorgias, through the character 
Polus of Agrigentum: ‘Don't they act like tyrants and put to death any one they please and 
confiscate property and banish any one they’ve a mind to?’ (466c)46 Kennedy notes the 
problem with truth in rhetoric that led to Plato’s protests – lying, he states, was ‘endemic in 
Western oratory from its beginning’.47 
Dilip Gaonkar notes that in the dialogue of the Gorgias, Socrates ‘poses a series of 
interrogatories regarding rhetoric’s identity and domicile, and predictably, neither Gorgias nor 
Polus and Callicles who successively undertake to respond, gives a satisfactory answer’.48 
Gorgias is bluntly asked to give an account for rhetoric: ‘Who are you?’ (447), and ‘With what 
class of objects is rhetoric concerned?’ (449). For Gaonkar, it is this failure to adequately 
respond that truly delegitimises the sophists in Plato’s view. However, Gaonker sees an even 
deeper critique of ‘rhetoric’s lack of substance … Plato as saying that rhetoric’s moral 
deficiency springs from its nomadic quality, a quality accentuated by the itinerant character of 
its teachers. Rhetoric is amoral precisely because it is rootless.’49 Gaonker summarises Plato’s 
rejection of rhetoric as a defective and incomplete art: 
First, rhetoric is rooted in a false ontology. It is content to deal with what appears to 
be true and good rather than inquire into what it is in reality. Second, rhetoric is 
epistemically deficient because it seeks to impart a mastery of common opinion rather 
than knowledge. Third, as an instrument of practical politics it exploits the resources of 
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language to make the “weaker cause appear stronger” and to promote the acquisition 
of power as an end in itself without consideration for the well-being of the soul.50 
Despite Plato’s strong opposition to sophistry, Crowley and Hawhee argue that ‘he appears to 
have understood the importance of rhetoric’. In the Phaedrus he developed a ‘philosophical 
rhetoric that could supposedly be used to find truth’. This involved ‘studying the souls of 
human beings and learning how to properly define and divide an issue into its constituent 
parts’.51 Plato directed rhetors to study the people in their audiences, and thereby be more 
persuasive. In the Phaedrus, he wrote: 
Since the function of oratory is in fact to influence mens’ souls, the intending orator 
must know what types of soul there are. Now these are of a determinate number, and 
their variety results in a variety of individuals. To the types of soul thus discriminated 
there corresponds a determinate number of types of discourse. Hence a certain type 
of hearer will be easy to persuade by a certain type of speech to take such and such 
action for such and such reason, while another type will be hard to persuade (271d).52 
Crowley and Hawhee take this to mean that, in part, Plato might have intended that ‘rhetors 
should study the emotions of their potential hearers or readers’. It would certainly seem to be 
an encouragement for the rhetor to take their cue from the audience rather than the 
handbook. Plato was not the only critic, however, and Kennedy addresses some of the other 
objections that arose: ‘the creation of rhetorical handbooks and the claims of sophists to teach 
the art of speech made rhetoric vulnerable to criticism’, with the implication that ‘anyone 
motivated to speak in public’ could learn rhetorical techniques.53 
Isocrates (c. 436-338 BCE) emerged as the rhetor who successfully challenged the 
baser practices of the sophists of his day. Randall Hart notes: ‘In his speech, Against the 
Sophists, he attacked teachers who claimed to be able to teach virtue and also opposed those 
who taught rhetoric as a mechanical formula based on the mastery of a few tricks of the 
trade.’ 54 Isocrates began his career as a logographer, writing speeches for others, and it is 
possible that he had studied rhetoric with Gorgias, ‘from whom he acquired his interest in 
style’.55 His earnestness was demonstrated in the establishment of his ‘famous and influential 
school of rhetoric that was attended by ambitious young men from all the Greek city-states’. 
His students enrolled ‘for a period of three to four years, during which they studied rhetorical 
theory, heard model orations and sample discourses, and practiced intensive declamation’.56 
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Isocrates taught his students the ‘art of rhetoric so that they could become capable and 
cultured citizens’. Thus, in Antidosis he wrote: ‘I try to persuade the city as a whole to 
undertake the sort of actions from which the citizens will become prosperous and which will 
deliver the other Greeks from their present evils’ (85).57 Antidosis also outlines ‘the purpose of 
rhetorical study’, as referred to by Crowley and Hawhee: 
When anyone elects to speak or write discourses which are worthy of praise and 
honour, it is not conceivable that such a person will support causes which are unjust or 
petty or devoted to private quarrels, and not rather those which are great and 
honourable, devoted to the welfare of humanity and the common good. It follows, 
then, that the power to speak well and think right will reward the person who 
approaches the art of discourse with love of wisdom and love of honour (276).58 
To achieve this goal, Isocrates claimed that three things were necessary: ‘native ability, study, 
and practice. Some authorities credit Isocrates with establishing the public speech as an art 
form.’59 His influence and legacy in the study and advancement of rhetoric cannot be 
underestimated and, as Marrou reminds us, Isocrates cast a larger shadow than the critic Plato 
in the educational tradition of the ancient West: ‘On the whole it was Isocrates, not Plato, who 
educated fourth-century Greece and subsequently the Hellenistic and Roman worlds; it was 
from Isocrates that, “as from a Trojan horse”, there emerged all those teachers and men of 
culture, noble idealists, simple moralists, lovers of fine phrases, all those fluent voluble 
speakers, to whom classical antiquity owed both the qualities and the defects of its main 
cultural tradition.’60 
The Greek rhetorical tradition has, according to Samuel Edelman, profoundly shaped 
and influenced our understanding of rhetoric, and continues to do so, partly because they 
‘theorized about their rhetorical practice’.61 However, Edelman then highlights the oft-
neglected rhetoric of the Jewish spoken voice: 
There is another, less studied, tradition in daily use. This rhetorical tradition is older 
than the 2400-year Greek rhetorical theory based upon the works of Aristotle, 
Isocrates and the Sophists. That alternative is Jewish rhetoric, which celebrates a 4000 
year old tradition.62 
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With specific regard to Jewish rhetoric, Falk helps to place the written biblical texts in a 
historical timeframe, noting that it is ‘impossible’ to situate the Hebrew Scriptures in a 
‘precise’ historical context: ‘According to Jewish tradition the oldest sections of the Torah were 
transcribed around 1220 BCE.’63 While much of the recent scholarship disagrees with this 
traditional dating, there is a general consensus that the majority of the texts were written no 
later than about 400 BCE, with certain selections written many centuries earlier from even 
older oral sources.64 Thus, when Homer’s Odyssey and Iliad were being transferred from an 
oral to a written form, in a parallel world, the Hebrew Scriptures were also being redacted 
from an oral tradition.65 Commenting on one of the major differences between Jewish and 
Greek rhetoric, Margaret Zulick states that while the Hebrew Scriptures do ‘not contain 
abstract rational reflection analogous to that of the Greeks’, they do ‘represent a consummate 
rhetorical practice, containing recognizable forms of invention, arrangement and style’.66 Jacob 
Mortensen notes a variety of rhetorical devices in one of the earliest Hebrew texts, the Book 
of Job; including irony, paradox, and aporia: ‘Irony holds great rhetorical power, just as 
paradox and aporia hold great intellectual power because they make you think.’67 Indeed, 
irony, he argues, ‘is perhaps the most prevalent stylistic feature in … Job’.68 David Howard Jr. 
claims that, like ‘all religious writing’, the ‘entire Bible is rhetorical’ because it attempts to 
change behaviour and persuade.69 
However, Jewish and, especially, biblical rhetoric are often overlooked because they 
are deemed to have a revelatory nature. An example of this can be found in Kennedy’s work 
on classical rhetoric, where he downplays the role of biblical rhetoric:  
The fundamental rhetorical technique of the Old Testament is assertion of authority. 
God has given his law to his people. They are convinced because of who he is, what he 
has done for them, how he will punish them if they transgress, and how his word is 
revealed to them.70 
Kennedy concedes that ‘Judeo-Christian rhetoric’ shows a little resemblance to philosophical 
rhetoric: ‘it claims to be the simple enunciation of truth, uncontaminated by adornment, 
flattery, or sophistic argumentation’.71 However, the similarities end there because biblical 
rhetoric is not discovered through human ‘dialectic’. It is worth noting that Kennedy’s 
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concession has to include Christian rhetoric, and even his ensuing discussion of the ‘Old 
Testament’ is framed by Christian interpretation and tradition.72 Yet, Falk notes that Jewish 
rhetoric ‘represents a distinct (and mostly uncorrupted through time) approach to speech’.73 
James Crenshaw takes a different view to the narrow analysis which ‘isolates’ biblical 
rhetoric as asserted authority: ‘Israel’s teachers spoke with authority, but they also developed 
and refined persuasion to an art.’74 He draws examples from the personification of ‘Wisdom’ 
(Dame Wisdom) in the Book of Proverbs; and the speeches of Job, his friends and God in the 
Book of Job. These examples from the ‘Wisdom Literature’ of Scripture demonstrate ‘appeals 
to ethos, pathos and logos … [where] persuasive technique oscillates among three different 
poles: the speaker, the audience, and the speech’.75 The appeals highlight the character of the 
speaker, the emotions of the audience, and the logic of the argument, as found in Greco-
Roman oratory. The Book of Proverbs presents two rhetors in the personifications of Wisdom 
and Folly: 
The voice of reason, Wisdom, uses rhetoric steeped in prophetic tradition, filled with 
threats and authoritative claims. She also offers rich reward for those who heed her 
teachings. Her rival, Folly, relies on suggestive eloquence, a smooth line that echoes 
promises often associated with clandestine sexual encounters.76 
Moreover, while Israelite teachers employed ‘persuasive techniques and rhetorical strategies’ 
in their instruction, in the Book of Job it is God who acts as teacher with unanswerable 
questions and the ‘ironical taunt, “Surely you know!”’77 Indeed, as David Frank asserts: ‘The 
God of the Hebrew Bible is, by nature, argumentative’.78 In the biblical narrative humans are 
made in the image of God (Genesis 1:26), and so they too are argumentative, according to 
Frank, and as a result: ‘Agonistic speech is the beginning of Jewish theology.’79 
Falk argues that the extreme power of speech, with its ability to create and destroy, 
forms the basis of Jewish rhetorical theory.80 In the opening words of the Hebrew Scriptures 
the universe is made by an act of speech: 
 In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. Now the earth was unformed 
and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the spirit of God hovered 
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over the face of the waters. And God said: ‘Let there be light.’ And there was light 
(Genesis1:1-3, JPS Tanakh 1917). 
These verses evoke the ‘very foundations of a Jewish theory of speech’ because a universe 
created with words imbues words with an extraordinary power worthy of respect. Other 
biblical passages ‘reveal a similar philosophy of powerful words’, where, for example, God’s 
word is likened to a ‘fire’ and a ‘hammer that breaks the rocks in pieces’ (Jeremiah 23:29).81 
Speaking words (דבר, davar) becomes the ‘touchstone notion’ in Scripture, where ‘God's 
arguments become speech acts, creative interventions in the world of experience’.82 Agonistic 
speech between the human and divine is not essentially characteristic of the Western tradition 
– Frank points out that in Greek mythology, ‘humans do not engage in genuine argument with 
Zeus’, while ‘Christian tradition submerges the arguing-with-God tradition in order to 
emphasize contrition’.83 An example of this Christian propensity can be seen in the translation 
of a verse from the Book of Job in the King James Version, where Job declares: ‘Though he slay 
me, yet will I trust in him: but I will maintain mine own ways before him’ (13:15). Frank 
believes that the Christian translation censors the Hebrew to eliminate argument: ‘the Hebrew 
Bible has Job declaring “[God] may well slay me; I may have no hope; Yet I will argue my case 
before Him”’.84 The Hebrew explicitly includes a form of the verb יכח (yakach), meaning ‘to 
argue’.85 
God’s arguments with Abraham (Genesis 18:16-33), Moses (Exodus 3-4:14, 32:7-14; 
Numbers 11:10-17, 14:11-20), and Job (Job 13, 23, 38-42:6) reveal ‘essential qualities of the 
Hebrew God,’ and elements of these arguments replay in subsequent Jewish thought.86 Speech 
from the mouth of God has power to create and destroy, to bring into existence and to sustain 
all things; whereas humans rarely have this power of speech in the Hebrew Scriptures, unless 
they are speaking on God’s behalf, as in the case, for example, of Moses or Elijah. However, 
speech in the mouths of humans towards God proves to have a different kind of power, a 
persuasive power. In response to argument, God shows surprise; changes his course of action; 
relinquishes control; and allows freedom of choice – God listens and adapts: 
To God's credit, argumentation leads God to reduce the scope of God's claims in 
argument with Abraham, change mood and the decision to act in response to 
arguments posed by Moses, and acknowledge defeat in argumentative exchange with 
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Job. By engaging in argument, God reveals an openmindedness, an openness I would 
extend to God's emotional state as well.87 
Of course, the effects of argumentation are ‘bilateral’ – both God and humans undertake risks 
in the process: ‘they risk significant change to self, others, and world’, because ‘the deepest 
function served by argument … is to confront self and other with the risk of change’.88 Frank is 
right to emphasise the concept of ‘risk’ in argument because the hearer is always free to agree 
or disagree – there is no guarantee the argument will successfully persuade. Additionally, the 
hearer may choose to simply ignore the argument or remain neutral or even subject it to 
criticism.89 In this sense, all orators run the risk of failure if their only goal is to persuade. 
In Abraham’s argument with God regarding the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah’s 
population, Abraham (with his nephew Lot – a resident of Sodom – clearly in mind) attempts 
to win a reprieve: 
Will you indeed sweep away the righteous with the wicked? Suppose there are fifty 
righteous within the city. Will you then sweep away the place and not spare it for the 
fifty righteous who are in it? Far be it from you to do such a thing, to put the righteous 
to death with the wicked, so that the righteous fare as the wicked! Far be that from 
you! Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just? (Genesis 18:23-25, ESV). 
Abraham frames the argument with rhetorical questions to remind God of his standards of 
justice and clemency, and then appeals to those standards: ‘The rhetorical questions pressure 
God to perform the reasoning necessary to reach a just conclusion.’90 God replies that if he 
finds fifty righteous people in Sodom, he will spare the whole city (26). Abraham commences 
to barter with God, drawing him into a negotiation over numbers, and driving down the 
minimum for which God will spare Sodom from fifty to forty-five to forty to thirty to twenty. 
Finally, Abraham says, “Oh let not the Lord be angry, and I will speak again but this once. 
Suppose ten are found there.” He answered, “For the sake of ten I will not destroy it.” (28-32). 
Frank likens the exchange to the trade between merchants and customers in a Middle-Eastern 
Kasbah but, more importantly, Abraham’s final offer succeeded in changing the measure of 
justice.91  
By using phrases such as ‘I who am but dust and ashes’ (27), Abraham ‘deploys a 
whole panoply of the abundant rhetorical devices of ancient Hebrew for expressing self-
abasement before a powerful figure’.92 Where Aristotle tied rhetoric to utilitarian goodness 
and Cicero tied oratory to sapiential prudence, Abraham ties argument to righteousness and 
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justice (צדק, tzedek). His appeal to tzedek ‘involves compassion for the other and an 
integration of equity with mercy, truth and peace, love and justice’.93 The final fate of Sodom 
and Gomorrah in the following chapter reveals that although Abraham understood his hearer 
and pitched his appeal to God’s thoughts and emotions with rhetorical skill, he perhaps 
overestimated the people he sought to help. Nevertheless, he does not challenge God’s plans 
if (as it turns out) ‘destruction is warranted by their agreed-upon standards’.94 
If, as Falk suggests, words have the power to ‘create worlds and destroy people,’ then 
it follows that they must be respectfully treated and subjected to laws regulating their use: 
‘Words are powerful and dangerous and as such Jewish culture puts a strong emphasis on the 
study of speech and has developed detailed laws concerning when, how, and why to use 
speech.’95 Perhaps the most dangerous type of speech identified in Jewish rhetoric is 
‘falsehood’ or lying (שקר, sheqer), which is explicitly prohibited in the ninth commandment: 
‘You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour’ (Exodus 20:16, ESV). Throughout the 
Torah and the Book of Proverbs falsehood is prohibited and strongly condemned: ‘the LORD 
hates … a lying tongue’ (Proverbs 6:16-17, ESV). According to Falk, the traditional Jewish 
interpretation of these verses prohibits ‘any act of speech that is false and damaging’, so that, 
collectively, the verses prohibit lying ‘in all circumstances – in important judicial matters of life 
and death, as well as in casual conversation’.96 Yet, there is at least one example in the 
Scriptures that appears to commend falsehood, when the king of Egypt commands the Hebrew 
midwives to kill all male babies born to the Hebrew women: 
But the midwives feared God and did not do as the king of Egypt commanded them, 
but let the male children live. So the king of Egypt called the midwives and said to 
them, ‘Why have you done this, and let the male children live?’ The midwives said to 
Pharaoh, ‘Because the Hebrew women are not like the Egyptian women, for they are 
vigorous and give birth before the midwife comes to them.’ So God dealt well with the 
midwives… (Exodus 1:15-20, ESV). 
There is no indication in the text that God is displeased with the midwives, quite the opposite, 
in fact. There is clearly a prioritisation in effect, because the midwives disobey the king’s 
orders, risking their own safety, out of reverence for God. This act appears to legitimise their 
false report to the king. It is not clear if Falk is aware of this example, but it seems to set a 
precedent for lying in order to save life. Generally, however, ‘acts of deception were 
considered criminal and punishable through public trial and judgment’.97 Moreover, Jewish 
rhetoric also draws attention to the role of the hearer of falsehood – thus, ‘Judges have a 
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responsibility not to listen to false testimony’, and ‘it is prohibited for one to listen to casual 
lies’.98 
Flattery (from חלף, chalaq, literally ‘smooth’) is likewise condemned in Scripture as a 
form of deceitfulness. In a Psalm attributed to David, he says of his enemies: ‘For there is no 
truth in their mouth; their inmost self is destruction; their throat is an open grave; they flatter 
with their tongue’ (Psalm 5:9, ESV). Falk contrasts the sophistic perspective wherein flattery is 
a ‘persuasive tool,’ with ‘Jewish rhetoric [which] considers it dangerous and prohibits it’.99 Both 
the flattered and the flatterer suffer as a consequence. For the former, ‘A lying tongue hates 
its victims, and a flattering mouth works ruin’ (Proverbs 26:28, ESV), because flattery ‘prevents 
self-improvement’. For the latter, ‘A man who flatters his neighbour spreads a net for his feet’ 
(Proverbs 29:5, ESV). No good can come of flattery, no matter what the intentions. Far more 
effective tools in Jewish rhetoric are ‘straight talk’ and open rebuke: ‘Whoever rebukes a man 
will afterward find more favour than he who flatters with his tongue’ (Exodus 28:23, ESV).100 
Indeed, an appropriate rebuke is positively encouraged, especially when laws have been or 
might be broken: ‘Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart; thou shalt surely rebuke thy 
neighbour, and not bear sin because of him’ (Leviticus 19:17, JPS Tanakh 1917). Nevertheless, 
there are very strict guidelines for giving rebukes – the speaker must show respect to the 
hearer, and not cause them embarrassment or shame: ‘Shaming a [neighbour] in public is 
considered lashon hara [לשון הרע, literally ‘evil tongue’] and is a violation serious enough to 
warrant exclusion from “olam haba” (the world to come).’101 
 Jewish rhetoric warns against slander (לשן, lashan): ‘Whoever slanders his neighbour 
secretly I will destroy’ (Psalm 101:5, ESV).’102 However, it is in the warning against verbosity 
that Jewish rhetoric makes a truly unique contribution: 
One of the most surprising negative commandments is the restricting of speech itself. 
One dominant theme in Proverbs is that people should speak seldom. Unlike Platonic 
rhetoric which promotes debate through dialectic, Jewish rhetoric promotes 
parsimony in speech and warns against debate. Underlying this approach is an idea 
fundamental to Judaism that speech is powerful and that dangerous consequences can 
result from speaking.103 
The ‘distrust of speech’ is clearly evidenced in the Scriptures: ‘When words are many, 
transgression is not lacking, but whoever restrains his lips is prudent’ (Proverbs 10:19, ESV); 
and ‘A prudent man conceals knowledge, but the heart of fools proclaims folly’ (Proverbs 
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12:23, ESV).104 Yet, Falk’s point is specific to debate rather than persuasive argumentation, for 
example, in the argument between God and Abraham neither party speaks superfluously. 
Whilst Falk’s presentation of Jewish rhetorical theory is mainly prohibitive (setting 
limits on speech), discussion of Torah is ‘explicitly promoted’: ‘And these words, which I 
command thee this day, shall be upon thy heart; and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy 
children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thy house, and when thou walkest by the 
way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up’ (Deuteronomy 6:6-7, JPS Tanakh 
1917). Talking about the law is here commanded in relatively limitless terms, encompassing all 
times of day and all situations where discussion is possible.105 The power of speech is also 
positively manifested in the keeping of promises, especially those promises or vows made to 
God: ‘If a man vows a vow to the LORD, or swears an oath to bind himself by a pledge, he shall 
not break his word. He shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth’ (Numbers 30:2, 
ESV).106 To break a word runs counter to the creative and sustaining power of speech – the 
broken vow becomes a falsehood and violates tzedek. To keep a word reflects the universe-
creating power of speech – the intact vow is consistent with true speech and upholds tzedek. 
The methods of style and delivery in Jewish rhetoric are not as pronounced as in the 
Greco-Roman counterparts. Neither are the Scriptures silent on these matters: 
Jewish law reflects a general attitude that persuasion and learning are enhanced with 
polite, well-composed, and pleasant appeals instead of agitating ones. Underlying 
these tenets are the beliefs that common courtesy and graciousness build 
relationships and are more effective in overcoming stubborn opposition.107 
Practical advice for the delivery of Jewish rhetoric can be found in the books of Proverbs and 
Ecclesiastes: ‘A soft answer turns away wrath, but a harsh word stirs up anger’ (Proverbs 15:1, 
ESV); ‘sweetness of speech increases persuasiveness’ (Proverbs 16:21, ESV); ‘Gracious words 
are like a honeycomb, sweetness to the soul and health to the body’ (Proverbs 16:24, ESV); ‘A 
word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in a setting of silver’ (Proverbs 25:11, ESV); 
‘With patience a ruler may be persuaded, and a soft tongue will break a bone’ (Proverbs 25:15, 
ESV); and ‘The words of the wise heard in quiet are better than the shouting of a ruler among 
fools’ (Ecclesiastes 9:17, ESV). Falk notes that the word ‘soft’ in Proverbs 15:1 means 
‘pacifying’, whilst the word ‘harsh’ (or ‘grievous’) means ‘producing pain’; and that ‘most 
commentaries interpret the line as referring to the persuasiveness of pleasant speech’.108 
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Ancient Jewish rhetoric presents conceptual abstraction mainly in the form of 
personification rather than through rational abstraction.109 Wisdom is not only personified as a 
virtuous woman, but also as a witness to creation with a rhetorical voice: 
The LORD possessed me at the beginning of his work, the first of his acts of old. Ages 
ago I was set up, at the first, before the beginning of the earth (Proverbs 8:22-23, ESV). 
Wisdom’s speech is powerful and authoritative, and throughout the Book of Proverbs her 
persuasive voice calls out to be heeded. Moreover, the creation itself, to whose birth wisdom 
was a witness, is given a voice – in the Psalms, ‘speech inhabits a sentient cosmos’: 
The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his handiwork. 
Day to day pours out speech, and night to night reveals knowledge. 
There is no speech, nor are there words, whose voice is not heard. 
Their voice goes out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world 
(Psalm 19:1-4, ESV). 
In the Hebrew world the creation is a rhetor, declaring, proclaiming, speaking and revealing its 
author. Creation’s voice and words fill space and time in a continuous oration of praise. As 
Zulick rightly states: ‘This intensely alive, intensely rhetorical cosmos contains little space for 
objectivity or abstract rational thought.’110 Thus, despite the absence of rational abstraction, 
the Scriptures hold a consistently high regard for the power of speech, eloquence, argument 
and persuasion: ‘not so much an articulated theory as a practice arising out of a distinct 
rhetorical spirituality…’111 
The Hebrew Scriptures contain a ‘cluster of synonymous verbs’ – נזל (nâzal), נטף 
(natap), and ערף (arap) – literally ‘dripping’, ‘to drip’ or ‘to trickle’, which ‘likens eloquence to 
smooth liquid dripping from the tongue, with either a prophetic or an erotic connotation’.112 It 
appears in a ‘prophetic embodiment’ in one of the songs of Moses: 
Give ear, ye heavens, and I will speak; and let the earth hear the words of my mouth. 
My doctrine shall drop as the rain, my speech shall distil as the dew… (Deuteronomy 
32:1-2). 
Zulick renders the beginning of the second verse as ‘May my eloquence drop like rain,’113 so 
that oratory in the Jewish tradition has the power to refresh and nourish the hearer.  
 Persuasion in the Scriptures, Zulick argues, ‘locates the responsibility for the 
persuasive act with the hearer.’114 Thus, when a situation is described in which ‘persuasion 
takes place in an ethically positive way,’ it attributes the hearer with the ‘decisive action’ 
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rather than the speaker. Both speaking and hearing are powerful acts in Jewish rhetoric. In 
Hebrew the verb שמע (shema) means ‘to hear’, ‘to listen’, ‘to pay attention to’ and, therefore, 
by extension ‘to obey’. Zulick gives the example of Judah trying to convince his brothers not to 
kill Joseph: 
Then Judah said to his brothers, “What profit is it if we kill our brother and conceal his 
blood? Come, let us sell him to the Ishmaelites, and let not our hand be upon him, for 
he is our brother, our own flesh.” And his brothers listened to him (Genesis 37:26-27, 
ESV). 
Here, ‘the action is described through their hearing, not his persuading’.115 Hearing, then, 
forms an essential part of persuasion and ‘formal appeals’. This is especially evident in the 
numerous appeals to God in prayers and petitions, for example, when Solomon implores God 
to hear the people (1 Kings 8:27-53). Likewise, the Prophets often ‘preface’ their messages 
with the instructive appeal to ‘Hear the word of the LORD…’116 Shema has even become the 
title of the fundamental prayer of Judaism – the recitation of Deuteronomy 6:4 – ‘Hear, O 
Israel: the LORD our God, the LORD is one.’ 
The appeal to hear places responsibility on the hearer not the speaker and, thus, 
makes them the ‘deciding figure’ in the rhetorical act. Moreover, Zulick argues that it 
‘strengthens the medium, the word itself, by removing any suggestion that true words might 
fail to persuade’. The hearer is convinced because of the weight, authority and rightness of the 
words, and not the art of oratory.117 Zulick concludes that ‘rhetors cannot compel persuasion, 
that rhetoric appeals to an independent motion of the will on the part of the hearer, much of 
which is dark to us, and only some aspects of which may be open to a speaker's influence’.118 
This conclusion emphasises the hearer’s response, but it does not diminish the effect of the 
speaker upon that response and the force of persuasion. In balance, the Scriptures present 
both speaking and hearing as powerful acts. Edelman sums up biblical rhetoric as ‘not 
restricted to policy, legalistic and moralistic rhetorical forms’, but as also demonstrating a well 
developed rhetorical form of poetry as advanced as any developed by the Greeks’: 
Most important … is the significance of the Bible as a source for strong models of 
oratory and general communication between people and God, people and people, and 
between people and their monarchs and religious leadership. Certainly the last 
speeches of Moses, those of Aaron, the various angels, and even those of God become 
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important models for the future development of communication in Jewish society over 
the centuries.’119 
 
Roman and Rabbinic Rhetoric 
 
The Roman Latin word oratoria, from the verb orare, gives us the origins of the English word 
oratory, meaning ‘to speak before a court assembly, or to plead’.120 Commenting on Roman 
rhetoric, Joy Connolly states: ‘Active, reactive, and rich with resources for self-reflection, 
rhetoric in Rome always meant much more than learning to deliver a speech, which is why it 
has lived for so many centuries not in dusty library corners or the memories of curious 
antiquarians but at the [centre] of European culture, in monasteries, rural schools, and royal 
courts.’121 Alongside grammar and dialectic, ‘rhetoric constituted the core of study for 
educated Romans by (at the latest) the first century BCE’.122 Not unlike the Greek rhetoric that 
preceded it, Roman rhetoric arose from ‘the practice of oratory, acts of formal speaking before 
citizens gathered together – political orations, sermons, law court arguments – and also bears 
the influence of artistic performances and casual exchanges of conversation’.123 Unsurprisingly, 
then, the body of Greek rhetoric from the fifth to fourth centuries BCE had an ‘enormous 
impact on the Roman legal culture’.124 Both Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) and Marcus 
Fabius Quintilian (35-95 C.E) were Roman lawyers, educators, and philosophers who fused 
together and developed the ideas of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle.125 They wrote handbooks 
that ‘advocated rhetoric as the basis for all dealings in civic and practical matters’; and the 
‘unification of philosophy and rhetoric’. This led to Quintilian's definition of the ideal orator as 
‘the good man speaking well’.126 The ‘good’ was the highest virtue committed ‘however 
indirectly, to regulating the res publica, especially in the microcosm of the law court, the 
guardian of justice and equality before the law.’127 
Enrica Sciarrino, citing Cicero, points to Marcus Porcius Cato (c. 234-149 BCE) as the 
first Roman to ‘produce samples of oratory worth reading (Brut. 60)’.128 Cato came from 
outside of Roman aristocracy to achieve the heights of consulship in 195 BCE, censor in 184 
BCE, and ‘as an ex-consul made his opinions heard in the senate for about forty years’. Percival 
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Cole mentions that a manual of oratory is ascribed to Cato, and that from his time rhetors 
began to write down and publish their speeches, which had until then been given without 
notes.129 Cicero compared Cato’s style to that of the Greek logographer and orator, Lysias (c. 
445-380 BCE), affirming that Cato was ‘acutus (“acute”), elegans (“charming”), facetus 
(“witty”), and brevis (“brief”) like Lysias’ (Brut. 63). Cicero also notes that Cato was ‘solemn in 
praising, harsh in chastising, shrewd in preaching, and subtle in arguing (65)’.130  
For Cicero and Quintilian, the ‘goal of rhetoric was to persuade; hence, rhetoric was 
most commonly deemed as “the art of persuasion.”’131 The ‘first criterion’ and most common 
characteristic of Roman rhetoric, according to Remer, is its ‘persuasive design’: 
In pursuit of their goal of persuasion, Roman orators esteemed prudence as their 
foremost virtue. In doing so, they manifested their esteem for prudential reasoning as 
a sine qua non for effective oratory while also evincing the broader Roman respect for 
practical wisdom.132 
This was an attempt, then, to create a fusion of persuasion and philosophy – held apart, for 
the most part, in the Greek sophist and Platonic traditions. The good man was also the wise 
man speaking well. The prudence of Roman orators was manifested in a commitment to 
practical, human wisdom. The ‘rhetoric of prudence’ adapted speech to circumstance, thus, 
moving towards Plato’s suggestion for the orator that they take more consideration of their 
audience.133 
Cole claims that above all other study, oratory was pursued by talented Roman youths, 
who formally trained in oratorical schools and began speaking in the forum at the age of 
eighteen or nineteen, often debuting in funeral orations.134 Oratorical education emphasised 
the ‘cultivation of a community of learners, reflecting on tradition, and preparation for public 
democratic life, particularly through mastering language and texts.’135 Quintilian’s Institutio 
Oratorio (Institutes of Oratory) was considered a classic work on education from its publication 
in 90 CE, and utilised in Roman schools ‘until the collapse of the Empire, and probably beyond’: 
‘The education he prescribed for young citizens was aimed at producing speakers and writers 
who had the best aims of their community at heart.’136 However, as oratory developed, it 
gained ‘new functions and a new status’ in the Roman world, as a ‘pursuit valued for its own 
sake, a high intellectual amusement’; ‘an important element in public ceremonial … to 
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welcome distinguished visitors, to praise a city or a festival, to celebrate a society marriage or 
commemorate a death’; a ‘framework for the discussion of literature in general, and especially 
poetry’.137 As a result, rhetoric appeared to lose some of its gravitas. Remer argues that in the 
later republican period, Roman orators simply reinforced the political consensus regardless of 
their loyalty, creating an “ideological monotony”.138 As Robert Morstein-Marx notes, the rights 
and benefits of the people took second place in a battle of personality over ideology.139 Cole 
documents the decline of rhetoric in Roman education, where ‘oratory became less genuine 
and more servile’. The schools renounced ‘serious topics’ and became centres of a ‘host of 
fictions’. Critics believed the schools ‘made youths into fools’; and they ridiculed the questions 
raised for disputation, ‘dealing with tyrants, or pirates, or the sacrifice of maidens’. Questions 
concerning contemporary politics were ‘practically tabooed’ and historical debates lacked 
realism.140 
Connolly summarises the role of the rhetor, which perfectly reflected the Roman 
governing class: 
The demanding blend of bodily and mental skills involved in rhetorical training, which 
combined and mingled rival discourses of traditional senatorial authority, logical 
reasoning, literary knowledge, deportment, theatrical strategies of popular appeal, 
and sheer pleasure in the grain of the voice, prescribed normative practices of identity 
formation designed to reflect the values of the Roman governing class and reinforce its 
traditional dominance.141 
Nevertheless, in the wake of the classical Roman orators, interest in rhetoric ‘waxed and 
waned through the early Christian period (150-400 C.E.), the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, 
and the Enlightenment’.142 During the Italian Renaissance, rhetoric was recognized and valued 
as ‘an essential route to knowing and acting in the world of practical affairs’, however, 
elsewhere ‘it was primarily relegated to issues of style and delivery’. 143 Yet, according to 
Connolly, it was Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, his handbook on Ciceronian rhetoric, which 
revealed the ‘proximity of ideals of republican citizenship and imperial courtly life’ and, thus, 
‘helps explain the persistence of rhetoric into late antiquity and beyond.’144 
Edelman notes that during the Talmudic period ‘Jewish rhetorical practice moved from 
orality to literary creation; from policy formulation to policy interpretation’.145 In the rabbinic 
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literature of the first century onwards there is an ‘argumentation and argumentative structure’ 
within the texts that reveals the full scope of Jewish rhetorical tradition.146 Marc Hirshman 
points out that speech continued to be a powerful act in the post-biblical period: 
For the rabbinic sages, understanding was consummated in speech … for the early 
rabbis learning was done through recitation and talk. Its object was full mastery of 
God's word and full understanding of it.147 
Thus, the study of Torah was ‘quintessentially speaking Torah’. The goal of Torah study was to 
shape the style and content of human speech: ‘Learning was conceived of as an oral speech 
act.’148 The words of the Torah were ‘repeated incessantly’, fulfilling the biblical ordinance: ‘Let 
not this Book of the Teaching [Torah] cease from your lips, but recite it day and night’ (Joshua 
1:8, JPS Tanakh).149 
Edelman defines Talmudic rhetoric as ‘finding balance and integration … the art or 
method of reconciling of individual and systemic goals and constraints.’150 He gives as an 
example the ‘principle of Rabbi Judah in which dissent was sanctified’. This principle 
demonstrates the Talmud’s ‘rhetorical complexity’ and ‘malleability’.151 Frank highlights the 
visual aspect of the Talmud’s rhetorical nature: ‘The Talmud is structured as a spiral, with the 
earliest arguments in the middle of the page, attended by responses curling around the 
[centre] in chronological order.’152 The page positioned the rhetorical speakers, celebrating 
argumentation: ‘Disagreement is privileged and assumed, and speech is valued most highly.’153 
Jacob Neusner notes that the rhetorical conventions of both the Jerusalem and Babylonian 
Talmuds govern the order for setting out the different types of composition in much the same 
way, such as text-criticism, exegesis, and proof-texts: ‘both Talmuds conform to complex and 
distinctive rhetorical programs’.154 This ordering, according to Frank, ‘placed the elements of 
argument in relationship and in attenuated hierarchy’: 
In this system, all the elements and values in an argument might be valued, but 
temporarily placed in a rank order given the context and issues facing the community. 
The argumentative technique used to determine hierarchies in the Talmud is known as 
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the kal ve-chomer. Kal ve-chomer deploys juxtaposition, seeking to tease out 
similarities and differences.155 
The Talmud innovated an interaction between rhetoric and dialectic, where the ‘discovery of 
the truth is paramount’, through the method of demonstration.156 As Eliezer Segal points out, 
argumentation permeated the atmosphere: ‘The encouragement of free exchange was a 
crucial feature of Talmudic culture, where the preferred mode of instruction involved intensive 
debate and argumentation, and every statement had to be defended against challenges by 
colleagues and students.’157 
The compilers of the Talmud had ‘more in mind than to convey legal or theological 
information’, according to Martin Jaffee: ‘Their concern was to transmit not only content but, 
perhaps even more importantly, a discursive process by which content could be intellectually 
mastered … they clearly chose a rhetorical style that would reconstruct, and draw students 
into, the richly oral/aural world of the Rabbinic bet midrash (“study group”), bay rav (“disciple 
circle”), or yeshivah (“learning community”).’158 Indeed, José Faur notes that the teachers of 
the Talmudic Academies in third and fourth century Israel and Babylonia were called Amoraim 
(singular amora), from the root word אמר (amar) meaning ‘to say’ or ‘to utter’. Thus, the 
amora is an ‘orator, or master of eloquence’.159 
Rhetoric is also to be found in the midrashic texts, as Neusner points to in the Midrash 
on Genesis: ‘The mixed character of Genesis Rabbah, joining propositional to exegetical 
rhetoric in order to make points of both general intelligibility and also very specific and 
concrete amplification of detail, marks a transitional moment in the workings of Midrash.’160 
Alexander Samely, commenting on the ‘halakhic Midrashim’, states that ‘one frequently finds a 
rhetoric of dialogue, featuring expressions such as “You say…”, “Am I to understand…?”, “I 
raise an objection: …”, “Come and hear!”, and many similar ones.’161 Whereas, David Metzger 
and Steven Katz, commenting on the ‘particular mode of Jewish rhetoric’ in ‘aggadic’ Midrash, 
note that: Retelling and interpreting these narratives, aphorisms, and parables are central 
rhetorical activities in Jewish religion, thought, literature, and culture.’162 Michael Fishbane 
also comments on the rhetoric of aggadic Midrash, which employs a variety of devices to 
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transform the audience’s position or principles: ‘Revision, reorientation, and reversal of the 
standpoint of the addressee are thus major preoccupations of the rhetor or writer who may 
use aggadic exegesis and embellishment as his tool; and irony, subversion, co-optation, 
selective emphasis, or didacticism (lapidary and indirect, or exhortatory and direct) are some 
of the other rhetorical devices used.’163 One implication of midrashic rhetoric, Metzger and 
Katz argue, is that the ‘rabbinic imagination continually creates new discursive spaces where 
none could have existed before (or discovers and opens new spaces in old places)’.164 As a 
result, midrashic rhetoric does not shut down arguments or ‘avenues of exploration’. Much 
like the Talmudic texts, the Midrashim present a polyvalent rhetoric: 
In both aggadic and halakhic midrash, interpretations and opinions are often left to 
coexist in a delicately and eloquently balanced text, although the last opinion is always 
the preferred option. This is a rhetoric that therefore acknowledges, accepts, and 
tends to retain multiple perspectives. Midrashic rhetoric accepts the multiplicities of 
truth, the partiality and limitations of perspective … and the necessity of privileging 
one version of truth over another (or deception over truth).165 
Thus, the multifaceted exegesis of the Midrashim forms a rhetorical voice (or voices) on the 
Scripture it seeks to interpret. Whilst the interpretations of Scripture were open, layered and 
multitudinous in Midrash, they were also essential to the practical application of Scripture to 
the hearer or reader. Hence, the interpretations must be persuasive. 
Rabbinic discourse marked a watershed moment in the development of Jewish 
rhetoric – it was post-biblical and increasingly diasporic. It had to contend with the pervasive 
impact of Hellenistic and Roman culture, as well as the relatively new emergence of 
Christianity, which was becoming increasingly polemical. Richard Hidary believes that Greco-
Roman rhetoric had a degree of influence upon rabbinic argumentation: 
The rabbis and their predecessors flourished in a common culture that included 
classical rhetoric, and they found within that tradition a mode of reasoning that 
resonated with their own organic thinking. This resonance allowed the rabbis to adopt 
various technical aspects of classical rhetoric, such as arrangement, certain 
hermeneutical tools, and select progymnasmatic exercises, even if they may have 
rejected some of the more relativistic and sophistic underpinnings and techniques of 
the Greco-Roman tradition.166 
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If Hidary is correct, then the rabbinic period would mark the beginnings of an interest in 
classical rhetoric that was later developed by the medieval and Renaissance Jewish scholars.167 
Whether the Rabbis embraced aspects of classical rhetoric or not, they clearly had a rich 
tradition of their own to draw on. 
 
Aristotle and the Hebrew Prophets 
 
Aristotle (c. 384-322 BCE) wrote and delivered his lectures on rhetoric partly in response to 
Plato’s critique of the sophists.168 He was possibly the first to identify rhetoric as a 
communicative art that was morally neutral and, thus, it had the potential to be used 
positively or negatively.169 Aristotle gathered the rhetorical handbooks that were available in 
his time and collated them into a collection: the Synagoge Technon (Synthesis of Arts).170 It 
seems that this process persuaded him that rhetorical theory was unacceptable in its current 
state, and consequently he tried to establish rules for rhetoric that would hold good in any 
given situation. Rather than teaching by example, as was the way of the sophists, Aristotle 
preferred to teach by these general principles, which could be taught to successive 
generations of students. Crowley and Hawhee believe that Aristotle’s lecture notes to his 
students formed the basis for the text now known as On Rhetoric.171 
In On Rhetoric, Aristotle attempts to bring rhetoric and philosophical dialectic 
together, bridging the divide between Plato and the sophists: 
Rhetoric is an antistrophos [counterpart] to dialectic; for both are concerned with such 
things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no 
separately defined science. A result is that all people, in some way, share in both; for 
all, up to a point, try both to test and uphold an argument [as in dialectic] and to 
defend themselves and attack [others, as in rhetoric] (1354a).172 
As Cohen points out, here Aristotle sought to ‘reground’ rhetoric: ‘emphasizing its capacity to 
use reasoning from common premises and other forms of logical argument for persuasive 
purposes’.173 Previous writers on oratory had missed the essentials, according to Aristotle, and 
focused instead on either ‘formal properties of speeches’ or persuasion through emotion and 
so on. He then argues that rhetorical argument occurs consciously and unconsciously in 
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everyday life: ‘Now among the general public, some do these things at random and others 
through an ability acquired by habit, but since both ways are possible, it is clear that it would 
also be possible to do the same by [following] a path; for it is possible to observe the cause 
why some succeed by habit and others accidentally, and all would at once agree that such 
observation is the activity of an art [tekhnē]’ (1354a).174 Thus, as Crowley and Hawhee state, 
‘all people learn how to argue in the course of their daily affairs’.175 Nevertheless, Janice Lauer 
makes the point that as an art, oratory ‘entailed knowledge of effective rhetorical strategies 
and provided a guide for rhetorical action’.176 
It is likely that Aristotle also observed Plato's imperative that rhetors should know the 
types of men’s souls, and as a result he drew up a long list of audience ‘characters’, based on 
age, position, and the like.177 Indeed, Aristotle defined rhetoric as the ability to find the 
available arguments suited to any given situation: ‘Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in 
each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion’ (1355b).178 In commenting on 
this definition, Steven Katz argues that rhetoric, therefore ‘could be considered a means to an 
end, an expedient,’ as well as an ‘episteme or faculty for discovering social knowledge’: 
…in Aristotle's conception of deliberative rhetoric, expediency seems to be the primary 
virtue. Deliberative rhetoric is expedient when it serves its end, that is, political 
persuasion. The test of success in Aristotelian rhetoric is in the persuasion of the 
audience (the so-called “audience criterion”).179 
Thus, rhetoric, for Aristotle, must be both pragmatic and personal – it must fit the occasion 
and the audience in its relevancy to both. However, rhetors could invent characters to fit an 
occasion, using an ‘invented ethos’, which was an invented ethical proof (1355b). Or if they 
held a good reputation in their community, they could use that reputation as a ‘situated 
ethos’, which was a situated ethical proof.180 
Aristotle described the rhetorical process using the five terms of invention, 
arrangement, style, memory, and delivery.181 He identified various topoi (topics) – categories of 
effective argument and information for persuasion – which he listed and grouped for teaching 
others. Whilst Crowley and Hawhee argue that Aristotle is unlikely to have invented the topics 
– they had been circulating for years amongst the sophists – he did devise a scheme for their 
classification.182 These lists divided into two classes: firstly, there were twenty-eight common 
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(koina) topics – these were lines of reasoning for any type of discourse; and secondly, there 
were special (eide) topics – subject matters for specific types of discourse, such as political, 
judicial or ceremonial.183 For the special topics, rhetors require sufficient specific knowledge to 
argue effectively.184 He created a range of ‘arts’ which were his principles for the analysis of 
discourses and their matter; for using the common and special topics; and for framing 
rhetorical epistemology aided by the enthymeme (or rhetorical syllogism) and the example 
(informal deduction and induction).185 Of enthymemes, Aristotle remarked: 
…all [speakers] produce logical persuasion by means of paradigms or enthymemes and 
by nothing other than these … Speeches using paradigms are not less persuasive, but 
those with enthymemes excite more [favourable] audience reaction (1356b).186  
Enthymemes are a major principle in On Rhetoric, and in Aristotle’s writing they often appear 
as a statement followed by a clause introduced by the supporting reason ‘for’ (the Greek 
particle gar).187 Crowley and Hawhee point out that the word enthymeme is derived from the 
ancient Greek word thymos, meaning ‘spirit’ and the ‘capacity whereby people think and feel’; 
and because thymos was literally ‘located the in the midsection of the body … an 
enthymematic proof was a visceral appeal.’188 
The art of persuasion (pisteis) is dependant upon three elements, according to 
Aristotle: ‘Of the pisteis provided through speech there are three species; for some are in the 
character [ēthos] of the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some way, and some in 
the speech [logos] itself, by showing or seeming to show something’ (1356a).189 These intrinsic 
rhetorical proofs of ethos, pathos, and logos translate as ‘ethical’, ‘pathetic’ and ‘logical’. The 
ethical relates to the character of the rhetor and the audience’s perception of their 
trustworthiness. The pathetic relates to the rhetor’s ability to appeal to and engender the 
audience’s emotions. The logical relates to the soundness of the argument being made, in 
terms of its logical truths.190 Thus, the rhetor must draw upon personal character, emotional 
appeal and sound logical argument as resources for winning the audience over. Regarding the 
logical, Aristotle wrote: ‘Persuasion occurs through the arguments [logoi] when we show the 
truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case’ (1356a).191 However, if 
that truth was in doubt, then the rhetor’s character became more important in winning the 
argument: ‘for we believe fair-minded people to a great extent and more quickly [than we do 
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others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact 
knowledge but room for doubt’ (1356a). Thus, the better the rhetor’s reputation and the more 
highly esteemed they are, the more credible their arguments appear.192 The appeal to emotion 
– pathos – which Aristotle used to describe emotions in general derives from early Greek 
thought, where pathos referred to the passive state of ‘experience’; and in the Greek tragic 
plays, where pathos became associated with ‘suffering’.193 
A typical speech, claimed Aristotle, could be dissected into three component parts: ‘a 
speaker and a subject on which he speaks and someone addressed’ (1358b). The ‘objective’ or 
telos of a speech is related to the hearer.194 Rhetorical speeches were either symbouleutikon 
(‘deliberative’), dikanikon (‘judicial’) or epideiktikon (‘demonstrative’): 
Deliberative advice is either protreptic [“exhortation”] or apotreptic [“dissuasion”]; for 
both those advising in private and those speaking in public always do one or the other 
of these. In the law courts there is either accusation [katēgoria] or defense [apologia]; 
for it is necessary for the disputants to offer one or the other of these. In epideictic, 
there is either praise [epainos] or blame [psogos] (1358b).195 
Regarding deliberative rhetoric, as Katz points out, Aristotle subsumes all ethical questions into 
the question of expediency196 – ‘he [the speaker] includes other factors as incidental: whether 
it is just or unjust, or [honourable] or disgraceful’ (1358b).197 It appears from this statement 
that Aristotle did not care too much if the ultimate goal of deliberative rhetoric was just or 
unjust, or even true, as long as the means were expedient. As Katz rightly observes, ‘it is 
precisely because rhetoric is a practical art rather than a theoretical science, one located in 
praxis, in the contingent realm of action, that deliberative rhetoric can be understood to be 
primarily based on an ethic of expediency’.198 Deliberative oratory mainly focused on 
expedient subjects: ‘finances, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the 
framing of laws’ (1359b).199 In these subjects, Aristotle was concerned with the common good 
as well as the utilitarian objective: ‘But since the objective of the deliberative speaker is the 
advantageous [sympheron], and since [people] do not deliberate about this objective but 
about means that contribute to it and these [means] are things advantageous in terms of 
actions, and since the advantageous is a good, one should grasp the elements of good and 
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advantageous in the abstract’ (1362a).200 Thus, as a combination of logic and ethics, 
deliberative discourse merges ‘goodness’ and ‘utility’, so that they become synonymous.201 
In On Rhetoric, Aristotle claims that political understanding is of paramount 
importance: ‘The greatest and most important of all things in an ability to persuade and give 
good advice is to grasp an understanding of all forms of constitution [politeia] and to 
distinguish the customs and legal usages and advantages of each; for all people are persuaded 
by what is advantageous, and preserving the constitution is advantageous’ (1365b).202 He 
enumerates four political constitutions (echoing Plato in the Republic 8.544c203) which either 
partly or wholly form the central authority or decision-making institution: ‘democracy, 
oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy’. In Aristotle’s view, then, it is in the political field that 
rhetoric displays its greatest worth, regardless of the political system in which it seeks to 
persuade. 
In addition to ‘logical demonstration’, Aristotle noted the characteristics of the 
persuasive rhetor: ‘These are practical wisdom [phronēsis] and virtue [aretē] and good will 
[eunoia]; for speakers make mistakes in what they say through [failure to exhibit] either all or 
one of these…’ (1378a).204 Accordingly, there were three types of ethical mistake which 
Aristotle believed it was possible for rhetors to make: they could fail to form the correct 
opinion or conclusion on a matter through a lack of experience or knowledge; they could 
knowingly fail to disclose the correct opinion or conclusion due to ‘bad character’ or an ulterior 
motive; or they could knowingly fail to give the ‘best advice’ through lack of good will, despite 
being what Aristotle calls, ‘prudent and fair-minded’ (1378a).205 These were the only three 
ways in which rhetors could make mistakes, and the ‘only possibilities for a failed invented 
ethos’.206 
The ‘greatest force’ in persuasive rhetoric, according to Aristotle, is hypokrisis – this is 
the style and delivery of a speech: ‘It is a matter of how the voice should be used in expressing 
each emotion, sometimes loud and sometimes soft or intermediate, and how the pitch accents 
[tonoi] should be entoned, whether as acute, grave, or circumflex, and what rhythms should 
be expressed in each case; for [those who study delivery] consider three things, and these are 
volume, change of pitch [harmonia], and rhythm’ (1403b).207 The emphasis on delivery was 
necessary for the sake of clarity, as the speaker addressed their audience (1404b). Yet, as 
important as style and delivery were in Aristotle’s view, they were still ‘secondary to the 
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substance of an argument’ (1404a).208 It was also important for the rhetor to possess the 
lexical knowledge appropriate for each type of speech, be it deliberative, judicial, etc. As 
Aristotle put it, this meant ‘knowing how to speak good Greek’ (1413b).209 The correct 
language and delivery should have the effect of influencing the audience, so that they are well 
disposed towards the rhetor, or angry if required, or attentive, or distracted by humour. 
Aristotle believed that an audience paid more attention if the speaker appeared to be a 
‘reasonable person’ (1415a).210 The ideal speech should be delivered in two parts: ‘[first] to 
state the subject with which it is concerned and [then] to demonstrate the argument’ 
(1414a).211 A statement (prothesis) without a subsequent demonstration (pistis) or a 
demonstration without a preceding statement were both equally ineffective. The statement or 
premise is ‘laid down’ or ‘assumed’ before the argument is made. Therefore, any conclusion 
drawn from the ensuing argument can only be true if the premise is true.212 
In summing up Aristotle’s contribution to rhetoric, Katz makes the claim that Aristotle 
provided a ‘practical ethic for technical writing and deliberative discourse, an ethic based 
almost exclusively on expediency’.213 Yet more than that, as Erika Falk has rightly pointed out, 
Aristotle ‘codified the limits, goals, and methods of rhetoric’, and this has resulted in a 
‘delimitation of rhetoric as influence that has continued into the contemporary period’.214 
The rhetoric of the Hebrew Prophets was, however, far from expedient. Following 
Remer’s definition, the term ‘prophet’ encompasses ‘the prophet of the Hebrew Bible, from 
Moses to the Babylonian exile, including the “classical” or “canonical” prophets who 
prophesied in Israel from the eighth century B.C.E. (during the period of the great Assyrian 
expansion) onward, such as Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and others’.215 According to Henry 
Ellison, the ‘true function’ of a prophet is best illustrated by the following verse: ‘And the LORD 
said to Moses, “See, I have made you like God to Pharaoh, and your brother Aaron shall be 
your prophet.”’ (Exodus 7:1). Ellison’s argument is that the ‘prophet is to God what Aaron was 
to Moses … the prophet is God's spokesman’.216 This reference in Exodus is the second time 
that the most common word in Hebrew for ‘prophet’ or ‘speaker’ (נביא, navi) appears, and 
suggests the ‘intrinsic connection between prophet and speech’.217 Contrary to the popular 
understanding of the prophet’s function, their role ‘may involve foretelling the future’, but this 
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is a secondary function. Indeed, a great deal of the prophetic literature deals with the current 
and immediate situation of the prophet and the people, and some even focuses on past 
events. 
Yehoshua Gitay, in discussing the nature of the prophetic office, asks: ‘Does the 
prophet seek to influence his audience, or does he limit himself to the role of a messenger 
delivering God's word as a statement or a judgment, with no intent to sway that audience.’218 
Gitay notes the critical view, and the one taken by Kennedy, that ‘there is no need to move the 
audience; God's judgment is determined, and the prophet announces God's decision’.219 Whilst 
not holding this view himself, he traces it logical conclusion, where biblical criticism of the 
prophetic office led to a general regard for ‘prophetic speech as an oracle reflecting various 
literary forms, but not as a communicative discourse seeking a dialogue with the audience’.220 
Yet, many other scholars of prophetic literature see a clear case for prophetic discourse as a 
rhetorical dialogue with its audience – for Tim Bulkeley, the prophetic writing has ‘rhetorical 
purposes’, because it ‘seeks to persuade or convince’.221 Amos Kiewe also refers explicitly to 
‘prophetic rhetoric’ for the tradition of prophetic speaking practiced in the oratory of Amos, 
Hosea, Jeremiah and Isaiah: 
The principal objective of the ancient Hebrew prophets was to warn the people of an 
impending calamity unless specific measures were taken to avert it and to heed God’s 
command. The prophetic speaking, designated as an address, was rhetorical in 
structure, substance and style. It was addressed to audiences with the specific 
objective of influencing people to take a different course of action, and prophetic 
rhetoric was always action oriented.222 
Whilst it is easy to understand the critical view, because there is undoubtedly an element of 
the revelatory in the prophetic message – the prophet is communicating a divine message – 
yet, at the same time, the prophet must persuade the audience not only of the authority 
behind his message, but also of the need to act upon the message. The Prophets used 
recognisable rhetorical devices in their speech, including parables, metaphors, analogies and 
repetition for the purpose of emphasis, as in: ‘the LORD, the God of hosts, the LORD is His 
name’ (Hosea 12:5, JPS Tanakh 1917).223 
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The prophetic rhetorical tradition did not remain static but, like the Western rhetorical 
tradition, developed over the centuries. Thus, whilst Samuel, Elijah and the other early 
prophets delivered a rhetoric of shorter declaration statements; Amos, Isaiah and the later 
prophets were ‘full-fledged orators’. However, some features of the prophetic genre 
‘remained constant’, and resonate throughout the prophetic Scriptures: ‘all prophets 
addressed the nation of Israel and Judea with a distinct message – warning the people of 
impending disasters unless they corrected their sinful ways’.224 Across the span of biblical 
history, the Prophets concerned themselves with an ethical and moral rhetoric and thereby set 
the social, political and religious ‘boundaries’.225 
Just as the credibility of the orator was important in the Greco-Roman tradition, so too 
the prophetic message was measured by the credibility of the Prophets, and their ‘claim to be 
selected by God for the special task’.226 Credibility of the character was, therefore, an equally 
significant factor for rhetors in both traditions. James Darsey considers the aspect of credibility 
the central part of prophetic rhetoric, and calls this ‘the prophetic ethos’.227 An audience could 
recognise the prophet’s credibility through the stylistic devices they used, which belong to the 
prophetic office. These rhetorical devices include mentioning the prophet’s divine assignment 
to the task of delivering God’s message and recounting the experience of any visions in which 
the prophets were called, as well as the message or messages of warning. However, Kiewe 
makes a distinction between the Western and Jewish traditions in that classical rhetoric 
‘emphasized adaptation of message to audiences, [whereas] prophetic rhetoric’s very 
credibility rested on delivering orations that audiences preferred not to hear’: 
Not surprisingly, the prophets were often attacked, called names and were considered 
‘fanatic’ or ‘madmen.’ The prophet’s credibility was present when the audience was 
unwilling to heed God’s warning. This credibility was the distinguishing characteristic 
of true versus false prophets.228 
Consequently, the goal of prophetic oratory was not to adapt messages for the audience’s 
sake, but rather to ‘summon the people to justice, to righteousness, to humility and trust 
before God’.229 The Prophets achieved this goal through delivering a clear warning to the 
people and threatening God’s judgement, if the warning was not heeded: ‘Most prophecies 
included the following structural outline: accusation, repentance, warning, judgment and 
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salvation.’230 Kevin Youngblood notes that the prophetic judgement warnings often included 
speech addressed to Israel’s neighbours: 
Most prophets delivered oracles of judgment addressed to foreign nations, but they 
did so rhetorically as part of their message to Israel to serve as harbingers of Israel’s 
deliverance from foreign oppression (e.g., Obadiah and Nahum), to warn Israel/Judah 
of the disastrous consequences of dependence on alliances with foreign nations (Isaiah 
13-24), or to humble Israel by reducing her to the status of one of the nations in need 
of YHWH’s judgment (e.g., Amos 1-2).231 
Youngblood considers the uniqueness of the Book of Jonah in this context, where Jonah is 
commissioned to deliver a message of judgement ‘directly’ to the nation of Nineveh. As he 
rightly states, Jonah’s commission ‘breaks new ground in Hebrew prophecy’.232 
Because the prophet’s credibility usually led to attack, name-calling, resistance and 
disdain, the role was not one that a person voluntarily sought out. Rather, as Darsey correctly 
points out, it was ‘a role with which one [was] burdened’. He gives a clear example of this from 
the prophet Jeremiah: 
O Lord, you have deceived me, and I was deceived; you are stronger than I, and you 
have prevailed. I have become a laughing-stock all the day; everyone mocks me. For 
whenever I speak, I cry out, I shout, “Violence and destruction!” For the word of 
the Lord has become for me a reproach and derision all day long. If I say, “I will not 
mention him, or speak any more in his name”, there is in my heart as it were a burning 
fire shut up in my bones, and I am weary with holding it in, and I cannot (Jeremiah 
20:7-9, ESV). 
Jeremiah was ‘perhaps the most reluctant prophet,’ but considering all that he went on to 
suffer, he had good reason. Nevertheless, his example illustrates that the prophet’s will is 
‘overpowered and completely subjugated to the will of God’.233 The prophet’s calling is 
irresistible – Jeremiah cannot contain his message, much as he tries – and this adds an 
additional force to the act of speech and persuasion. The story of Jonah illustrates even more 
dramatically the outcome for the prophet who attempts to opt-out. 
If we return to Zulick’s point that responsibility for the persuasive act lies with the 
hearer, then Darsey frames the issue of responsibility for the ‘community confronted by the 
prophet’ – they must authenticate the prophet's call and credibility. Thus, if they deem that 
the call is real, then ‘there can be no disputation of the message’.234 The only alternative 
recourse for the community is to dispute the character, call and credibility of the individual 
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prophet – not as God’s spokesperson, but as an immoral or dubiously motivated fraud. It is not 
surprising then, that such confrontations degenerate into a personal attack, with name-calling 
and the vilification of the prophet. The prophet’s response is to rise above this accusation by 
negating or downplaying his part in the call, while emphasising God’s part: ‘Presenting his 
ethos as nugatory, consumed in the divine ethos, the prophet succeeds in making his ethos, 
the authenticity of his call, the paramount question.’235 
Michael Fox highlights the exception to the rule in the prophetic rhetoric of Ezekiel, 
who faced an unusual dilemma as his ‘artistry was drawing crowds’ and proving popular: 
The literary artistry a rhetor employs in order to achieve persuasion can detract from 
his persuasiveness by competing for the audience's attention. The rhetor’s necessary 
instruments may interfere with his rhetoric.236 
In the ‘Vision of the Valley of the Bones’ (Ezekiel 37:1-14), Ezekiel does not take the traditional 
role of the Hebrew prophet as ‘messenger’, but as ‘an essentially passive spectator’. By doing 
so, Ezekiel steps into the audience … and aligns himself with them’. He does not ask the 
audience to accept his vision, or to judge its validity and truth. ‘Such a request’, argues Fox, 
‘would invite refusal, and such an argument would invite refutation’.237 Ezekiel thereby avoids 
the confrontation scenario that his fellow prophets endure. However, he is still able to 
persuade: 
In effect the prophet says, “Here is what I saw. I too was surprised. Now believe it or 
not.” This stance gives an impression of objectivity. More important, by taking the 
point-of-view of an audience the rhetor makes his audience’s point-of-view congruent 
with his own. The audience looks over the rhetor’s shoulder and watches the event 
unfold from the same angle of vision.238 
Thus, by aligning the audience’s perspective with his own, Ezekiel ‘encourages alignment of 
belief’. Whilst this marks a distinct difference with the experiences of the other Hebrew 
Prophets, it is only fair to note that Ezekiel’s context was very different. He exercised his office 
in exile after judgement had been dealt; and offered, in the ‘Vision of the Valley of the Bones’, 
at least, a message of hope and restoration.  
When the Prophets spoke, they often conveyed a ‘fierceness and anger’ in their voices 
that, as Michael Walzer argues, we ‘conventionally attribute to demagogues’.239 Having 
already established that the majority of the Prophets were rarely popular, we may add that 
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they did not aspire to political office. Nevertheless, in practice the Prophets became politicians 
because, as Remer states, ‘prophetic religion “embraced” politics’.240 As God-ordained 
messengers, they publicly addressed and rebuked the political authorities of their day – 
essentially monarchies – but without partisan interests. Moreover, their speeches had political 
ramifications: 
They called upon political leaders to amend their actions, though … they were not 
responsible for bringing about these changes. Their predictions, too, were political. In 
their prophecies of doom, most famously the prophecies of Jeremiah, “political 
disaster stood ominously at the gate.” And, perhaps most important, they reminded 
earthly rulers that they did not possess ultimate power; God did.241 
Remer sees a connection between the Roman orator and the Hebrew prophet, as ‘both 
employed public, political speech’, and ‘made use of distinct rhetorics – each reflective of its 
own civilization’.242 However, Remer points out that unlike ‘the Roman orator, who adhered to 
the canons of classical rhetoric, based on prudence’, the Prophets ‘adopted a rhetoric of 
purity, obediently but often imprudently imparting God’s word to his people’.243 This ‘rhetoric 
of purity’, as Remer calls it, can be defined as ‘truthful speech unadulterated by practical 
concerns’.244 This also contrasts with the Aristotelian predilection for expediency in rhetoric – 
persuasion was not the ultimate aspiration. Emmanuel Levinas highlights the open, fearless 
nature of the Prophets’ political rhetoric: 
It is an extremely bold, audacious speech, since the prophet always speaks before the 
king; the prophet is not in hiding, he is not preparing an underground revelation. In the 
Bible – it's amazing – the king accepts this direct opposition. He's an odd kind of king! 
Isaiah and Jeremiah submit to violence. Let us not forget the perennial false prophets 
who flatter kings. Only the true prophet addresses the king and the people without 
truckling, and reminds them of ethics.245 
The true Prophets often put themselves at odds with the political status quo and confronted 
the king – risking their own welfare in the process – they sought ethical correctness over any 
expedient harmony. 
Like the risk-taking argumentation between God and Abraham, the Prophets message 
was also open to the risk of apparent failure. If the community rejects the prophet, they will 
invariably reject his message and fail to act upon it. However, the Prophets had no remit to 
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ensure success – their responsibility was to faithfully deliver the message, and the rest was 
between God and the people. Obedience to God was the benchmark of the prophet’s 
success.246 Abraham, Moses and Job had varying degrees of personal vested interest at risk, 
whereas the Prophets, who received little thanks for their warnings, had less at stake, 
especially when pushed outside the community. Jonah stands out as the prophet who 
appeared to have little care or interest in the people to whom he was sent. In chapter four of 
the Book of Jonah, the prophet becomes angry when the people of Nineveh act upon the 
message of judgement he has just delivered, and repent. Jonah takes a seat and waits, hoping 
that judgement has not been averted: ‘Then Jonah went out of the city, and sat on the east 
side of the city, and there made him a booth, and sat under it in the shadow, till he might see 
what would become of the city’ (Jonah 4:5, JPS Tanakh 1917). God rebukes Jonah for his lack of 
compassion, and asks with divine rhetoric: ‘And should not I pity Nineveh, that great city, in 
which there are more than 120,000 persons who do not know their right hand from their left, 
and also much cattle? (Jonah 4:11, ESV). Jonah’s response was not the norm, and regardless of 
a prophet having ‘no responsibility to ensure that his words persuaded, he still tried to move 
his audience, and, despite his rough words, his prophecies sometimes did persuade.’247 
Jeremiah gives us an example of the prophet’s effort in seeking to persuade their hearers to 
change: ‘It may be they will listen, and every one turn from his evil way, that I may relent of 
the disaster that I intend to do to them because of their evil deeds’ (Jeremiah 26:3, ESV).248 
The paramount objective in the persuasive acts of the Prophets was to urge the 
community to ‘follow the divine commandments already known from the Torah.’249 According 
to Walzer, ‘the prophetic message depends upon previous messages’ and, thus, the prophet’s 
message is not ‘radically new’, neither is it of his own invention.250 Later prophets may have 
revised the message, but it remained essentially the same: 
For the most part, they disclaim originality – and not only in the obvious sense that 
they attribute their message to God. It is more important that they continually refer 
themselves to the epic history and the moral teaching of the Torah: “He hath showed 
thee, O man, what is good…” (Micah 6:8). The past tense is significant. The prophets 
assume the previous messages, the divine “showings,” the immediacy of history and 
law in the minds of their listeners.251 
Thus, prophetic rhetoric is located as much in the past, as in the future, with the aim of 
impacting the present. Recalling history awakens ‘remembrance, recognition, indignation, 
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repentance’.252 The Hebrew word for repentance (שובה, shubah) derives from a root word שוב 
(shub), meaning ‘to turn’, ‘to turn back’, or ‘to return’. Thus, repentance is ‘parasitic’ upon 
something that went before, to which one returns to: ‘a previously accepted and commonly 
understood morality’.253 Prophetic rhetoric simultaneously evokes time past, present and 
future, invoking the wisdom of Qohelet: ‘What has been is what will be, and what has been 
done is what will be done, and there is nothing new under the sun’ (Ecclesiastes 1:9, ESV). 
When the prophet foretells impending doom, the hearer is not only motivated by fear of 
coming disasters, but also by ‘knowledge of the law, a sense of their own history, and … 
religious tradition’.254 Here, the prophet may use an intertextual analogy, drawing on the 
hearer’s knowledge of Scripture. 
Fishbane explains the function of intertextual allusion as a rhetorical tool of the 
prophet: ‘Hereby, the analogical correlations are rhetorically geared to shift the addressee's 
attention from the present to the past – and its paradigmatic events, biographies, and spatial 
topoi – for the sake of a new future and the requisite human actions which may be 
involved.’255 For example, in the Book of Zephaniah, the author evokes the Torah, and in 
particular the well-known creation narrative in Genesis, chapter one: ‘I will sweep away man 
and beast; I will sweep away the birds of the heavens and the fish of the sea’ (Zephaniah 1:3, 
ESV). However, in the act of destructive judgement we are presented with the opposite of the 
creative act, and strikingly the order of the creation narrative in Genesis is inverted. It is thus 
familiar to the hearer but simultaneously alarming. The rhetoric of the Prophet causes the 
hearer to hear afresh and so challenges complacency. 
 
The Rhetoric of Cicero, Amos and Isaiah 
 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) was a member of the Roman Senate and, according to 
Crowley and Hawhee, ‘the most influential practitioner and theorist of ancient rhetoric who 
ever lived’.256 Politically, he was ‘unrelentingly republican’ and, thus, gave the power of the 
Senate his full support. Alongside his political career, Cicero was a prolific author, writing on 
literature, philosophy, and rhetorical theory, and a rhetor of many speeches.257 Whilst his 
earliest work on rhetoric, De Inventione (On Invention), owed much to sophistic rhetoric and 
the inspiration of Aristotle can be seen in his later work, the overarching influence on Cicero 
was the Roman state, with its ‘respect for authority and tradition, its political fluctuations, and 
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its ethical dilemmas’.258 Connolly makes the claim that from the very outset of Cicero’s 
rhetorical career he was not concerned with the ‘ethical formation’ of individuals, but rather 
with a ‘civic ideal’ that dynamically reflected the republican constitution.259 His work on 
oratory was an ‘extended engagement with the ideals and demands of republican citizenship’ 
and a ‘practice of virtue located firmly in the political community’.260 The art of rhetoric, for 
Cicero, had the potential to produce a ‘well-rounded, humanistically trained, urbane person 
who can participate with others in governing the state through oratory’, rather than the mere 
ability to address a courtroom or display verbal prowess.261 
In De Inventione, Cicero divided rhetorical discourse into six parts: ‘an exordium, or 
introduction; a narratio, or statement of the issue; a partitio, or division of the issue into its 
constituent parts; confirmatio, where the rhetor's strongest arguments are made; refutatio, 
where arguments that can damage a rhetor's case are anticipated and refuted; and a 
peroratio, or conclusion’.262 It was important to Cicero that oratory was presented in the 
language of the people: ‘the whole art of oratory lies open to the view, and is concerned in 
some measure with the common practice, custom, and speech of mankind, so that, whereas in 
all other arts that is most excellent which is farthest removed from the understanding and 
mental capacity of the untrained, in oratory the very cardinal sin is to depart from the 
language of everyday life, and the usage approved by the sense of the community’ (I.iii.12).263 
Other arts may use uncommon language and technical terminology, but rhetoric must be 
understood by the community. The rhetor needed a broad knowledge of ‘very many matters’ 
to avoid speaking an ‘empty and ridiculous swirl of verbiage’ (I.v.17).264 This should include the 
memorisation of history, legal precedents, statute laws and national laws. Creating a 
distinctive style of oratory involved the choice and arrangement of words, and a good 
understanding of human emotion – ‘because it is in calming or kindling the feelings of the 
audience that the full power and science of oratory are to be brought into play’ (I.v.17).265 
Additionally, Cicero lists the following qualities for the speaker: ‘a certain humour, flashes of 
wit, the culture befitting a gentleman, and readiness and terseness alike in repelling and in 
delivering the attack, the whole being combined with a delicate charm and urbanity’.266 
However, the correct delivery of a speech involved not just the correct language, knowledge 
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and style, but also the correct physical and vocal expression through posture, gesture and 
intonation (I.v.18).267 
Remer believes that the political function of Cicero’s ideal orator was not to act as a 
‘check’ on the system, but rather to actively participate in and support the Roman res publica.’ 
Thus, in De oratore, Cicero’s character, Crassus, extols the orator’s contribution to the republic 
by celebrating the eloquent orator who contends for the common good: 
…Crassus asks, ‘What is so regal, so generous, so magnanimous, as lending aid to those 
in distress, raising up the afflicted, offering people safety, freeing them from dangers, 
saving them from exile?’ [De oratore 1.32] Through Crassus, Cicero revived the myth of 
the civilizing orator who, first, led the human race away from a feral existence to ‘this 
truly human, communal way of life,’ and, then, ‘once communities had been founded… 
established laws, judicial procedures, and legal arrangements.’ For Cicero, the orator 
protected ‘the safety of countless individuals and of the State at large’ [De oratore 
1.33–34].268 
Crassus presented the orator as the founder of civilization who brought the ‘scattered savages 
together into peaceful societies’.269 He insists that the orator be well educated and practically 
experienced: ‘an orator can neither attack nor defend a general in court if he does not have 
experience in battle, or address an assembly or the Senate about governing the state “without 
the highest understanding of civil affairs and prudentia” (1.60)’.270 Cicero saw great civic power 
in rhetoric – the orator was to advise with authority, and it was a duty to ‘arouse a listless 
nation, and to curb its unbridled impetuosity’. Eloquence had the potential to destroy the 
deceitful and deliver the righteous. Oratory held the power to encourage virtuous conduct, 
rescue those on the wrong path, condemn the wicked, praise the worthy, hold back 
lawlessness, and comfort the grieving (II.ix.35).271 
It was of utmost importance to Cicero that orators won the favour of their hearers, 
because feelings held more influence than facts. An audience could be ‘so affected as to be 
swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by judgement or 
deliberation’; and more problems were decided ‘by hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or 
joy, or hope, or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or authority, or 
any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute’ (II.xlii.178).272 The merits, achievements 
and reputation of the orator could win the feelings of the hearer, but whilst Cicero points out 
that these can be embellished if they are genuine, they are harder to fabricate when the 
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orator has none. A mild tone of voice, a modest countenance, gentle language, and the ability 
to appear to be ‘dealing reluctantly and under compulsion with something you are really 
anxious to prove’ were all helpful attributes. Likewise, the ‘tokens of good-nature, kindness, 
calmness, loyalty and a disposition that is pleasing and not grasping or covetous, and all the 
qualities belonging to men who are upright, unassuming and not given to haste, stubbornness, 
strife or harshness, were also helpful and ‘powerful in winning goodwill’. Cicero ungenerously 
suggests that ‘the very opposites of these qualities must be ascribed to our opponents’ 
(II.xliii.182).273 
The speaker should cultivate versatility in emotional persuasion, through a speaking 
style which ‘excites and urges the feelings of the tribunal towards hatred or love, ill-will or 
well-wishing, fear or hope, desire or aversion, joy or sorrow, compassion or the wish to punish’ 
(II.xliv.185).274 However, it was essential that the orator displayed authenticity in their 
emotional persuasion: ‘Moreover it is impossible for the listener to feel indignation, hatred or 
ill-will, to be terrified of anything, or reduced to tears of compassion, unless all those 
emotions, which the advocate would inspire in the arbitrator, are visibly stamped or rather 
branded on the advocate himself’ (II.xlv.189).275 People would not be moved, argued Cicero, 
unless the speaker was moved or, at the very least, appeared to be. The most common 
emotional responses that the orator should seek to evoke from the audience were ‘love, hate, 
wrath, jealousy, compassion, hope, joy, fear or vexation’. Love could be ‘won’ if the speaker is 
perceived to be upholding the audience’s interests, representing good men, or pursuing a 
good and useful purpose (II.li.206).276 It was also to the orator’s advantage to encourage the 
audience to hope for a better future rather than reminding them of a better past.277 
Compassion could be ‘awakened’ in the audience by causing the hearer to consider their own 
sufferings – whether real or imaginary – while the speaker laments the sufferings of others; or 
by causing the hearer to refer back to their own experiences while contemplating the 
speaker’s presentation of the plight of others. Even greater compassion could be aroused if the 
orator laments the ‘dejection and ruin of the righteous’ (II.lii.211).278 In contrast, Cicero then 
notes the value of humour in oratory: ‘Jesting too and shafts of wit are agreeable and often 
highly effective: but these, even if all else can be taught by art, are assuredly the endowment 
of nature and in no need of art’ (II.liv.216).279 Whilst he goes to great lengths enumerating 
many types of witticism and jesting, and detailing their characteristics (for example, anecdote, 
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caricature, mimicry, wordplay, allegory, irony, farce, ridicule), Cicero concludes that because 
humour is a gift, and not an art, it cannot be taught. 
Robert Cape Jr. highlights evidence in De Inventione that demonstrates an attempt to 
bring Greek philosophy into the teaching of oratory, citing an example from the preface: 
‘Indeed, after long thought, reason itself has led me to this opinion most strongly, that wisdom 
[sapientia] without eloquence has been of little help to states, but eloquence without wisdom 
has never helped and has often caused too much harm’ (1.1).280 The statement reflects 
Cicero’s desire to fuse rhetoric and philosophy, especially philosophy in the form of the 
‘broader and more intellectually esteemed’ wisdom, sapientia: ‘Joining sapientia and 
eloquentia became the first step in Latin to recover the connection between philosophy and 
rhetoric that had been severed by Plato.’281 Through Crassus, Cicero voices the view ‘that the 
orator ought to be devoted to the whole of wisdom’. He praises oratory, saying that 
‘eloquence [eloquentia] is one of the highest virtues’. However, because of oratory’s power, it 
is potentially dangerous and, thus, needs to be tempered: ‘the stronger this power is the more 
it needs to be joined with goodness [probitate] and the highest prudentia, for if we hand over 
fluency of speaking [dicendi copiam] to men who lack these virtues, we will not have made 
them orators, but will have given weapons to madmen’. Cicero’s influence was felt for 
centuries after, with his works – from De inventione (his first) to De officiis (his last) – ‘among 
the most widely read books in the Middle Ages’ and resurfacing thereafter as humanist 
textbooks.282 
Unlike Cicero, the prophets Amos and Isaiah showed little respect for political 
authority and tradition. According to Walzer, Amos (fl. c. eighth century BCE) was the ‘first and 
possibly the most radical of Israel’s literary prophets’.283 Robert Gordis comments that the 
Rabbis’ fondness for ‘etymologizing proper names,’ led to an explanation of the name Amos 
 as ‘meaning “heavy of tongue, a stammerer” (Midrash Lev. R., sec. 10), and then (עמוס)
repeated by Jerome as ‘unskilled in speech’.284 Yet, this interpretation could not be further 
from the fluency and skill we find in Amos’ words: 
Actually, Amos is a master of Hebrew, expert in his use of rhetorical figures, terse and 
vigorous in expressing his ideas. Every line of his book is afire with his passionate 
devotion to his conviction that the ideal of righteousness is God's imperative to Israel 
and the world. His sensitivity to the domestic scene is matched by his grasp of 
international affairs, all the more remarkable in ‘a herdsman and a dresser of 
                                                 
280
 Cape Jr., ‘Cicero and the Development of Prudential Practice’, pp. 40-41. 
281
 Cape Jr., ‘Cicero and the Development of Prudential Practice’, p. 41. 
282
 Cape Jr., ‘Cicero and the Development of Prudential Practice’, p. 36.  
283
 Walzer, ‘Interpretation and Social Criticism’, p. 58. 
284
 Robert Gordis, ‘Studies in the Book of Amos’, Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research, 46/47 
(1979 - 1980), pp. 201-264 (p. 201). 
 119
sycamore figs.’ Virtually every significant idea and insight of classical Hebrew prophecy 
is set forth in Amos or is at least adumbrated in his book.285 
Perhaps his name עמוס owes more to the closely related word עמס (amas), meaning ‘to carry a 
load’ – in this sense, Amos is the burden-bearer of God. It is also worth noting his profession – 
‘I was no prophet, neither was I a prophet's son; but I was a herdman, and a dresser of 
sycamore-trees’ (Amos 7:14, JPS Tanakh 1917) – unlike the classical orators, Amos was 
untrained. As such, he provides an example in the Jewish tradition that demonstrates that the 
calling of a prophet was open to all, regardless of social status and education – herding and 
shepherding were lowly occupations. To this, we might add, that gender was no bar to the 
prophetic calling either, as the Scriptures consider Miriam (Exodus 15:20); Deborah (Judges 
4:4); Huldah (2 Kings 22:14); Noadiah (Nehemiah 6:14); and Isaiah’s unnamed wife (Isaiah 8:3) 
as prophetesses (נביאה, neviah). 
Karl Möller claims that the ‘arrangement’ of the Book of Amos is ‘best described as a 
rhetorical one, i.e. as being motivated by rhetorical interests’.286 From a rhetorical perspective, 
Möller notes that ‘it is remarkable’ that chapter three of Amos ‘opens with the paradoxical 
notion that Yahweh will punish Israel precisely because he has known only them of all the 
families of the earth’287 – ‘You only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore I will 
visit upon you all your iniquities’ (Amos 3:2, JPS Tanakh 1917). Amos’ hearers would not have 
expected this controversial statement, and it would have aroused their curiosity – ‘it must 
have left them looking at the speaker in utter dismay and disbelief’, because they were to ‘be 
punished in spite of, indeed because of (‘al-kēn), all their privileges’.288 There then follows a 
series of rhetorical questions: 
Will two walk together, except they have agreed? Will a lion roar in the forest, when 
he hath no prey? Will a young lion give forth his voice out of his den, if he have taken 
nothing? Will a bird fall in a snare upon the earth, where there is no lure for it? Will a 
snare spring up from the ground, and have taken nothing at all? Shall the horn be 
blown in a city, and the people not tremble? Shall evil befall a city, and the LORD hath 
not done it? For the Lord GOD will do nothing, but He revealeth His counsel unto His 
servants the prophets. The lion hath roared, who will not fear? The Lord GOD hath 
spoken, who can but prophesy? (Amos 3:3-8, JPS Tanakh 1917) 289 
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The link between the announcement of punishment and the rhetorical questions that follow 
seems unclear on a superficial level. However, Möller argues that the link may be established 
on the grounds of Amos’ credibility: ‘This link is usually seen in the fact that Amos’ audience 
apparently objected to his announcement of punishment questioning his authority and the 
validity of his message.’290 Amos responds to the audience’s objections by means of the 
questions, thus ‘forcing’ the audience to actively participate in the process of persuasion (this 
is not unlike Zulick’s view, which places responsibility for the persuasive act with the hearer). 
The rhetorical questions force the audience to consider causation, culminating with the 
reproof that ‘Yahweh would not punish his people without giving them a prior warning, which 
he does through the prophets (v. 7)’.291 Amos then establishes his credibility by stating that he 
is bound to prophesy because God has spoken, no less than a person is bound to fear because 
the lion has roared (v. 8).292 
Thus, Möller argues that the ‘rhetorical strategy’ in the Book of Amos may be 
described as the ‘presentation of a prophet in debate’, where Amos’ oracles are arranged and 
presented as ‘the debate between the prophet Amos and his eighth-century audience’.293 
Amos appears to struggle and ultimately fail to persuade his audience of their situation, that 
they ‘stand condemned’ because of their ‘horrible social wrongdoings’ and ‘misplaced 
complacency’.294 Möller suggests that even the redaction of the Book of Amos is a rhetorical 
strategy aimed at persuading the reader or hearer to ‘learn from the failure of the prophet's 
audience to respond appropriately to his message’.295 
Lyle Eslinger comments on the rhetoric of the ‘first oracle series’ in chapters one and 
two of Amos, as a ‘geographical organization’.296 Amos presents a series of oracles against 
Israel's various enemies, crisscrossing geographically from north to south and west to east – 
from Damascus to Gaza, and from Tyre to Edom. He builds up a long list of transgressions 
committed by these enemies and the judgements that will follow, but his objective is to ‘evoke 
an emotional attitude of judgment in his audience’: 
The rhetorical ploy culminates in the oracle against Israel, his audience, which is 
caught in the same trap that Nathan set for David in 2 Samuel (12:7): “you are the 
man.” Having approved the judgment on all the surrounding nations for their various 
crimes, the Israelite audience should be compelled – so the rhetorical plan – to assent 
to their own damnation for the most serious crimes of the series.297 
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Thus, Amos sets a rhetorical trap from which there is no escape –those who followed him into 
the trap, walking in the footsteps of his rhetorical logic, would find themselves caught. 
In the dispute between Amos and the priest Amaziah (7:10-17), we can see an element 
of rhetorical irony where ‘the prophet … appeals to religious tradition, the priest only to 
reason of state’.298 As Jennifer Stiles points out, the depiction of the characters of Amaziah and 
Amos and ‘all that they may represent … is full of contrasts’: 
Amaziah’s report of Amos’ activity as ‘conspiracy’ contrasts with Amos’ own account of 
his activity as compulsion. Amaziah orders Amos to be silent; Yahweh orders Amos to 
speak out. Amos’ reported prediction of the king’s death and the people’s exile is 
matched by a similar prediction of death for the priest and his children, and the exile 
of the people.299 
These contrasts serve as a rhetorical device to ‘juxtapose’ the ethos of Amaziah and Amos. 
Amaziah was the representative for the temple at Bethel and, by extension, all state-
sanctioned religion, whereas Amos was the prophetic representative of God. The juxtaposition 
highlights the contrast between human and divine authority. 
Thus, Amos not only has to contend with the community but, if needs be, the 
establishment too. His oracles address the injustices of the rich against the poor. His ‘critical 
message’ is that the rich ‘live well at the expense of the poor’.300 Amos warns the social elite: 
Woe to them that are at ease in Zion, and to them that are secure in the mountain of 
Samaria … That lie upon beds of ivory, and stretch themselves upon their couches, and 
eat the lambs out of the flock, and the calves out of the midst of the stall … That drink 
wine in bowls, and anoint themselves with the chief ointments; but they are not 
grieved for the hurt of Joseph (Amos 6:1, 4-6, JPS Tanakh 1917). 
They no longer identify with the poor, there is no ‘solidarity’, and Amos invokes the name of 
Joseph – sold into slavery by his brothers and forgotten (Genesis 37). It is the rich, then, 
according to Amos, who are ‘responsible for the hurt of Joseph; they are guilty of the Egyptian 
crime of oppression’.301 Again, we see in this charge the rhetorical device of intertextual 
analogy, referring the hearer back in a persuasive attempt to influence present behaviour. We 
should not conclude that Amos’ rhetoric is hopeless and damning – indeed, he repeatedly 
appeals to the people to seek God: 
For thus saith the LORD unto the house of Israel: Seek ye Me, and live … Seek the 
LORD, and live … Seek good, and not evil, that ye may live; and so the LORD, the God 
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of hosts, will be with you, as ye say. Hate the evil, and love the good, and establish 
justice in the gate; it may be that the LORD, the God of hosts, will be gracious unto the 
remnant of Joseph (Amos 5:4, 6, 14–15, JPS Tanakh 1917).302 
The message of Amos may have failed, but unlike Jonah, Amos implored his audience to act. 
He did not trap them in words to simply win an argument, but used powerful rhetoric in an 
attempt to liberate them from their harmful and self-destructive choices. 
John Hayes and Stuart Irvine argue that the prophet Isaiah (fl. c. eighth century BCE) 
was ‘an orator, a rhetorician who presented his insights through the medium of the spoken 
word’.303 Indeed, they easily cast Isaiah in the role of the classical orator, seeing many shared 
characteristics in his work: 
Like any good orator, Isaiah varied his material and approach according to the nature 
of the rhetorical situation and the inclination and character of the audience. At 
different times, he employed invective and denunciation, rebuke and reproof, satire 
and sarcasm, assurance and encouragement, poetry and prose, depending apparently 
on the needs of the situation, the goal at hand, and the response to be evoked.304 
Isaiah’s persuasive appeal can be seen in his ‘word choice, turn of phrase, and selection of 
similes and metaphors’, as well as in his ‘emotionally based appeals’ and ‘rational 
argumentation’.305 Different rhetorical situations arose in response to the changing national 
and international state of affairs that Isaiah found himself in.306 
In the first chapter of the Book of Isaiah, the prophet compares his audience with the 
inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah in Genesis: 
Except the LORD of hosts had left unto us a very small remnant, we should have been 
as Sodom, we should have been like unto Gomorrah. Hear the word of the LORD, ye 
rulers of Sodom; give ear unto the law of our God, ye people of Gomorrah (Isaiah 1:9-
10, JPS Tanakh 1917). 
The juxtaposition of the two verses and the use of the ‘Sodom and Gomorrah motif’ display 
Isaiah’s ‘oratorical artistry’:  
In verse 9, the prophet uses these two cities to illustrate the state of his audience and 
to allow the people to feel momentarily how bad off they are, how desperate their 
condition is, and how pitifully they stand there, in need of consolation, solace, and 
sympathy. In verse 10, he immediately pulls that protective blanket from the hearers 
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and identifies them with the residents of ancient Sodom and Gomorrah, who everyone 
in his audience would have believed got what they deserved!307 
Like Amos, Isaiah set a trap; and like Amos’ audience, Isaiah’s audience walk right in. However, 
in the realisation that the audience is equally due its just deserts, the rhetorical responsibility 
is placed upon the hearer – the audience’s own deduction leads them to where the prophet 
wants them to be. 
Gitay highlights the use of the poetic as a rhetorical device in Isaiah’s prophecy.308 
Specifically, Isaiah takes up a song of lament in chapter one:  
How is the faithful city become a harlot! She that was full of justice, righteousness 
lodged in her, but now murderers. Thy silver is become dross, thy wine mixed with 
water. Thy princes are rebellious, and companions of thieves; every one loveth bribes, 
and followeth after rewards; they judge not the fatherless, neither doth the cause of 
the widow come unto them. Therefore saith the Lord, the LORD of hosts, the Mighty 
One of Israel: Ah, I will ease Me of Mine adversaries, and avenge Me of Mine enemies; 
And I will turn My hand upon thee, and purge away thy dross as with lye, and will take 
away all thine alloy; And I will restore thy judges as at the first, and thy counsellors as 
at the beginning; afterward thou shalt be called the city of righteousness, the faithful 
city (Isaiah 1:21-26, JPS Tanakh 1917). 
In Isaiah’s song, the ‘instrument’ is language and the playing style is the lament, which is 
characterised by the Hebrew term איכה (eykhá, meaning ‘alas’) and the ‘metre’ of the song.309 
According to Gitay, Isaiah chooses a ‘familiar song as the artistic device to appeal to his 
audience’ and to convey the prophetic truth he seeks to share with them.310 To counter 
opposition or even rejection in the audience, the prophet ‘creates an easy tune, readily 
perceived by the audience, by utilizing the devices of assonance and alliteration’.311 He 
sharpens the sense of contrast in the song by using the device of ‘contradiction (antithesis, 
contentio)’ .312 This can be seen, for example, in the contrast of faithful/harlot; silver/dross. 
The use of the poetic in the form of song, served a very definite purpose for Isaiah:  
Rhetorically, it would be ineffective and unrealistic to announce God's judgment 
directly. The people had suffered and had expected God's help, not His punishment. 
However, the use of an appropriate approach and specific language, which may sound 
sympathetic at first, can reach the audience and capture their immediate attention.313 
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In a certain sense, then, the lament is also a trap to lure the hearer in, but it is a much gentler 
construction, attended by feeling. The creative design of Isaiah’s composition and the 
structure of his poetry reveal his ‘concern with the impact of his words’.314 Gitay believes that 
a ‘close rhetorical analysis’ of the lament reveals Isaiah’s mission: ‘to move his audience and to 
deliver God's judgment by controlling his listeners’; while his ‘literary creativity shows him to 
be a master of language’.315 
Gitay also identifies the rhetorical use of ridicule in Isaiah: ‘The opponent’s refusal to 
accept the speaker’s premise motivates the latter to employ a rhetorical weapon which 
depicts the opponent as someone who does not deserve serious treatment, but a laugh.’ 316 
Gitay gives the following example to illustrate Isaiah’s use of ridicule: 
To whom then will you liken God, or what likeness compare with him? An idol! A 
craftsman casts it, and a goldsmith overlays it with gold and casts for it silver chains. 
He who is too impoverished for an offering chooses wood that will not rot; he seeks 
out a skilful craftsman to set up an idol that will not move (Isaiah 40:18-20, ESV). 
In Isaiah’s discourse, he is debating the ‘uniqueness of God versus the emptiness of the idols’. 
However, rather than engaging in theological dispute, Isaiah ‘prefers to employ the device of 
ridicule as his tool for avoiding a serious theological debate with opponents who do not share 
his premise’.317 The effect is to make his hearers ‘laugh’ at the opposition and, at the same 
time, make plain the ‘superficiality of the opponents’ belief: they worship to a piece of wood, 
shaped into an idol by a fellow human being!’318 Isaiah continues the theme in a later chapter, 
commenting on the work of a carpenter: 
He plants a cedar and the rain nourishes it. Then it becomes fuel for a man. He takes a 
part of it and warms himself; he kindles a fire and bakes bread. Also he makes a god 
and worships it; he makes it an idol and falls down before it. Half of it he burns in the 
fire. Over the half he eats meat; he roasts it and is satisfied. Also he warms himself and 
says, ‘Aha, I am warm, I have seen the fire!’ And the rest of it he makes into a god, his 
idol, and falls down to it and worships it. He prays to it and says, ‘Deliver me, for you 
are my god’ (Isaiah 44:14-17, ESV). 
The absurdity of the argument is clear: one piece of wood used for such disparate purposes 
that one – burning part of the wood for cooking and keeping warm – annuls the validity of the 
other – fashioning the rest of it into an idol to worship and pray to for deliverance. The 
                                                 
314
 Gitay, ‘The Effectiveness of Isaiah’s Speech’, p. 171. 
315
 Gitay, ‘The Effectiveness of Isaiah’s Speech’, p. 172. 
316
 Gitay, ‘Religious Rhetoric and Public Deliberation: Preliminary Thoughts’, Javnost - The Public, 8.3 (2001), pp. 51-






rhetorical force of the ridicule might even persuade the idol-worshippers to laugh at 
themselves and reconsider their actions. 
Isaiah actually defines prophetic rhetoric in the first chapter, and it is perhaps the 
clearest definition in the whole of the Hebrew Scriptures: ‘Learn to do well; seek justice, 
relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow’ (Isaiah 1:17, JPS Tanakh 1917, 
in Hebrew: למדו היטב דרשו משפט אשרו חמוץ שפטו יתום ריבו אלמנה). The Hebrew verb ריב (riv) 
is translated as ‘to plead’ in this verse, and can also mean ‘to contend’, ‘to argue’, and even ‘to 
agitate’. It is thus a call to the community to become a rhetorical people; to employ powerful 
speech on behalf of the oppressed and suffering. A similar call can be found in the Book of 
Proverbs: 
Open thy mouth for the dumb, in the cause of all such as are appointed to destruction. 
Open thy mouth, judge righteously, and plead the cause of the poor and needy 
(Proverbs 31:8-9, JPS Tanakh 1917). 
 In other words, speak up for those who have no voice or for those who have been silenced by 
injustice, poverty and hardship. If the responsibility for justice was shared equally by the 
community, it would be transformed into a nation of prophets, and the onus would no longer 
fall upon the few or the one. In this regard, the desire expressed by Moses might be realised, 
‘would that all the LORD'S people were prophets, that the LORD would put His spirit upon 
them’ (Numbers 11:29, JPS Tanakh 1917). However, the final verb in Isaiah’s definition of 
rhetoric, ‘plead’ must be framed by the first verb ‘learn’ (למד, lamad). Thus, there is a 
necessity even in the Jewish tradition of rhetoric to learn how to speak powerfully. This is not 
expressed as clearly as it is in the classical tradition but, nonetheless, learning is involved – 
learning from Torah; learning from the examples of Abraham, Moses and Job; and, of course, 
learning from the Prophets. 
 
The Spoken Jewish Voice as Rhetoric for the Voiceless 
 
The two traditions of Western classical rhetoric and Jewish rhetoric are diverse and culturally 
unconnected. In the biblical history of Israel there exists, according to Fox, ‘a well-documented 
major rhetorical movement entirely independent of the classical tradition from which Western 
rhetoric and rhetorical criticism descend.’319 They share many common characteristics, while 
their differences enhance and enrich all that rhetoric has to offer as an aid to speaking. Unlike 
the Greek tradition, Jewish rhetoric does not present a systematic understanding of 
persuasion. Rather, as Falk claims, it presents a ‘symbol system,’ with ‘methods, goals, and 
effects’. In understanding different types of rhetoric, we may construct ‘new inclusive 
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understandings of rhetoric’, which will then allow us to ‘review traditional (Greek) rhetoric in a 
different light’.320 Remer astutely sums up the strengths and weaknesses of both the Greco-
Roman and the Jewish rhetorical traditions, as the ‘insider’ orator and the ‘outsider’ prophet 
affected their respective audiences and influenced the political and social sphere: 
The prophet’s contribution lay in his role as social critic, a ‘political outsider’ without 
ties to formal political institutions, speaking truth to the powers that be. But the 
prophet did not often effect the changes he called for, because he spoke forthrightly 
and uncompromisingly – that is, imprudently. The Roman orator, however, did not 
stand outside the power structure to criticize it. He was a ‘political insider’ who 
affected policy decision making primarily by moving the public with his words. At the 
same time, as a member of the political elite, the orator was limited in his ability to 
depart from the political status quo, and, at times, he compromised principle for 
political necessity; he was constrained by a concern for practical consequences.321 
Moreover, a positive feature of the political system of the Roman republic was that it allowed 
the hearing and consideration of ‘opposing political views’, which was altogether ‘absent in the 
Hebraic kingdoms’. On the other hand, the conservative character of Roman oratory was a 
negative: ‘A radical critique of existing policies, open to a political outsider like the prophet, 
was inconceivable to a political insider like the orator.’322 The Western classical tradition of 
rhetoric provides a model for speaking to influence change from within, through the means of 
persuasion. The Jewish tradition adds a model for critiquing and challenging from the outside, 
through the means of argumentation. 
Oratorical speech was prone to compromise because the speaker needed to stay 
onside; they ‘required a political base of support’.323 Cicero represented the interests of the 
senatorial optimates, but also represented the people as a ‘consul popularis at the contiones’. 
However, with the latter, his action was motivated by political prudence because the common 
people were politically powerful, not weak. Roman orators did not present reforms especially 
to protect the widows and orphans, or the poor, but the Prophets did (see Isaiah 1:23, 10:1-2, 
58; Jeremiah 7:3-11; Ezekiel 22:6-7). The prophetic voice was politically independent and not 
compromised by trying to maintain the status quo. Their support base was divine not human, 
as Remer argues and, thus, ‘they were able to challenge their society’s authorities and 
conventions through their interpretations of its traditions’.324 Classical oratory was also prone 
to a ‘deceit’ and ‘insincerity,’ that was absent in prophetic rhetoric: 
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For strong critics of rhetoric, like Plato, rhetoricians had no principles to compromise. 
In the Gorgias, Plato made Socrates contend that orators could argue as easily for 
falsehood as for truth, for right as simply as for wrong, because their goal was to 
convince their audience of whichever side they were arguing [Gorgias 462c-466a]. But 
even rhetoricians like Cicero, who defended rhetoric as a moral enterprise, conceded 
that orators must sometimes use ethically objectionable techniques.325 
Indeed, Falk notes that no condemnation of lying appears in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and 
truthfulness is only discussed in the context of its utility.326 Falk lists the aspects of rhetoric in 
the Jewish tradition that manage the act of speech: 
Jewish rhetoric insists that we keep our promises to God, speak sweetly and softly, 
teach the laws of the culture, be honest and truthful, offer corrections for [behaviour], 
and listen and think before speaking. Meanwhile, it prohibits flattery, lying, cursing, 
arguing [not argumentation], slandering, whispering, gossiping, or bearing false 
witness. These laws specifically govern both what should be said and what should not 
be said.327 
These all act as a harness upon the powerful act of speaking, tempering a potentially 
dangerous and damaging force; so that it serves to exhort, edify and bring change for the 
good. The Hebrew Scriptures portray speech as ‘powerful, serious, and deserving of respect’. 
Biblical rhetoric is ‘dominated by, is built around, and instructs in moral communication’.328 
Falsehood and deception were forms of explicitly forbidden speech. The prophets were always 
sincere – even in their occasional ridicule or humour, they maintained honesty. They esteemed 
truth over political success; compromise was not an option. If the prophet had to challenge the 
status quo, then so be it – no one was above critique, if the critic is God, albeit God speaking 
through his messenger. Yet, in political terms, the orator may have proved more effective than 
the prophet, because the prophet’s results were seldom quantifiable. As Remer states, the 
prophets ‘may have sometimes checked the power of the kings and the people with their 
reproofs, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to specify when and to what degree’.329 The 
classical tradition offers us prudence as an aid to effective speech. This is counterbalanced by 
the Jewish tradition, which offers us the value of honest speaking – a safeguard against the 
potentially dangerous power of persuasion. Falk summarises the main differences, as she sees 
them, between the Greek and Jewish rhetorical traditions: 
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Like Jewish rhetoric, Greek rhetoric explains what to say and how to say it. But the 
goals and methods of these different systems are striking. Where one aims at ethical 
community living and social harmony, the other aims at individual influence and 
power. Where one code respects and is fearful of the power of speech, the other uses 
it as a tool. Where one makes no distinction between public and private speech, the 
other emphasizes the former.330 
Falk’s distinction may seem simplistic, but it does emphasise how rhetoric can be used for such 
diverse purposes in the two traditions. 
However, Scallen argues that for Isocrates, Aristotle and Cicero, ‘the utilitarian uses of 
rhetoric were not the sole measure of the “good” orator’.331 They emphasised that the good 
orator taught through example, actively participated in government, and put community 
interests above self-interests: ‘In doing so, the orator influences and inspires the moral 
consciousness of his audience.’332 Darsey regards the rhetorical practices of the Prophets as 
the activity of ‘those who agitate on behalf of great causes’.333 For today’s speaker, no less 
than the speaker of old, it is the work of great rhetoric to champion great causes. For the 
Prophets, the great causes were not always the most obvious – they were more likely the 
overlooked, the seemingly weak, those deprived of their own voice, the outcast – it was the 
outsider speaking for the community of outsiders. Both traditions emphasise the character of 
the speaker. The ethos of the rhetor and the credibility of the prophet legitimise and give 
foundational force to their speech. Character establishes the authority of the speaker – be that 
the authority of knowledge learnt or a cause divine – without it, the force of persuasion is lost, 
the words are empty. Character, then, places a limit on how far the speaker can go, and how 
persuasive they can be. These traditions together remind us that character and rhetoric must 
be ever wed to be in any way effective. 
Connolly rightly draws our attention to the exclusivity in the classical rhetorical 
tradition: ‘Not every homo is a vir: all women stand outside the circle, in the company of the 
poor, immigrants, and other classes legally or culturally determined to lack the authority 
necessary to act in the political arena.’334 Gender, class and background create an exclusive 
pool from which the orator is raised up. This is clearly not so in the Jewish tradition, which 
celebrates its prophetesses, and opens opportunity to the inexperienced (Jeremiah), the 
untrained (Amos), and the alien (Job). The spoken Jewish voice is the voice of the outsider, not 
just in the sense that they often stand outside of the establishment, but because they stand 
outside the walls of inclusion – the walls of gender, class and race. This voice challenges the 
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lines of exclusion as much as the words challenge the issues they contest. The classical 
tradition offers us the tools for explicit rhetorical training, and while the Jewish tradition is not 
as explicit, the spoken Jewish voice does remind us to bar none from speaking up and to speak 


























































Chapter 3: The Jewish Thinking Voice 
 
 
Having considered the Jewish written and spoken voices, we turn finally to the Jewish thinking 
voice. In the Western classical tradition this voice is expressed through philosophy (the ‘love of 
wisdom’) and logic; in the Jewish tradition it is expressed through the voice of wisdom – 
however, it is not the wisdom of Greek sophia but of the Hebrew hokmah. This chapter will 
examine the Jewish tradition for the ways in which it might help us to think, alongside the 
Western discipline of philosophy. We will consider the origins of Greek philosophy, with 
particular attention to Socrates, and how this tradition has shaped the way we think. Alongside 
this, we will explore Hebrew wisdom in the Scriptures, especially in the Wisdom literature of 
Proverbs, Job and Ecclesiastes. I will argue that Hebrew Wisdom leads us to a sense of love, 
awe and humility in the perspective of our thinking, which then shapes our actions, influencing 
the written and spoken voices of the Jewish tradition. 
The Western tradition embraces a variety of terms for the thinking voice – philosophy, 
logic, metaphysics and dialectic. Rachel Fulton explains ‘logic or dialectic,’ can be ‘narrowly 
defined as the art of constructing arguments or, more generally, as metaphysics, including the 
philosophy of mind’.1 Henry Chadwick highlights the variance in meaning with regard to logic 
in the ancient Greek world: 
The place of logic in the hierarchy of knowledge was one of the many matters long in 
dispute between the Aristotelians and the Stoics. To the Stoics ‘logic’ meant something 
wide, an independent branch of philosophy, the other two contrasted branches being 
ethics and ‘physics’ (the scientific study of nature). The Stoics could point out that this 
threefold classification had a basis in the Topics (A, 14) of Aristotle himself. The 
Aristotelians, on the other hand, treated logic almost in our modern sense as a 
practical instrument for the discovery of fallacies in argument on any subject, an 
indispensable tool for every department of human inquiry.2 
The Stoics’ propositional logic was, according to Chadwick, ‘developed by the Peripatetic 
school and then taken over by the late Platonists,’ before it was ultimately ‘passed down to the 
Western philosophical tradition’.3 Thus, the Western philosophical tradition subsumed logic, so 
that logic and philosophy became terms that involve the capacity for thinking, and to these we 
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could also add dialectic, reasoning or the study of metaphysics. For the purpose of this study, 
the term philosophy will be considered to reflect the love of wisdom in the classical tradition; 
which finds a counterpart in the love of biblical wisdom in the Jewish tradition. 
 
The Origins of Greek Philosophy and Hebrew Wisdom 
 
David Wagner cites the beginnings of Western philosophy in the development of early Greek 
cosmologies: ‘Philosophy originated when the Greeks began to interpret the universe in 
rational terms.’4 According to Aristotle, Thales of Miletus (c. 620-546 BCE) was the first Greek 
philosopher – the ‘founder’ (Metaphysics, 1.983b).5 Thales allegedly proposed that all things 
originated from water, that the ‘permanent entity is water’. He was also numbered first among 
the ‘Seven Sages of Ancient Greece’, a company that also included Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of 
Priene, Solon of Athens, Cleobulus of Lindus, Myson of Chen, and Chilon of Sparta. Their 
legend includes seven maxims – one from each of these wise men – that were purportedly 
distillations of their wisdom. Plato recounts their assembly at Delphi in Protagoras (343a), 
where their maxims were inscribed at Apollo’s temple. The most famous of these sayings 
(343b) were: ‘Know thyself’ and ‘Nothing overmuch’ (or ‘everything with moderation’).6 
Interestingly, John Collins adds that although Thales stated that ‘all things are full of gods,’ he 
‘spoke of water, not Oceanus or Poseidon, as the first principle of the universe’.7 Aristotle also 
credited Empedocles (c. 490-430 BCE) ‘as the first to articulate the four elements,’ states Ethan 
Dor-Shav, ‘albeit in a mythic form: “Hear first the four roots of all things: bright Zeus and life-
bringing Hera and Aidoneus, and Nestis, whose tears are the source of mortal streams” … 
(Zeus was the god of fire, Hera supposedly of wind, Aidoneus of earth, and Nestis of water.)’8 
Collins cites Plato (c. 427-347 BCE) as an example of the development in the Greek tradition 
that attempted to ‘integrate the scientific approach of the cosmologists with religious 
conceptions’: ‘Already in Plato, especially in the Timaeus and the Laws, we find a conceptual 
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cosmological reflection on the universe which leads to the recognition of God as the “Soul of 
the Cosmos.”9 
Marie Sandy notes that ancient philosophical desire was driven by contemplation: ‘The 
impulse for the Presocratic, and later on, the philosophers’ tradition, starts with the 
observation that thinking requires a withdrawal from the world.’10 Thus, the philosophers 
‘most intensely devoted to thinking withdraw from human affairs in order to contemplate the 
eternal, inspired by a sense of wonder …[and] the space to which they withdraw [is] the 
“contemplative” realm’.11 Sandy argues that this is the nascent point of philosophy as a distinct 
form: ‘This is the beginning of the idea of thinking – and knowledge – for its own sake.’12 She 
draws here on the work of Hannah Arendt, who distinguishes between the outward 
appearances of the world and the inner life of the mind: ‘In order to find out what truly is, the 
philosopher must leave the world of appearances among which he is naturally and originally at 
home – as Parmenides did when he was carried upward, beyond the gates of night and day, to 
the divine way that lay “far from the beaten path of men,” and as Plato did, too, in the Cave 
parable.’13 However, the process means that the outward informs the inner, thus, ‘when the 
philosopher takes leave of the world given to our senses and does a turnabout (Plato’s 
periagōgē) to the life of the mind, he takes his clue from the former, looking for something to 
be revealed to him that would explain its underlying truth’.14 
Nevertheless, ascertaining Plato’s philosophical view is not straightforward because, as 
Randall Hart points out, ‘he did not write a systematic treatise giving his views; rather he wrote 
about 30 dialogues’.15 Furthermore, within these dialogues, Plato never appears as a character, 
and so it is unclear whether ‘Plato’s assertions truly represent his own views’. While Socrates is 
Plato’s essential protagonist, it is not clear to what extent he or Plato’s other characters are 
expressing views ‘which they themselves would have put forward’. Nevertheless, the 
‘commonly held’ position is that ‘the thoughts expressed by Socrates in the early dialogues 
represented views actually held by Socrates’.16 Although Plato gave no systematic philosophy, 
he did, according to Henri Marrou, build a ‘system of education’ to oppose the Sophists and 
their exclusive concern with ‘immediate practical results’.17 This system was ‘built … on a 
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fundamental belief in truth, and on the conquest of truth by rational knowledge’.18 Marrou 
emphatically states Plato’s aim: 
In any field of human activity whatsoever, the only worthy ideal for a man of culture 
was that which led him to seek the truth and the possession of real knowledge. The 
whole of Plato’s thought is dominated by this great idea.19 
According to Gordon Clark, Plato based his system on ‘three original, independent principles: 
the World of Ideas, the Demiurge, and chaotic space’.20 These principles were ‘equally eternal 
and independent of each other,’ however, ‘the Demiurge fashioned chaotic space into this 
visible world by using the Ideas as his model’: 
Hence in Plato the World of Ideas is not only independent of but also even in a sense 
superior to the maker of heaven and earth. He is morally obligated, and in fact willingly 
submits, to the Ideas of justice, man, equality, and number.’21 
Jacob Howland points out that Plato’s aim was passionately pursued: ‘Plato’s word for 
philosophical desire is erōs [Symposium 203d], the Greek term for the intrinsically clever and 
resourceful passion of sexual attraction.’22 Thus, the erōs of philosophia is, as John Genung so 
aptly phrases it, ‘philosophy, the love of wisdom, a love always in quest of its object and 
enjoying the process of search’.23 Plato’s love of wisdom is compelling – his quest for truth and 
knowledge is pursued with intensity. Later, we shall see an equally intense pursuit of wisdom 
in the Jewish tradition; yet not wisdom manifested in the realm of impersonal Ideas, but 
wisdom manifested in relational action. 
In the Hellenistic period, training in philosophy comprised of three parts, according to 
Marrou: ‘logic, physics and ethics – i.e. a theory of knowledge, a doctrine about the physical 
world, and a system of morality’.24 This three part focus was introduced into the schools of 
philosophy by Xenocrates (c. 396-314 BCE), a student of Plato. The more renowned student in 
Plato’s Academy was, of course, Aristotle (c. 384-322 BCE), who also developed a clear 
philosophical aim, as Amos Funkenstein succinctly distilled: 
It is the task of philosophy, we are told by Aristotle [De caelo Dl, 308a24], to articulate 
what everyone knows, only better. By “better” or “more adequately” he had in mind a 
transparent, unequivocal scientific terminology – definitions, first principles, and 
proofs that proceed according to a clear scheme.25 
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In his Metaphysics Aristotle boldly asserted that ‘All men by nature desire to know’ 
(Metaphysics, 980a21).26 Thus, the philosophical desire for knowledge is innate – to think is 
natural. He then goes on to consider the object of this desire – the knowledge of wisdom: 
…all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the 
principles of things; so that, as has been said before, the man of experience is thought 
to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser 
than the men of experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the 
theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the 
productive. Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes. 
Since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what kind are the causes and 
the principles, the knowledge of which is Wisdom (Metaphysics, 981b30-982a5).27 
Wisdom, for Aristotle, gives meaning and provides knowledge through the principles and 
causes at work in life and in the world. Yet, he values both this theoretical knowledge and also 
what he calls ‘practical wisdom’: ‘Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical 
wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in 
some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but 
about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general’ (Nicomachean Ethics VI, 1140a-
b).28 Theoretical knowledge helps us to understand the world we live in, but practical wisdom 
helps us to live in that world. 
From the outset, the thinking voice in the Jewish tradition finds little room for 
expression. It is deemed irrelevant because the biblical texts are not appropriate for modern 
philosophical reflection. However, Shalom Carmy and David Shatz believe that the Bible is an 
appropriate source for Jewish philosophical reflection,29 whilst acknowledging a number of 
problems and objections. Among these, they note that the Bible ‘contains, at its very core, a 
great deal of material that is not necessarily philosophical: law, poetry, and narrative’. 
Philosophical truths are usually ‘formulated in declarative sentences’, but the Bible makes few 
propositional statements. Conclusions in philosophy are normally arrived at ‘by means of 
logical argumentation’, whereas the Bible ‘contains little sustained argument of a deductive, 
inductive, or practical nature, and attempts to impose the structure of rational argument on 
the biblical text yield [meagre] profit’. Whilst philosophers ‘try to avoid’ contradiction, the 
Bible ‘often juxtaposes contradictory ideas, without explanation or apology’, and the 
                                                 
26
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. William D. Ross <classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.1.i.html> [accessed 4 July 
2014]. 
27
 Aristotle, Metaphysics. 
28
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. William D. Ross <classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.6.vi.html> 
[accessed 25 June 2014].  
29
 Shalom Carmy and David Shatz, ‘The Bible as a source for philosophical reflection’ in Daniel H. Frank and Oliver 
Leaman (eds.), History of Jewish Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 10-29 (p. 10). 
 136 
‘philosophically more sophisticated work of harmonizing the contradictions in the biblical text 
is left to the exegetical literature’. The biblical position on ‘subjects of manifest philosophical 
importance seems primitive to later philosophical sensibilities’: 
For example, the biblical God ostensibly has human form and human emotions; he 
regrets his actions and changes his mind (e.g. Genesis 6:6; 1 Samuel 15:11). Miracles 
are commonplace, and natural events like earthquakes and winds are often identified 
as direct divine acts. If Jewish philosophy begins with the Bible, cynics might suggest, it 
can advance only by casting it behind.30 
Yet, having noted so many problems and objections, Carmy and Shatz argue that the Bible has 
many qualities that lend themselves to Jewish philosophy and philosophy in general: 
The Bible depicts the character of God, presents an account of creation, posits a 
metaphysics of divine providence and divine interventions, suggests a basis for 
morality, discusses many features of human nature, and frequently poses the 
notorious conundrum of how God can allow evil. Surely, then, it engages questions 
that lie at the very heart of Jewish philosophy, indeed of religious philosophy 
generally.31 
In the concluding verses of the Book of Jonah (4:10-11), God asks Jonah a ‘long rhetorical 
question’: “You pity the plant, for which you did not labour, nor did you make it grow, which 
came into being in a night and perished in a night. And should not I pity Nineveh, that great 
city, in which there are more than 120,000 persons who do not know their right hand from 
their left, and also much cattle?” God’s question to Jonah demonstrates the ‘impossibility of 
limiting philosophy to conventionally formulated sentences’. Indeed, Carmy and Shatz argue 
that: ‘There is no way of turning this interrogation into the indicative mood; yet if this verse is 
not philosophy, then nothing in the Bible is philosophy!’32 If there is a willingness to hear, then 
the Jewish thinking voice has much to say in the philosophical conversation, even if the terms 
are different. 
Yoram Hazony notes another common view that has tended to debar the Bible from 
philosophical study: ‘There are two kinds of literary works that address themselves to ultimate 
issues – those that are the product of reason; and those that are known by way of 
revelation.’33 According to this view, the works of Plato, for example, fall into the first category; 
they are ‘composed to assist individuals and nations looking to discover the true and the good 
as best they are able in accordance with man’s natural abilities’. However, the Bible falls into 
the second category; it is ‘a text that reports what God himself thinks about things’, bypassing 
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‘man’s natural faculties, [and] giving us knowledge of the true and the good by means of a 
series of miracles’. On these grounds, the Bible fails to engage with reason. Instead, it ‘offers … 
miraculous knowledge, to be accepted in gratitude and believed on faith’; it ‘requires the 
suspension of the normal operation of our mental faculties, calling on us to believe things that 
don’t make sense to us – because they are supposed to make sense to God.’34 However, 
Hazony also finds much to commend the Bible to the category of reason: ‘histories of ancient 
peoples and attempts to draw political lessons from them; explorations of how best to conduct 
the life of the nation and of the individual; the writings of individuals who struggled with 
personal persecution and failure and their speculations concerning human nature and the 
search for the true and the good; attempts to get beyond the sphere of the here and now and 
to try and reach a more general understanding of the nature of reality, of man’s place in it, and 
of his relationship with that which is beyond his control.’35 
Hazony disagrees with the view that demands that works which ‘have God speaking 
and acting in them’ must be classified as revelation and not reason. This judgement rules out 
the Jewish thinking voice from any participation in the liberal arts and philosophic discourse, in 
general. However, such a view, if fairly applied, ‘would long ago have ruled out as works of 
reason some of the most famous works of philosophy ever written – works that are today 
unchallenged as works of reason, and, indeed, regarded as the basis for the tradition of 
Western philosophy’: 
Consider, for example, the writings of Parmenides (c. 515–440 BCE), an Eleatic 
philosopher of the generation before Socrates. Parmenides is no sideshow in the 
history of philosophy. His examination of the nature of being had such an impact on 
subsequent Greek philosophy that Plato [in Sophist 241d] has one of his principal 
characters call him “father Parmenides.” No modern history of philosophy sees him as 
anything other than crucial. Yet Parmenides, who lived about 130 years after the 
Israelite prophet Jeremiah (c. 647–572), writes philosophy as though it were – 
revealed to him by a god.36 
This is not a ‘metaphorical god’, argues Hazony, but a god who Parmenides genuinely 
‘understood as having taught and inspired him and permitted him to engage in philosophy’.37 
Parmenides’ account ‘carefully describes the experience of climbing into the night sky on a 
horse-drawn chariot tended by the “daughters of the sun,” which ultimately enters the palace 
of an unnamed goddess’. She ‘promises to inform him of “everything” … [and the] everything 
we have of Parmenides’ philosophy consists of the words of this goddess as she revealed them 
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to him’. From the fragments that remain of his poem, Parmenides records that the goddess 
‘tells him of the creation of night and day, the sun and moon, the stars and the ether, and of 
“the divinity who governs all things”’.38 This early Greek cosmology is no less revelatory than 
the Hebrew cosmology of Genesis or the Wisdom literature. Both traditions draw on divine 
sources. 
Empedocles (c. 490–430), also describes the process of his philosophical thought as 
‘depending on the goddess Calliopeia, who “sends” him that which is appropriate for men to 
hear on a chariot from on high.’39 Moreover, Socrates, ‘the very archetype of the philosopher 
guided by reason,’ is restrained by ‘the god’ and commissioned by the Delphic Oracle.40 Unlike 
Parmenides, Socrates does not attribute his philosophy to ‘the speech of a goddess’, but he is 
depicted by Plato as ‘calling on the Muses and other gods to provide him with answers to the 
questions that arise in his philosophy,’ and for inspiration (for example, Symposium 237a; 
Republic 432c; Laws 893b; Timaeus 27b-d; and Phaedrus 242b-d). Thus, the works of Plato – 
traditionally held in the category of reason – present ‘a world in which gods speak to men, 
guiding them in what they say and how they live’.41 For Hazony, there is no place for a double 
standard: ‘If we can forgive the Greeks the strange gods and oracles that speak to them, 
looking beyond this difficulty and judging them by the content of their teachings, why should 
not this same standard be applied to the writings of the Jews?’42 
In defence of the Bible, David Novak argues that ‘its message is so coherent and its 
concerns so profound that it can be the object of philosophical reflection’.43 He likens the Bible 
to nature because it ‘transcends philosophical reflection as an object transcends a subject 
interested in it, and yet it attracts that subject with whom it has something (but not 
everything) in common’. The common ground is ‘wisdom’ (hokhmah), both that pertaining to 
God (for example, Psalms 104:24) and that pertaining to ‘humans, especially those humans 
who are properly related to God (for example, Deuteronomy 4:6)’.44 This Hebrew term hokmah 
 therefore, corresponds to and is somewhat synonymous with the Greek term ,(חכמה)
philosophia (φιλοσοφία).45 Robert Gordis defines hokmah as ‘encompassing all the practical 
skills and technical arts of civilization, as well as the inculcation of the personal qualities 
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required for success and well-being in society’.46 However, according to John McKenzie, biblical 
wisdom was ‘much more than a literary form, much more than a way of life … [it] was also a 
way of thought and a way of speech, which was by no means limited to the schools and the 
writings of the sages’.47 Wisdom was ‘the common way of thought and speech, in which those 
who were called wise excelled’. It shared an essential characteristic with Greek philosophy: ‘It 
was an approach to reality.’ McKenzie believes that biblical wisdom ‘dealt with some questions 
which philosophy also handles, and as a technique of discourse it served the purpose which 
philosophical discursive reasoning served in Greek thought’.48 However, whereas biblical 
wisdom ‘belonged to everyone,’ Greek ‘discursive reasoning was the skill of the intellectual’.49 
The potential for elitism is not inherent in the Jewish thinking voice. The technique of 
discourse runs throughout the biblical narrative, and McKenzie gives a few illustrations: 
But when Joab could find no means to bring David to change his mind towards 
Absalom, he invoked “a wise woman” (II Sam 141-21). The wise woman trapped David 
into accepting the principle of forgiveness by a parable, exactly the same technique 
which Nathan employed to convince David of his sin (II Sam 12 1-15). The professional 
sage was one who had a wealth of meshalim, of riddles such as those by which Samson 
outwitted the Philistines, of pertinent maxims for any situation. But this was the same 
technique by which the ordinary Israelite solved his problems as well as he could.50 
As we shall see in the Book of Proverbs, wisdom, at least in principle, is open to all – it is not 
the preserve of an elite. 
Like the Presocratic philosophers and like Plato, the Hebrew Scriptures have much to 
say on the subject of cosmology, for example: the creation narrative in the opening chapter of 
the Book of Genesis; Job, chapters 9, 26, 28 and 38; and Psalms 19 and 104. Dor-Shav has 
written an excellent article exploring biblical cosmology and the soul, and has demonstrated 
that the Scriptures contain a sophisticated understanding that compliments the development 
of ancient Greek cosmology: 
For the Hebrew Bible, the cosmic picture is defined by a four-element hierarchical 
construct. Surprising to those familiar with the model solely from Greek thought, a 
version of the ancient theory of the four elements – Earth, Water, Wind, and Fire – 
debuted in the ancient Israelite kingdom before Aristotle or, probably, Empedocles. 
Most easily, the four primal elements can be discerned in successive verses in the 
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opening chapter of Ecclesiastes (this reference will soon help illuminate earlier biblical 
sources): 
4. A generation goes, and a generation comes, but the earth forever stands. [Earth] 
5. The sun rises and the sun comes, and hastens to the place where it rises. [Fire] 
6. The wind blows to the south, and goes round to the north; round and round goes 
the wind, and on its circuits the wind returns. [Wind]  
7. All streams run to the sea, but the sea does not fill; to the place where the streams 
run to, there they run again. [Water]51 
Not only does the biblical view compliment the Greek, but by Dor-Shav’s reckoning it also 
predates it. He makes the case that the Hebrew word for sun shemesh (שמש) relates to the 
word for heavens shamayim (שמים), which both represent the element of fire: ‘Once we 
understand that the heavens, shamayim, are a literal embodiment of fire, the four elements 
emerge in many additional verses.’ Dor-Shav gives an example from Proverbs 30:4, where a 
series of four rhetorical questions contain the four elements: 
Who has ascended into Heaven [Fire] and descended? 
Who gathered the Wind in his fists? 
Who bound the Water in a garment? 
Who established all the ends of the earth?52 
Both of these examples, as well as ‘other references’, convince Dor-Shav that ‘the four-
element scheme was manifest in ancient Israelite writings’ from early on. This is supported, 
not least of all, by the Genesis creation narrative, and specifically in the opening two verses: ‘In 
the beginning God created the heaven [fire] and the earth … And the wind of God hovered 
upon the face of the water.’53 Thus, the Jewish thinking voice presents a consistent cosmology, 
which was clearly shared by a number of biblical authors. 
Dor-Shav believes that the elemental cosmology of the Scriptures relate to ‘the 
Hebrew Bible’s consistent concepts of the soul’, as ‘each Hebrew soul-term corresponds to 
one of the cosmic dominions, from which it was created and to which it gravitates at the 
moment of passing’.54 Whilst the element of earth relates to the body (the name אדם ‘Adam’ – 
the first human – is related to the word אדמה literally ‘red earth’, the substance from which his 
body was fashioned), the other three elements relate to corresponding Hebrew terms for the 
soul: water to nefesh ( שנפ ), wind to ruah (רוח) and fire to neshama (נשמה). Each of these four 
cosmological elements in the Bible ‘represents a realm of being’, wherein humans exist 
simultaneously: 
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For man, therefore, each elemental soul represents a different way of existing as an 
“I.” In understanding the three soul-terms distinctively, it becomes apparent that 
instead of an “immature” text, the Hebrew Bible proves to be philosophically acute, 
comprehensive, and revolutionary.55 
At the primary level of existence – earth – represents the ‘base component of our existence’, 
the physical body.56 The body finds both its origin and terminus in the earth: ‘out of [the 
ground] you were taken; for you are dust, and to dust you shall return’ (Genesis 3:19).57 
The first of the three soul-terms, nefesh, is the second level of existence or being and is 
‘related to water’. There is a biblical connection between water and life – ‘flowing waters are 
considered “alive” – mayim hayim,’ and ‘Ecclesiastes chose running streams to signify the 
element’.58 It is also possible to read the second verse of Genesis 1 as an account of the 
creation of life out of water rather than ex nihilo (על־פני תהום ורוח אלהים מרחפת על־פני המים 
 The earth was without form and void, and darkness was over the‘ ,והארץ היתה תהו ובהו וחשך
face of the deep. And the Spirit of God was hovering over the face of the waters’).59 Such a 
reading resonates with that of Thales in the ancient Greek worldview. Dor-Shav claims that 
there are ‘over sixty biblical references’ where nefesh represents ‘life (or the flowing “life 
force”)’; and that in ‘ancient Israelite thought, “life” means animation, the capacity for 
independent movement, and is therefore a term reserved for animals.’60 Moreover, nefesh is 
‘always described as liquid’ in its biblical context and Dor-Shav gives four of many examples: 
‘He poured out his nefesh to death’ [Isaiah 53:12]; ‘My nefesh leaks away for sorrow’ [Psalm 
119:28]; ‘our nefesh dried away’ [Numbers 11:6]; and ‘I poured out my nefesh before the Lord’ 
[1 Samuel 1:15].61 The second soul-term, ruah, literally meaning wind or breath, is the third 
level of human existence and ‘emanates from an intermediary realm between Heaven and 
Earth’. This second soul-term, ruah, shares a similar attribute to the first, nefesh, in that it is 
‘not unique to humans’ – Dor-Shav illustrates this with a reference from Psalm 104:29, ‘You 
take away their ruah, they die’, which refers to verse 25: ‘living things both small and great’.62 
The third soul-term, neshama, represents the ‘uniquely human soul’, appearing 25 times in the 
Bible and always referring ‘only to people’. It is uniquely human, argues Dor-Shav, because ‘it 
is our share in Heaven’.63 
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This uniquely human soul corresponds to heavenly ‘fire’ and ‘light’, which ‘signify 
wisdom and truth – as functions of our innate divine capacity’. It is this level of existence that 
is unique to humanity amongst all creatures: 
Indeed, in ancient Israelite metaphysics, the fire of supreme divination and the light of 
Godly knowledge both infuse the fire-nature of heaven … The human neshama is a 
spark of this fiery heaven embedded in man, and the nature of this component is our 
own ability to create with words, as the sole possessors of language in the animal 
kingdom.64 
The human ability to create with words appears in one of Adam’s very first ‘ensouled’ acts: 
Dor-Shave suggests that the word neshama is derived from the root word shem (‘name’), 
‘signifying the ability to name (i.e. to categorize) that defines man’s capacity for abstract 
thought’.65 The Bible, therefore, differentiates between four levels of human existence: ‘the 
material, the dynamic, the relational, and the ideal, and these distinctions add up to a 
worldview with far-reaching philosophical consequence’. These four distinctions provide an all-
encompassing existential framework: 
In the kingdom of light we transcend all characteristics of gender, status, tongue or 
nationality. In turn, the other three components of our being attain their own 
continuity: The body in progeny, the nefesh in universal life energy, and the ruah in the 
collective. Modern cosmology, therefore, does not debase the Israelite four-tier 
paradigm any more than dissecting a heart obliterates the idea of love.66 
Dor-Shav believes that this attempt to decipher ‘biblical metaphysics’ corrects ‘the dualist 
prejudice regarding the Hebrew Bible,’ and ‘our entire understanding of the canon’; whilst 
forcing a reconsideration of ‘the common notion that it is a book of stories – one with moral 
lessons, but without a philosophical backbone’.67 The ‘discovery of the elemental structure’ 
situates ancient Jewish cosmology and philosophy within an indigenous context, liberating it 
from the claim that it merely reflects borrowed ideas. It also renders the Hebrew Scriptures 
more holistically with an elemental framework scaffolding the texts, and ‘may provide an 
incentive to relate to the Hebrew canon as a whole, rather than as fragments’.68 This brings an 
overall consistency and unity to the Jewish thinking voice – it is a rational voice presenting a 
coherent cosmology, relating the individual soul to the wider existential context. 
Cherbonnier seeks to address the common view that the Bible was ‘written with an 
intent remote from that of the philosopher’, and that any effort to discover its ‘logical 
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implications might therefore appear futile’.69 He challenges this notion by arguing that in the 
Bible ‘human reason is a God-given instrument of self-criticism’, so that anyone who 
‘abrogates it thereby declares himself incorrigible’.70 Cherbonnier draws on the work of Levi 
Olan to support his claim: 
If there is a genuine characteristic of the Hebrew spirit, which is clear and 
unmistakable, it is its rational nature … Reason is energetically used to purify man’s 
faith of its impurities which were found in mythology and paganism. It is employed as 
a corrective … Reason, of itself, is never the source of truth, yet it is an integral 
ingredient of it.71 
The Jewish thinking voice is rational, as has been stated already and, as such, it defies the 
accusation that it is merely a revelatory text. Cherbonnier believes that the key to 
understanding the rational nature of the Bible is through an anthropomorphic understanding 
of God: ‘Anthropomorphism, by placing man and God in the same universe of discourse, may 
be the only conception of God which invites rational scrutiny.’72 For Cherbonnier, this is 
sufficient to allow the Bible to enter the ‘philosophical arena’.73 Indeed, in the Book of Isaiah, 
God addresses the people of Judah in terms that suggest both God and humanity share the 
characteristics necessary for rationality: ‘Come now, let us reason together, says the LORD’ 
(1:18, ESV). God appears to share the human capacity for reason, and thereby takes on an 
anthropomorphic quality. However, it could as easily be said that reason is a divine capacity 
which humans share, being made in the image of God (‘Then God said, “Let us make man in 
our image, after our likeness”’ Genesis 1:26, ESV). Later in Isaiah, God appears to distinguish 
between divine and human thought: 
For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, declares the 
LORD. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your 
ways and my thoughts than your thoughts (55:8-9, ESV). 
Whilst, God establishes his superiority in thought, these verses, nonetheless, present both God 
and humanity engaging in the act and process of thinking. Thus, the God of the Hebrew 
Scriptures is presented as a thinking, reasoning God; who engages with humanity 
anthropomorphically. Alternatively, humans are presented as sharing the divine qualities of 
thinking and reasoning as they engage with God. The Scriptures appear to allow for both 
readings. Indeed, as Cherbonnier finds the capacity for logic in the anthropomorphism of God, 
James Crenshaw speaks of a ‘divine logic’ that is manifested cosmologically: ‘Wisdom, ḥokmâ, 
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represented the divine logic by which the universe took shape, the structuring of things into a 
coherent order.’74 
As we shall see, the Jewish thinking voice is most clearly heard in the texts known 
collectively as Wisdom literature. However, it is not restricted to Wisdom literature alone in 
the Hebrew Scriptures, as Michael Fox makes clear: 
Wisdom in the first sense can manifest itself anywhere and be a factor in any genre. 
Hence, the appearance of the wise [behaviour] in a story, or even of words that refer 
to the faculty of wisdom, such as ḥākām and nābôn, does not demonstrate a special 
connection with Wisdom literature.75 
In this regard, Fox considers the appearance of wisdom in the narratives of the Book of 
Genesis and the Book of Daniel, and in particular, in the stories of Joseph and Daniel, which 
demonstrate some similarities in their courtly positions, dream interpretations, etc.76 The 
Wisdom literature is placed canonically within the third biblical division of the Writings 
 Torah; and, second, the תורה ,Ketuvim – the other two divisions are, first the Teaching ,כתובים)
Prophets, נביאים Nevi'im). Gordis sees other books within the Writings that possess explicit 
wisdom: ‘both Ruth and Esther are included because they show hokhmah in action, revealing 
practical sagacity, Esther in saving her people from destruction and Ruth (and Naomi) in 
securing a desirable husband!’77 
We have seen that proverbs and parables formed an integral part of ancient Jewish 
grammar and rhetoric but, as Genung points out, they are also central to ancient Jewish 
philosophy: ‘the proverb and parable were speedily [moulded] into the accepted vehicle of a 
philosophy of life and an instrument of popular education’.78 The word most commonly 
translated as ‘proverb’ in the Hebrew Scriptures is mashal (משל) – a ‘generic term with a large 
latitude of meaning; it does not differentiate … between proverb, parable, fable, allegory; nor 
between prose and verse’. 79 Biblical proverbs embody ‘in some fitting form the primary 
meaning of likeness, or analogy’, but they differ in function rather than form. Two of these 
functions are given in the Book of Proverbs: ‘To understand a proverb, and a figure; the words 
of the wise, and their dark sayings’ (1:6, JPS Tanakh 1917). The word translated ‘figure’ can 
also mean ‘interpretation’ (מליצה, melitsah), and is juxtaposed with the word for ‘dark 
sayings’, which in the singular means a ‘riddle’ (חידה, chidah). Thus, Genung states that the 
twofold purpose of proverbs is ‘to shed light and to shed darkness’.80 This illuminating and 
                                                 
74
 James L. Crenshaw, Education in Ancient Israel: Across the Deadening Silence (New York: Doubleday, 1998), p.70. 
75
 Michael V. Fox, ‘Wisdom in the Joseph Story’, Vetus Testamentum, 51.1 (2001), pp. 26-41 (p. 30). 
76
 Fox appraises Gerhard Von Rad’s article, ‘Josephgeschichte und altere Chokma’, VTSup, 1 (1953), pp. 121-127. 
77
 Gordis, ‘Religion, Wisdom and History’, p. 365. 
78
 Genung, ‘The Development of Hebrew Wisdom’, p. 18. 
79




obscuring is reminiscent of the aporia experienced by the liberated soul in the Socratic Cave, 
except that with proverbs it is the deciphering of riddles that requires effort and yields 
understanding. Genung notes that there are many examples of biblical mashal – both older 
and younger – outside of the Book of Proverbs: these include the mashals of Balaam (Numbers 
23-24); the Book of Job; the Book of Ecclesiastes; and the later Jesus Sirach. These all ‘combine 
in various proportions’ illuminating melitsah and obscuring chidah, they all provide a 
philosophical light and darkness.81 
Nevertheless, illumination may not be the most appropriate term to use in conjunction 
with ancient Jewish philosophy, because unlike the Greek tradition where sight is the primary 
sense (as we shall see later), in the Hebrew Scriptures hearing is the sense without equal. As 
with the Greek tradition, these are not mutually exclusive ideas – there is clearly a place for 
the visual in the Hebrew Scriptures, if not then the writings of the Prophets, for example, 
would be extremely brief. Comparatively, however, hearing is the sense most closely 
connected to biblical wisdom. Conjoined with this positive emphasis on hearing is a negative 
distrust of sight. This provides an important check to the philosophical voice in the Western 
tradition that prizes sight so highly. Whilst seeing is positively expressed from God’s 
perspective at the very outset of the Scriptures – ‘And God saw that the light was good’ 
(Genesis 1:4, ESV) – it is negatively expressed at the outset from the human perspective, when 
the serpent encounters Eve: 
He said to the woman, “Did God actually say, ‘You shall not eat of any tree in the 
garden’?” And the woman said to the serpent, “We may eat of the fruit of the trees in 
the garden, but God said, ‘You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree that is in the midst 
of the garden, neither shall you touch it, lest you die.’” But the serpent said to the 
woman, “You will not surely die. For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will 
be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.” So when the woman saw 
that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree 
was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate, and she also gave 
some to her husband who was with her, and he ate. Then the eyes of both were 
opened, and they knew that they were naked (Genesis 3:1-7, ESV). 
In the sabotage of Eden, the serpent’s first step is to encourage Eve to question her hearing, 
essentially asking: ‘What did you actually hear God say?’ The serpent succeeds in engaging Eve, 
and by repeating back what she believes she heard, the process of undermining begins (i.e. the 
undermining of the commandment and the undermining of Eve’s trust in her ability to hear). It 
is possible that this undermining produces an immediate effect because Eve misquotes God’s 
words, adding a prohibition against touching the fruit, absent in the original command 
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(Genesis 2:17).82 It is not clear from the text if this misquotation is an accidental or intentional 
embellishment, but it is only after having eaten of the fruit that the consequences are set into 
motion, not before. 
With the disparity between the words actually spoken by God and Eve’s recollection of 
them, the serpent has effected doubt, and is able to reinterpret the command, removing the 
judicial consequences. The serpent’s reinterpretation is presented as a correction – Eve has 
misunderstood – and he replaces the punishment of death with the promise of godlikeness, 
the knowledge of good and evil. Eve already has godlikeness (Genesis 1:26-27), but the 
serpent’s empty promise appeals to something beyond her hearing, which has now been 
deemed faulty, he appeals to seeing: ‘your eyes will be opened’. This is indeed what happens, 
but it is not recorded as a positive event: ‘Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew 
that they were naked’. In the aftermath, there is only shame, the need to hide and fear 
towards the God whose company they had previously enjoyed: 
And they heard the sound of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day, 
and the man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God among 
the trees of the garden. But the LORD God called to the man and said to him, “Where 
are you?” And he said, “I heard the sound of you in the garden, and I was 
afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself.” He said, “Who told you that you were 
naked? Have you eaten of the tree of which I commanded you not to eat?” (Genesis 
3:8-11, ESV) 
It was in the ‘cool of the day’ that God, Adam and Eve had previously enjoyed their time 
together – there is no reference to fearfulness in their previous encounters when God first 
addressed Adam, when Adam names the living creatures in God’s presence, and when God 
presents Eve to Adam (Genesis 2:16-24). Neither was there any shame: ‘And the man and his 
wife were both naked and were not ashamed’ (24). In a complete reversal, hearing becomes 
the negative sense to Adam and Eve as the sound of God creates panic. Yet the opening of 
their eyes has brought nothing good. The promise was deceptive. As Eve reached for the fruit 
we are told that she ‘saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, 
and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise’ (Genesis 3:6). The sense of sight as an 
instrument of functional judgement (she ‘saw that the tree was good for food’), aesthetic 
judgement (‘it was a delight to the eyes’) and philosophical judgement (‘the tree was to be 
desired to make one wise’) is deceptive. It is through her eyes that Eve is deceived, not least of 
all because she picked the wrong tree: ‘The tree of life was in the midst of the garden’ (Genesis 
2:9, ESV). 
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Thereafter, numerous references appear to connect vision with deception or evil – 
thus, the Jewish thinking voice sounds a warning in relation to wisdom and the senses – for 
example, Potiphar’s wife lusting over Joseph: ‘And after a time his master’s wife cast her eyes 
on Joseph and said, “Lie with me”’ (Genesis 39:7, ESV); Achan’s ruinous coveting: ‘when I saw 
among the spoil a beautiful cloak from Shinar, and 200 shekels of silver, and a bar of gold 
weighing 50 shekels, then I coveted them and took them’ (Joshua 7:21, ESV); and David’s 
adultery: ‘It happened, late one afternoon, when David arose from his couch and was walking 
on the roof of the king’s house, that he saw from the roof a woman bathing; and the woman 
was very beautiful’ (2 Samuel 11:2, ESV). Like the fruit plucked by Eve, each takes that which is 
not rightfully theirs because it appealed to their eyes. David was selected as Israel’s king by 
God, but was overlooked by his family and almost overlooked by the Prophet Samuel because 
he assumed that David’s older brother Eliab was God’s obvious choice: ‘But the LORD said to 
Samuel, “Do not look on his appearance or on the height of his stature, because I have 
rejected him. For the LORD sees not as man sees: man looks on the outward appearance, but 
the LORD looks on the heart”’ (1 Samuel 16:7, ESV). As Eve looked upon the aesthetic beauty of 
the fruit, Samuel looked upon Eliab’s physique – the look, however, was superficial and ill-
judged. God was using different criteria, but God’s vision is not defective. The wisdom and 
knowledge that comes though seeing is prone to producing self-deception – when Eve doubts 
her hearing, the serpent’s work is done; and by the time she lifts the fruit to her mouth the 
deception has become her own. She no longer needs persuading. The warning against self-
deceptive wisdom is clear: ‘Woe to those who are wise in their own eyes, and shrewd in their 
own sight’ (Isaiah 5:21, ESV); and ‘Do you see a man who is wise in his own eyes? There is 
more hope for a fool than for him’ (Proverbs 26:12, ESV). 
If seeing is construed as the negative sense, then hearing is the sense through which 
biblical wisdom is mediated. This is perhaps only natural for a tradition built on orality. The 
injunction given throughout the Hebrew Scriptures is to ‘Hear the word of the LORD’ (דבר־יהוה 
 which appears well over thirty times in this specific form.83 The vast majority of these ,(שמעי
references are found in the books of the Prophets, especially Jeremiah and Ezekiel, reflecting 
the appropriate response to that which is oracular. Likewise, there are over four hundred 
references to the expression: ‘Thus says the LORD’ (כה אמר יהוה), prefacing a message from 
God, and again the vast majority are found in the Prophets, again especially in Jeremiah and 
Ezekiel. These two prophets had arguably some of the toughest audiences to address, which 
perhaps explains the necessity to repeat the directives to listen because God is speaking. 
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Although the Prophet’s messages are replete with imagery, the overall emphasis is on the 
auditory and not the visual. 
The relationship between hearing and biblical wisdom is illustrated in a Psalm 
attributed to the Sons of Korah, where all are enjoined to listen: 
Hear this, all peoples! 
Give ear, all inhabitants of the world, 
both low and high, 
rich and poor together! 
My mouth shall speak wisdom; the meditation of my heart shall be understanding. 
I will incline my ear to a proverb; 
I will solve my riddle to the music of the lyre (Psalm 49:1-4, ESV). 
The Psalm is addressed to Jew and non-Jew alike, and to people of all social and economic 
position – it is thoroughly inclusive. It begins with instructions to hear and to literally give one’s 
ear (אזן, azan). The ear must be given to the speaker, or in this case, the singer – it must be a 
deliberate act, no less than the act of contemplation in the ancient Greek tradition. The Psalm 
effortlessly weaves together the wisdom of the mashal – the light and darkness of 
understanding and riddle – with the act of hearing. The Psalms are, of course, songs to be sung 
and often, as with this Psalm, with the accompaniment of instruments. Just as Socrates and 
Plato fused cosmological astronomy with musical harmonics as kindred sciences (Republic, 
530d);84 and just as the Trivium laid the foundation for the study of music and astronomy in 
the Quadrivium; so we find a similar understanding in the Hebrew tradition, fusing wisdom 
with music.  
In the Book of Proverbs the wise are instructed to ‘hear and increase in learning’ (1:5) 
and to hear a ‘father’s instruction’ (1:8). Wisdom is portrayed with a voice: ‘Wisdom cries 
aloud in the street, in the markets she raises her voice; at the head of the noisy streets she 
cries out; at the entrance of the city gates she speaks’ (1:20-21). Like the Prophetic literature, 
Wisdom literature is aimed at the ear: 
Does not wisdom call? Does not understanding raise her voice? …she cries aloud: “To 
you, O men, I call, and my cry is to the children of man. O simple ones, learn prudence; 
O fools, learn sense. Hear, for I will speak noble things, and from my lips will 
come what is right, for my mouth will utter truth; wickedness is an abomination to my 
lips. All the words of my mouth are righteous; there is nothing twisted or crooked in 
them” (Proverbs 8:1-8, ESV). 
The voice of wisdom is dependable; it is uncorrupted and therefore can be trusted to impart 
prudence, good sense, nobility, righteousness, and even truth. This is not the Aristotelian 
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understanding of truth as correspondence, but the truth of reliability – of true words spoken 
and of words being kept.85 
Perhaps the greatest call to hear in ancient Israel – still in force in Judaism today – 
comes from Deuteronomy, where Moses, addressing the people, says: ‘Hear, O Israel: the 
LORD our God, the LORD is one’ (6:4, JPS Tanakh 1917, אלהינו יהוה אחד   This .(שמע ישראל יהוה 
has become a prayer of recitation and a semi-creedal declaration, and is known as the Shema, 
taken from the first word in the verse שמע, to ‘hear’ or ‘heard’. Whilst the focus of the 
statement is often the identity and unity of Israel’s God (the paramount avowal of 
monotheism), the verbal command is to hear – as Danielle Celermajer states: 
Thus, what is perhaps the central prayer, repeated several times daily and throughout 
the liturgy, opens with the words, “Shema Israel”, “Hear Israel!” This, combined with 
the prohibition on making images of God and the impossibility of seeing God has led to 
a general understanding that, for the Hebrews, the pre-eminent knowing takes the 
form of hearing, and not seeing.86 
The prohibition against making images is found in the second commandment: ‘You shall not 
make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is 
in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth’ (Exodus 20:4). The 
commandment is reiterated by Moses in Deuteronomy, reminding the people of when they 
received the Ten Commandments:  
Then the LORD spoke to you out of the midst of the fire. You heard the sound of 
words, but saw no form; there was only a voice … Therefore watch yourselves very 
carefully. Since you saw no form on the day that the LORD spoke to you … out of the 
midst of the fire, beware lest you act corruptly by making a carved image for 
yourselves, in the form of any figure, the likeness of male or female, the likeness of 
any animal that is on the earth, the likeness of any winged bird that flies in the air, the 
likeness of anything that creeps on the ground, the likeness of any fish that is in the 
water under the earth. And beware lest you raise your eyes to heaven, and when you 
see the sun and the moon and the stars, all the host of heaven, you be drawn away 
and bow down to them and serve them, things that the LORD your God has allotted to 
all the peoples under the whole heaven (4:12-19, ESV). 
The commandment against idolatry is reemphasised with regard to the relationship between 
the visual and the auditory. Crucially, the people ‘heard the sound of words, but saw no form’ 
– the visual was likely to lead to idolatry, so the people are warned in no uncertain terms – 
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God reveals no visual manifestation. They are left with only a voice. However, the sound of 
words requires both voice and ears, as Shmuel Trigano argues: 
A voice does not exist in itself and for itself. It exists as a “voice” only insofar as it is 
heard, even and especially by those who push it away. One could even go so far as to 
say that it is the hearing that makes the voice, that without hearing the voice is 
nothing and, consequently, that without human beings, creation is nothing, nothing 
but an endless, anonymous passing. What makes God’s Name, the purpose for which 
God needs a name, is man.87 
Thus, the sound of words mediates the covenantal relationship – the divine voice and the 
human ear (via the prophet), the divine ear and the human voice (via the priest). The Jewish 
thinking voice requires a receptive ear – an open ear. Room must be made in the Great 
Conversation of literature, rhetoric and philosophy to allow not just for the Jewish written, 
spoken and thinking voices to sound, but to be heard; to strike a two-way relationship 
between Athens and Jerusalem. 
However, it is necessary that the people remember what they heard, not what they 
saw. In the absence of the visual (Moses), the people broke the second commandment even 
before Moses returned to them with the stone tablets; they created a golden calf evoking the 
deities of Egypt (Exodus 32). To remember what was heard – the sound of words – requires a 
deliberate act of memorisation – an act of recalling. Hence, the Shema and the directives that 
immediately follow it: 
You shall love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all 
your might. And these words that I command you today shall be on your heart. You 
shall teach them diligently to your children, and shall talk of them when you sit in your 
house, and when you walk by the way, and when you lie down, and when you rise. You 
shall bind them as a sign on your hand, and they shall be as frontlets between your 
eyes. You shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates 
(Deuteronomy 6:5-9, ESV). 
The commandments were to be recited, taught and learnt in the day-to-day activities of 
sitting, walking and lying down, dawn till dusk. From ear to heart, they were to be 
communicated to each successive generation. The binding to hand, head and house has been 
translated into the physical tefillin or mezuzah, however, the command may as easily mean 
that the actions of the hands and the direction of the head are guided by the commandments; 
whilst the activities of going out of the home into the world and the return again are checked 
by the words on the doorpost and gate. But even the physical representations are memory 
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aids to put in mind the words spoken by God, which correspond to the words heard by the 
people. As Trigano states: 
…the voice reaches hearing through the agency of words: “you heard the voice of 
words” (Deut. 4:12), but the hearing in this relationship is by no means pure passivity. 
The ear has to arrive at hearing words, discerning them, making a covenant.88 
In Trigano’s view, the speaker and the hearer are interdependent – neither can exist without 
the other: ‘The voice can spring forth only in the hearing, which means that in the voice there 
is always already someone listening … hearing is always preceded by a voice, but a voice exists 
only to be heard’.89  
In the ensuing post-biblical period, Carmy and Shatz trace the line of Jewish 
philosophy: ‘Beginning with Philo and continuing on through medieval thinkers like Saadia 
Gaon and Maimonides, biblical hermeneutics often rested on the principle that the Bible 
conveys major philosophical and scientific truths.’90 Daniel Breslauer argues that Philo (c. 20 
BCE-50 CE) understood Judaism as ‘the best pedagogy for teaching true philosophy’: 
Through allegorical interpretation, he identifies the ideals and values of the Bible with 
Greek thought. He justifies Jewish observances as inherently philosophical and as 
indispensable for a philosophic life. In this way he defends Judaism, the true 
philosophy, as an exalted religious tradition worthy of emulation by Jew and non-Jew 
alike.91 
An example of Philo’s allegorical interpretation can be seen in On Drunkenness, where he puts 
forward a cosmology in which wisdom partners God in the act of creation: 
…the Creator of the universe is also the father of his creation; and that the mother was 
the knowledge of the Creator with whom God uniting, not as a man unites, became 
the father of creation. And this knowledge having received the seed of God, when the 
day of her travail arrived, brought forth her only and well-beloved son, perceptible by 
the external senses, namely this world. Accordingly wisdom is represented by some 
one of the beings of the divine company as speaking of herself in this manner: “God 
created me as the first of his works, and before the beginning of time did he establish 
me.” For it was necessary that all the things which came under the head of the 
creation must be younger than the mother and nurse of the whole universe (VIII, 30-
31).92 






 Carmy and Shatz, ‘The Bible as a source’, p. 11. 
91
 Daniel Breslauer, ‘Philosophy in Judaism: Two Stances’ in Jacob Neusner and Alan J. Avery-Peck (eds.), The 
Blackwell Companion to Judaism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 162-180 (p. 166). 
92
 Philo of Alexandria, On Drunkenness, trans. Charles D. Yonge 
<www.earlyjewishwritings.com/text/philo/book13.html> [accessed 18 June 2014]. 
 152 
Here, Philo quotes directly from the Book of Proverbs: ‘God created me as the first of his 
works, and before the beginning of time did he establish me’ (8:22). Yet, he develops the 
biblical text into an allegorical relationship between God and wisdom that bears a son, which 
represents the world. This goes well beyond the text of Proverbs, elevating wisdom to a co-
creator. Whilst in no way orthodox, he does present a cosmology that could engage a Jewish 
and/or non-Jewish audience. 
Breslauer also notes the contribution of Josephus Flavius (ca. 38-100 CE), the Jewish 
historian, who in Against Apion ‘offers several examples to demonstrate that philosophy has 
an exalted place in Judaism’.93 He made the bold claim that ‘among the formative Greek 
thinkers, both Protagoras and Aristotle learned from the Jews’, thereby suggesting that 
‘Judaism has a “natural” philosophy, inherent in itself, that has instructed even the most 
advanced of Greek thinkers’.94 Josephus quotes from Clearchus of Soli (c. 300 BCE), a student 
of Aristotle, with regard to an alleged encounter between Aristotle and a Jew: ‘Now, for a 
great part of what this Jew said, it would be too long to recite it; but what includes in it both 
wonder and philosophy it may not be amiss to discourse of’ (Against Apion 1.22).95 Josephus 
views Judaism and philosophy as compatible. Indeed, as Breslauer points out: ‘True Judaism 
demonstrates its authenticity through its philosophical rigor.’96 Yet, arguably, Josephus goes 
beyond the synthesis of Philo: 
While maintaining that Jews have a long history of being philosophical, Josephus goes 
even further than Philo, arguing that the Greeks already recognized this aspect of 
Jewish philosophical inclination as inherent to Judaic culture. Josephus does not 
merely show that Jewish and Greek thought teach the same truths. He insists that 
native Jewish thought is intrinsically philosophical.97 
Whether or not Josephus’ examples can withstand historic scrutiny, he himself appears to 
believe them, just as Clearchus appears to believe in the account of Aristotle, even though the 
veracity of the encounter seems dubious.98 
In the rabbinic period of Antiquity, the Talmudic view of philosophy would appear to 
be negative, or superficially so, at least. As Howland points out, ‘At first sight, the Talmud’s 
opinion of Greek intellectual [endeavours] seems unambiguous: “Cursed be a man who rears 
pigs and cursed be a man who teaches his son Greek wisdom!” the Gemara declares [BT Sotah 
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49B (Soncino trans.), repeated at BT Bava Kamma 82B].’99 Yet, Howland believes that this is not 
a ‘blanket condemnation of Greek thinking’, but rather a prohibition on ‘teaching such wisdom 
to children’.100 The meaning of ‘Greek Wisdom’ is unclear from the context but, furthermore, 
‘neither here nor elsewhere does the Talmud explicitly forbid its study’. Indeed, even the 
prohibition ‘bears comparison to Socrates’ assertion that no one under thirty years of age 
should be exposed to dialectical argumentation, lest he be “filled with lawlessness” (Republic 
537e).’101 Indeed, in The Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides also appears to uphold the 
Rabbi’s view of age in relation to the teaching of philosophy: 
 Now, consider how, in the writings of the Rabbis, the admission of a person into 
discourses on metaphysics is made dependent on distinction in social qualities, and 
study of philosophy, as well as on the possession of clearsightedness, intelligence, 
eloquence, and ability to communicate things by slight allusions. If a person satisfies 
these requirements, the secrets of the Law are confided to him. In the same place we 
also read the following passage: - R. Jochanan said to R. Elasar, “Come, I will teach you 
Ma‘aseh Mercabah.” The reply was, “I am not yet old,” or in other words, I have not 
yet become old, I still perceive in myself the hot blood and the rashness of youth. You 
learn from this that, in addition to the above-named good qualities, a certain age is 
also required.102 
Maimonides is drawing on a rabbinic text where the Law is in view, but he applies the principle 
of age to metaphysical discourse by extension. Whether this is merely reflects Maimonides’ 
fusion of Western philosophy and the Scriptures, or whether this also represents the rabbinic 
view from centuries before regarding philosophy is unclear, but his use of the rabbinic allusion 
supports Howland’s conclusion. 
If the rabbinic view of Greek philosophy is unclear, the attitude towards Jewish 
wisdom is much more positive. Thus, the influence of the Jewish thinking voice reaches 
beyond the biblical age, even if only in the Jewish world. The Bereshit Rabbah (Midrash on 
Genesis) I.1, for example, begins with an exposition of wisdom from Proverbs 8: 
R. Oshaya commenced [his exposition thus]: Then I was by Him, as a nursling (amon); 
and I was daily all delight (Prov. VIII, 30). ‘Amon’ means tutor; ‘amon’ means covered; 
‘amon’ means hidden; and some say, ‘amon’ means great. ‘Amon’ is a tutor, as you 
read, As an omen (nursing-father) carrieth the sucking child (Num. XI, 12). ‘Amon’ 
means covered, as in the verse, Ha'emunim (they that were clad – i.e. covered) in 
scarlet (Lam. IV, 5). ‘Amon’ means hidden, as in the verse, And he concealed (omen) 
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Hadassah (Est. II, 7). ‘Amon’ means great, as in the verse, Art thou better than No-
amon (Nah. III, 8)? Which is rendered, Art thou better than Alexandria the Great, that 
is situate among the rivers?103 
The Midrash draws on a variety of biblical sources to flesh out the character of wisdom 
through the noun amon (אמון) meaning ‘nursling’. Unlike the Philonic understanding of 
wisdom, which characterises her as a co-creator with God, this rabbinic exegesis positions her 
as a subordinate – a nursing child. Wisdom is, therefore, nurtured by God. There is also 
reference to the dark and obscure nature of wisdom – it is concealed, hidden, covered – like 
Socratic aporia, wisdom is not at first perceived, it must be uncovered, it must be found. The 
Midrash continues to explore the text: 
Another interpretation: ‘amon’ is a workman (uman). The Torah declares: ‘I was the 
working tool of the Holy One, blessed be He.’ In human practice, when a mortal king 
builds a palace, he builds it not with his own skill but with the skill of an architect. The 
architect moreover does not build it out of his head, but employs plans and diagrams 
to know how to arrange the chambers and the wicket doors. Thus God consulted the 
Torah and created the world, while the Torah declares, IN THE BEGINNING GOD 
CREATED (I, 1), BEGINNING referring to the Torah, as in the verse, The Lord made me 
as the beginning of His way (Prov. VIII, 22).104 
By means of a small ‘word-play’, Jacob Neusner explains that in ‘changing its vowels and 
reading uman’, wisdom becomes a ‘workman’.105 Wisdom is both at once a ‘working tool’ in 
God’s hand and a skilled workman – an architect. Thus, the nurtured child grows into an 
apprentice builder-architect in Hebrew cosmology. Yet the key here, for the Rabbis, is that the 
architect’s working plans are no less that Torah. At first, the suggestion is that wisdom is 
consulting Torah, but going further, the final sentence above identifies wisdom as Torah (i.e. 
Proverbs 8:22 is referring to Torah as the first of God’s creations rather than wisdom). In an 
editorial footnote to the Midrash, Maurice Simon attempts to clarify the text: 
The speaker is the Torah (Wisdom) personified, referring to the pre-Creation era. The 
Torah was with God as with a tutor, reared, as it were, by the Almighty … it was also 
covered up and hidden. This may mean that the laws of the Torah were unknown until 
the Revelation at Sinai, while some of them remained ‘hidden’ even then, i.e. their 
reasons are not known.106 
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However, later in the Midrash a clearer understanding of the relationship between wisdom 
and Torah emerges: ‘the incomplete form of the heavenly wisdom is the Torah’ (XVII, 5).107 
Thus, by implication, wisdom in its fullest – ‘heavenly’ – form is greater than the Torah, which 
in turn implies that Torah is an earthly version of wisdom, not a complete representation, as 
the earlier text suggests. 
Jewish philosophy developed distinctively out of the period of Late Antiquity and into 
the medieval world, and as it did so, it began to synthesise far more with Platonic and 
Aristotelian models. Arguably, it began to lose some of its distinctive shape and morph into 
something different as it imbibed the Western tradition, and as it found itself in the company 
of Christian appropriations of the Hebrew Scriptures and Islamic appropriations of the Greek 
philosophers. Effectively, the unique Jewish thinking voice was subdued, as the Western 
thinking voice began to dominate. Despite the great contributions to Jewish philosophy from 
the likes of Saadia Gaon (882-942 CE)108 and Maimonides (1135-1204 CE)109, Jerusalem began 
to speak the language of Athens. 
 
The Elenchus of Socrates and Hebrew Wisdom Literature 
 
We return now to the work of Plato and the person of Socrates, whose philosophy has had one 
of the most profound effects on the Western tradition. We have seen that Plato did not 
directly present himself in his writings – he wrote but did not speak. Conversely, Socrates 
spoke but did not, as far as we know, write – his philosophy is presented in speech, but he 
himself composed no written works.110 Howland sums up the life and times of Socrates as 
presented by Plato through his dialogues and the socio-political context in the ‘aftermath of 
the Peloponnesian War, a conflict of twenty-seven years that ended when the Spartans 
starved the Athenians into submission in 404 BCE’: 
Unlike many Athenians, including those most strongly allied with the democratic 
faction, Socrates remained in the city during the brief postwar rule of the Thirty 
Tyrants, a ruthless Spartan-installed oligarchy that murdered roughly 1,500 of his 
fellow citizens. When the returning democrats defeated the oligarchs in battle in 403, 
Socrates fell under their suspicion. Well known for his practice of philosophizing in 
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public, he was tried and executed in 399 for the crimes of impiety and corrupting the 
young.’111 
However, rejecting these charges, Socrates denied ‘having students or being a teacher 
(Apology 33a), presumably because his pedagogy consists in trying to enable others to learn 
through their own efforts’.112 Nevertheless, Howland argues that Socrates ‘seduces as all great 
teachers do, inspiring his companions by his moral and intellectual seriousness, passion for 
learning, and depth of insight to attempt to philosophize as he does in order to achieve 
something like his nobility of soul’.113 
During his public trial Socrates uttered one of his most well-known maxims: ‘the 
unexamined life is not worth living’ (Apology 38a).114 This epitomises the contemplative act 
described by Sandy and Arendt. Howland believes that Plato almost fully renders the 
contemplative act of Socrates in the dialogues: 
Taken as a whole, the dialogues constitute a relatively complete portrait of Socrates’ 
version of the examined life. Most of the dialogues begin in everyday circumstances 
that spontaneously give rise to a discussion of some philosophical issue – the nature of 
piety, for example (as in the Euthyphro), or courage (the Laches), or justice (the 
Republic).115 
Yet, this was ‘philosophical reflection’ as life rather than ‘a refined pastime nor simply one 
alternative among many intellectual pursuits’; it was ‘a means of examining the basic beliefs 
that guide human action … an indispensable part of what human beings ordinarily understand 
by living well’.116 Howland emphasises the ‘social and collaborative’ aspect of Socratic 
philosophising, which is present in ‘even the silent and interior process of thinking’ – the inner 
‘conversing [dialegesthai]’ – where ‘the soul proceeds by “asking and answering itself” 
(Theaetetus 189e-90a)’.117 This outwardly manifests when Socrates ‘asks his interlocutors to be 
cooperative (in participating in a joint inquiry), honest (in saying what they believe), gracious 
(in submitting to criticism), reasonable (in admitting what they don’t know), and courageous 
(in continuing the investigation once their ignorance has been revealed).’118 Socrates’ social 
and collaborative philosophy – the conversing – finds a mirror in the Jewish tradition, where 
the auditory depends on speaker and hearer. 
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Thus, as Hart makes clear, Socrates was zealous to ‘discover guidelines for leading a 
just life’; with a concern for ‘ethics and morality’.119 Plato’s dialogues present ‘Socrates and 
others in extended conversation about philosophy’, and in which Socrates is the ‘relentless 
questioner of his fellow citizens, foreign friends, and various sophists’.120 His questions were 
formed to cause his interlocutors to ‘examine the basic assumptions of their way of life’ – this 
has become known as the ‘Socratic Method’ – leading ‘his students to draw conclusions in 
response to his probing questions,’ whilst refuting any assumptions. Jenny Labendz adds that 
the Socratic Method is ‘also known as elenchus or elenchos, from the Greek verb elenchein – to 
refute, examine critically, or censure – which Socrates uses to describe his method in Plato’s 
dialogues’.121 Consequently, Socratic elenchus ‘tests a certain belief through a series of 
questions and answers between a leader and an interlocutor … Socrates seeks out and initiates 
conversations with his interlocutors’.122 As a result, Socrates’ interlocutors were ‘often left … 
bewildered because they realized they were ignorant regarding an idea they thought they 
knew perfectly well’. Socrates, on the other hand, ‘openly acknowledged that he did not know 
everything’.123 
Socrates’ acknowledgement reflects his uniqueness within ‘the context of Greek 
thinking’, as Howland rightly notes: ‘Socrates is something unexpected: a philosopher for 
whom the vita contemplativa is inseparable from the vita activa, and whose intellectual pride 
is tempered by religious humility.’124 In the Apology, Socrates delivers his defence speech and 
recounts his quest to test the Delphic Oracle, which had named him the wisest man: 
Socrates claims in the Apology that he began to engage in his distinctive philosophical 
activity – the process of questioning his fellow citizens and, inevitably, exposing the 
incoherence of their opinions – in order to test the oracle of the god at Delphi, which 
had declared that no one was wiser than he. Socrates explains that he came to 
understand the oracle to mean that he is wiser than others just to the extent that he 
recognizes his own ignorance. By examining and refuting his fellow Athenians, he 
shows that human wisdom is “worth little or nothing” (23a-b).125 
Socrates’ quest took him far and wide, and ‘into the most unlikely quarters’, according to 
Edmond Cherbonnier: ‘Unimpressed by pedigrees, he winnowed ideas in banquet hall and 
market place, rejecting none until they stood condemned by their own inner contradictions.’126 
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Socrates becomes the ‘model or pattern (paradeigma) of human wisdom’ (Apology 23a-b), 
because he recognises his own ignorance.127 
Labendz notes that another significant aspect of Socratic elenchus is the use of 
analogy. However, the analogical element of elenchus is not a demonstration of rhetoric, 
rather when Socrates uses analogies they are ‘intimately connected with his theory of 
learning’, because they join different areas of knowledge together. 128 Moreover, Socrates’ 
analogies make ‘the lofty ideas’ in his discussions more accessible to his interlocutors.129 One 
of the most profound analogies of Socrates is the Cave. In the Republic Socrates uses this 
image to explain the effects of philosophic education upon the soul, but he begins by depicting 
life without philosophy, without thinking: 
Imagine human beings living in an underground, cavelike dwelling, with an entrance a 
long way up … open to the light … They’ve been there since childhood, fixed in the 
same place, with their necks and legs fettered, able to see only in front of them … Light 
is provided by a fire burning far above and behind them. Also behind them, but on 
higher ground, there is a path stretching between them and the fire. Imagine that 
along this path a low wall has been built, like the screen in front of puppeteers above 
which they show their puppets … Then also imagine that there are people along the 
wall, carrying all kinds of artifacts that project above it – statues of people and other 
animals … these prisoners [do not] see anything of themselves and one another 
besides the shadows that the fire casts on the wall in front of them … the prisoners 
would in every way believe that the truth is nothing other than the shadows of those 
artifacts (Republic 514a-515c).130 
Socrates paints a vivid picture of people living in relative ignorance and knowing no better. It is 
the unexamined life. What occupies them is shadow play. Furthermore, they have been 
imprisoned their whole lives – unaware and unquestioning. 
Socrates now proceeds to describe the act of liberation from this imprisonment, in its 
initial stages: 
Consider … what being released … and cured of their ignorance would naturally be like 
… When one of them was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, 
walk, and look up toward the light, he'd be pained and dazzled and unable to see the 
things whose shadows he'd seen before. What do you think he’d say, if we told him 
that what he’d seen before was inconsequential, but that now … he sees more 
correctly? … if someone compelled him to look at the light itself, wouldn’t his eyes 
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hurt, and wouldn’t he turn around and flee towards the things he's able to see, 
believing that they’re really clearer than the ones he’s being shown? (515c-d)131 
The process of liberation is painful, causing aporetic disorientation. Contemplation, therefore, 
does not come easily. All men may desire to know, as Aristotle stated, but not all desire 
liberating knowledge because it comes at a great cost: every held view and all prior 
understanding must be abandoned. 
Next, Socrates takes the liberated soul out of the cave, to experience life in the world 
outside for the first time: 
…if someone dragged him away from there by force, up the rough, steep path, and 
didn't let him go until he had dragged him into the sunlight, wouldn’t he be pained and 
irritated at being treated that way? And when he came into the light, with the sun 
filling his eyes, wouldn’t he be unable to see a single one of the things now said to be 
true? …he’d need time to get adjusted before he could see things in the world above. 
At first, he’d see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, 
then the things themselves. Of these, he’d be able to study the things in the sky and 
the sky itself more easily at night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than 
during the day, looking at the sun and the light of the sun … Finally … he’d be able to 
see the sun, not images of it in water or some alien place, but the sun itself, in its own 
place, and be able to study it … And at this point he would infer and conclude that the 
sun provides the seasons and the years, governs everything in the visible world, and is 
in some way the cause of all the things that he used to see (515e-516c).132 
The aporia gradually clears like mist and, with the new dawn, the liberated soul begins to make 
sense of life, the world and the universe it inhabits. It is in stages, with increasing degrees of 
illumination leading to greater and fuller understanding, from the shadow to the sun. 
Now Socrates has the soul turning to consider the cave again, and the fellow-prisoners 
that were left behind: 
What about when he reminds himself of his first dwelling place, his fellow prisoners, 
and what passed for wisdom there? Don’t you think that he’d count himself happy for 
the change and pity the others? …if there had been any [honours], praises, or prizes 
among them for the one who was sharpest at identifying the shadows as they passed 
by and who best remembered which usually came earlier, which later, and which 
simultaneously, and who could thus best divine the future, do you think that our man 
would desire these rewards or envy those among the prisoners who were [honoured] 
and held power? Instead, wouldn’t he feel, with Homer, that he’d much prefer to 
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“work the earth as a serf to another, one without possessions,” and go through any 
sufferings, rather than share their opinions and live as they do? (516c-d)133 
After the pain, liberation finally brings its reward – happiness and contentment without the 
esteem of others, without possessions or prizes. What passed for wisdom is now revealed to 
be a shallow token, and those who excel in it are to be pitied. 
Going further, Socrates imagines the soul returning to the cave, and the implications 
for those who return and those who have remained: 
If this man went down into the cave again and sat down in his same seat, wouldn’t his 
eyes – coming suddenly out of the sun like that – be filled with darkness? …before his 
eyes had recovered – and the adjustment would not be quick – while his vision was 
still dim, if he had to compete again with the perpetual prisoners in recognizing the 
shadows, wouldn't he invite ridicule? Wouldn't it be said of him that he’d returned 
from his upward journey with his eyesight ruined and that it isn’t worthwhile even to 
try to travel upward? …as for anyone who tried to free them and lead them upward, if 
they could somehow get their hands on him, wouldn't they kill him? (516e-517a)134 
The soul liberated by philosophic contemplation finds no place in the cave, only rejection. This 
was, of course, Socrates’ own experience, and whether the killing he speaks of is Socrates 
predicting his own demise or an idea woven in by Plato we do not know. The unexamined life 
may not be worth living but many, Socrates fears, prefer the bliss of ignorance. The journey is 
too costly and perhaps too remote – they will settle for the safety of the puppet show. 
Finally, Socrates makes clear the meaning of the analogy, revealing the purpose of the 
journey: 
…if you interpret the upward journey and the study of things above as the upward 
journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you'll grasp what I hope to convey … In the 
knowable realm, the form of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached 
only with difficulty. Once one has seen it, however, one must conclude that it is the 
cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that it produces both light and its 
source in the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides 
truth and understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public 
must see it … It isn’t surprising that the ones who get to this point are unwilling to 
occupy themselves with human affairs and that their souls are always pressing 
upwards, eager to spend their time above (517b-c).135 
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Freedom from the cave represents the upward journey towards the intelligible, knowable 
realm. It is the journey towards the ‘good’ which illuminates everything, however, Socrates 
acknowledges that it is a difficult journey, attended by aporetic pain and rejection. 
Celermajer believes that Socratic philosophy – as demonstrated in the Cave analogy – 
promotes the concept of thinking as seeing: ‘When, with our mind’s eye, we followed Socrates 
from the obscurity of the cave out into the clarity of the sun’s light, we inherited a metaphoric 
world of knowing that remains deeply woven into the fabric of Western thought and 
language.’136 She supports her claim with a reference to Arendt’s reflection on the 
predominance of sight in philosophic thinking – Arendt wrote: 
Thus, from the outset in formal philosophy, thinking has been thought of in terms of 
seeing, and since thinking is the most fundamental and the most radical of mental 
activities, it is quite true that vision “has tended to serve as the model of perception in 
general and thus as the measure of the other senses.” The predominance of sight is so 
deeply embedded in Greek speech and therefore in our conceptual language that we 
seldom find any consideration bestowed on it, as though it belonged among things too 
obvious to be noticed.137 
For Celermajer, the ‘truth’ of Arendt’s comment ‘is evidenced by the ubiquitous presence of 
visual metaphors throughout our language’.138 Certainly, the elenctic analogies of Socrates are, 
by their very nature, replete with visual images, as the Cave vividly illustrates. Celermajer 
argues that the influence of Greek thought through seeing is felt everywhere: ‘Although 
obvious once pointed out, the dominance of sight in the Greek way of thinking is so pervasive 
that it has entered the category of the invisible conditions of thought.’139 This ‘visual 
dominance’ is ‘most striking in Plato's doctrine of ideas,’ and ‘in the intimate relationship that 
the Greeks perceived between geometry and metaphysics.’140 Moreover, William Barrett finds 
evidence of the connection between sight and thought in the pre-Socratic philosophers: 
Parmenides and Heraclitus were visionaries and seers. Parmenides wrote in verse, and 
his poem opens by describing itself as the account of a vision vouchsafed by the 
goddess, who has taken the poet in her chariot beyond the portals of the day and 
night. Heraclitus’ sayings are dark and oracular, and they are meant to be taken as 
oracles – visionary disclosures of the real. The Greek word for “I know,” oida, is the 
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perfect of the verb “to see” and means “I have seen.” He who knows is the man who 
has seen, who has had a vision.141 
To see, then, is to know. The liberated soul emerges from the cave seeing – it is through sight 
that the world outside the cave is perceived. Indeed, even the shadow play within the cave is 
the visualisation of a base understanding. Unlike Hebrew Wisdom where hearing is the 
predominant sense, the Western voice of philosophy is in no small way shaped by the sense of 
seeing. 
Another facet of Socrates’ philosophy (often overlooked) is the connection between 
his elenchus and religion. Howland notes that earlier in the Republic Socrates attributes the 
good with the divine: ‘When Glaucon at one point surmises that the Good is pleasure, Socrates 
warns him not to engage in blasphemy (509a).’142 The religious language employed by Socrates 
is ‘a register of the gratitude he feels at the gift of learning’. His philosophy ‘begins from 
human experience’ and the ‘erotic longing for wisdom, which directs him prophetically toward 
the beginning of the Whole that he calls the Good’. Thus, ‘the process of learning is an 
essential way of relating to that which is divine’; and ‘for Socrates, the activity of philosophical 
inquiry is the grateful reception of a sacred gift’.143 Indeed, his elenchus is divinely motivated, 
his quest inspired by the Oracle. In the Apology Socrates ‘humbles others in argument in order 
that they may come to share his knowledge of ignorance and his humility in relation to the 
wisdom of “the god,” and so turn in earnest to the quest for truth and the care of their souls 
(cf. 29d-30a)’.144 Likewise, in the Theaetetus, Socrates ‘maintains that he serves “the god” as a 
philosophical midwife (149a-151d)’; and in various other dialogues, he ‘speaks of the divine 
being (daimonion) that directs his philosophical activity’.145 Notable among these is a reference 
from the Apology: 
I have a divine or spiritual sign … This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and 
whenever it speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never 
encourages me to do anything. This is what prevented me from taking part in public 
affairs, and I think it was quite right to prevent me (31d).146 
Leo Strauss astutely remarks on the contrary roles played by the Oracle and ‘the god’ in the life 
of Socrates: ‘While the Delphic oracle urged him forward toward philosophizing, toward 
examining his fellow men, and thus made him generally hated and thus brought him into 
mortal danger, his daimonion kept him back from political activity and thus saved him from 
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mortal danger.’147 Ironically, whilst Socrates desisted from political activity, in the Republic he 
presents his ideal model for political order – and it is a human order, not divine: 
…according to Socrates, the coming-into-being of the best political order is not due to 
divine intervention; human nature will remain as it always has been; the decisive 
difference between the best political order and all other societies is that in the former 
the philosophers will be kings or the natural potentiality of the philosophers will reach 
its utmost perfection. In the most perfect social order, as Socrates sees it, knowledge 
of the most important things will remain, as it always was, the preserve of the 
philosophers, i.e., of a very small part of the population.148 
The ideal city is ruled by philosopher-kings (473c-d), and they are, as Strauss observes, the 
select few. However, the reason it is a ruling minority may be due to the steep climb from the 
cave below to the world above – few are willing to make it. Nevertheless, leaving the Republic 
aside, Sandy well sums up the contribution of Socrates, who ‘advocated for the pursuit of 
timeless truth untouched by human affairs, and this removal from public life later became the 
hallmark for Platonic philosophy and the philosophers’ paradigm of education’.149 Yet, a 
philosophy removed from public life and human affairs is in danger of producing an 
unconcerned and remote elite, with a contemplative wisdom that has no practical value. An 
examined life, yes, but one that is out of touch in the relational and social realm. 
Hebrew Wisdom Literature, on the other hand, presents a wisdom that is practical, 
relational and socially aware. John Skinner traces the development of Hebrew Wisdom 
literature – the Book of Proverbs, the Book of Job and the Book of Ecclesiastes – in Jewish 
tradition: 
Originating in the time of Solomon, it is supposed to have been carried forward by a 
succession of Sages or Wise Men, who were ultimately incorporated as a regular 
teaching profession or guild. From this circle of thinkers there emanated the various 
writings which we group together under the title of the Ḥokmah literature: – first, 
perhaps, the Proverbs of Solomon, next the Book of Job, and lastly … Ecclesiastes.150 
In Jewish and Christian tradition, Job is a contemporary of the Patriarchs, and is even 
considered one of the earliest of biblical narratives. He is mentioned twice by the prophet 
Ezekiel (see Ezekiel 14:14, 20) in the exilic period (c. 587-538 BCE), thus, the story was already 
considered a part of established Scripture by this time, and its origins must precede the sixth-
century. James Crenshaw argues for a redaction of Proverbs that sees the completed collection 
somewhere in the Hellenistic period, and also a later dating for Job and Ecclesiastes: 
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The book of Proverbs may not have been complete until Hellenistic times (332-198), 
although containing older literature as well. Its anthological character suggests that a 
distinction must be made between the origin of discrete collections and the final 
composition of the book. A sixth-century date for the book of Job seems likely, and 
Ecclesiastes was probably written in the third century.151 
Genung also argues for a redaction process in the compilation of Proverbs, with a variety of 
authors: ‘The Book of Proverbs is an anthology of Wisdom utterances, a deposit of mashals of 
a certain artistic species and finish, gathered from various sources, and representing the 
accumulation of a long period of time.’152 
The Book of Proverbs names three authors within the text: Solomon (1:1, 10:1, 25:1), 
Agur son of Jakeh (30:1) and Lemuel (31:1), as well as noting the anonymous ‘sayings of the 
wise’ (22:17, 24:23). However, the book has become synonymous with Solomon (c. 1000-900 
BCE), the king of Israel and son of David. The origin of his legendary wisdom is recorded in the 
Book of Kings, when Solomon was still a young monarch: 
…the LORD appeared to Solomon in a dream by night, and God said, “Ask what I shall 
give you.” And Solomon said … “O LORD my God, you have made your servant king in 
place of David my father, although I am but a little child. I do not know how to go out 
or come in. And your servant is in the midst of your people whom you have chosen, a 
great people, too many to be numbered or counted for multitude. Give your servant 
therefore an understanding mind to govern your people, that I may discern between 
good and evil, for who is able to govern this your great people?” It pleased the Lord 
that Solomon had asked this. And God said to him, “Because you have asked this, and 
have not asked for yourself long life or riches or the life of your enemies, but have 
asked for yourself understanding to discern what is right, behold, I now do according 
to your word. Behold, I give you a wise and discerning mind, so that none like you has 
been before you and none like you shall arise after you. I give you also what you have 
not asked, both riches and honour, so that no other king shall compare with you, all 
your days” (1 Kings 3:5-13, ESV). 
The conversation between God and Solomon takes place in a dream – God invites Solomon to 
ask him for something – anything – the invitation is open-ended, so Solomon could request 
whatever he desired or needed. He chooses the latter – a need – wisdom, understanding, 
discernment and the ability to govern the people well. God is pleased with Solomon’s request, 
noting that he could have chosen a more selfish desire – longevity, wealth or revenge. God 
grants Solomon his request, and throws in riches and honour anyway. Solomon will possess 
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unequalled wisdom and discernment. However, even before this endowment, Solomon 
appears to possess a certain degree of wisdom evidenced in the very request he makes. Like 
Socrates, centuries later, Solomon reveals his wisdom in the admission that he lacks it. Both 
men are given a divine mission, but Solomon appears to understand his lack from the 
beginning of his journey, rather than at its end. Solomon has examined his young life and 
found it wanting – his need for wisdom is in the service of others, in public life and human 
affairs. 
Almost immediately, as if to demonstrate that this was more than just a dream, 
Solomon’s wisdom is put to the test: 
Then two prostitutes came to the king and stood before him. The one woman said, 
“Oh, my lord, this woman and I live in the same house, and I gave birth to a child while 
she was in the house. Then on the third day after I gave birth, this woman also gave 
birth … And this woman's son died in the night, because she lay on him. And she arose 
at midnight and took my son from beside me, while your servant slept, and laid him at 
her breast, and laid her dead son at my breast. When I rose in the morning to nurse 
my child … he was dead. But when I looked at him closely … he was not the child that I 
had borne.” But the other woman said, “No, the living child is mine, and the dead child 
is yours” … And the king said, “Bring me a sword” … And the king said, “Divide the 
living child in two, and give half to one and half to the other.” Then the woman whose 
son was alive said to the king, because her heart yearned for her son, “Oh, my lord, 
give her the living child, and by no means put him to death.” But the other said, “He 
shall be neither mine nor yours; divide him.” Then the king answered and said, “Give 
the living child to the first woman, and by no means put him to death; she is his 
mother.” And all Israel heard of the judgement that the king had rendered, and they 
stood in awe of the king, because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him to 
do justice (1 Kings 3:16-28, ESV). 
Crucially, the two women had been alone in the house, so there were no witnesses that 
Solomon could call on. How could he choose between their two conflicting testimonies? His 
method seems extreme and violent, yet we discover that he had no intention of harming the 
child (‘by no means put him to death’). Indeed, he is searching for maternal love and 
compassion to manifest itself when the child’s very life is in the balance. The true mother will 
forfeit her right to her child in order to preserve his life. Solomon’s wisdom may be divinely 
imparted, but it appears to employ very logical means. 
Solomon is considered the wisest person to have ever lived in Jewish tradition. In the 
following chapter, we read a summary of the extent of his wisdom and achievements: 
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And God gave Solomon wisdom and understanding beyond measure, and breadth of 
mind like the sand on the seashore, so that Solomon's wisdom surpassed the wisdom 
of all the people of the east and all the wisdom of Egypt. For he was wiser than all 
other men, wiser than Ethan the Ezrahite, and Heman, Calcol, and Darda, the sons of 
Mahol, and his fame was in all the surrounding nations. He also spoke 3,000 
proverbs, and his songs were 1,005. He spoke of trees, from the cedar that is in 
Lebanon to the hyssop that grows out of the wall. He spoke also of beasts, and of 
birds, and of reptiles, and of fish. And people of all nations came to hear the wisdom of 
Solomon, and from all the kings of the earth, who had heard of his wisdom (1 Kings 
4:29-34, ESV). 
Bruce Waltke believes that Solomon’s wisdom is representative of a wider regional literary 
genre: ‘The comparison made in 1 Kings 4:29-34 between Solomon's wisdom and that of the 
ancient Near Eastern sages strongly implies that his proverbs were a part of an international, 
pan-oriental, wisdom literature.’153 Solomon is credited with speaking ‘3,000 proverbs, yet the 
Book of Proverbs contain only a small fraction of that amount. Moreover, there is no way of 
knowing to what degree the redacted version of Proverbs, as a collection, represents the 
individual proverbs spoken by Solomon. 
Whilst the account of Solomon’s wisdom in the Book of Kings points to wisdom as a 
divine gift, the Book of Proverbs points to a wisdom that can be learnt and emulated, as well as 
sought: 
My son, if you receive my words 
and treasure up my commandments with you, 
making your ear attentive to wisdom 
and inclining your heart to understanding; 
yes, if you call out for insight 
and raise your voice for understanding, 
if you seek it like silver 
and search for it as for hidden treasures, 
then you will understand the fear of the Lord 
and find the knowledge of God. 
For the Lord gives wisdom; 
from his mouth come knowledge and understanding; 
he stores up sound wisdom for the upright (2:1-7, ESV). 
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Wisdom is not just passively received in sleep, despite Solomon’s experience – there must be 
some activity on behalf of the individual – in these verses there is a variety of verbal actions: 
receiving, treasuring, paying attention (giving one’s ear), inclining the heart, calling out, raising 
one’s voice, seeking, searching, and finding. Educative instruction plays a role in obtaining 
wisdom: ‘My son, do not forget my teaching, but let your heart keep my commandments’ 
(3:1). As with Socratic wisdom, there is much climbing to be done. The repeated address to a 
‘son’, suggests that the initial responsibility for instruction is parental, passed down from 
father or mother to child:  
Hear, O sons, a father's instruction, 
and be attentive, that you may gain insight, 
for I give you good precepts; 
do not forsake my teaching. 
When I was a son with my father, 
tender, the only one in the sight of my mother, 
he taught me and said to me, 
“Let your heart hold fast my words; 
keep my commandments, and live” (4:1-4, ESV). 
The mother’s role is also explicit in the instruction of wisdom: ‘Hear, my son, your father’s 
instruction, and forsake not your mother’s teaching’ (1:8); ‘My son, keep your father’s 
commandment, and forsake not your mother’s teaching’ (6:20); and the proverbs of Lemuel 
begin with: ‘An oracle that his mother taught him’ (31:1). The parental responsibility does not 
diminish the divine origin of wisdom, but it does imply that the Jewish thinking voice can be 
communicated and passed on through instruction and example. 
The idea that wisdom can be taught by instruction and example is also clear in 
Proverbs, because it is intimately connected with morality, righteous and just living – it cannot 
be obtained without these: 
Then you will understand righteousness and justice 
and equity, every good path; 
for wisdom will come into your heart, 
and knowledge will be pleasant to your soul; 
discretion will watch over you, 
understanding will guard you, 
delivering you from the way of evil… 
So you will walk in the way of the good 
and keep to the paths of the righteous. 
For the upright will inhabit the land, 
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and those with integrity will remain in it (2:9-12, 20-21, ESV). 
As we shall see later, biblical wisdom and morality are interdependent – you cannot have one 
without the other. Thus, philosophical understanding mirrors moral understanding, and vice-
versa. However, morality must be translated into a corresponding ethical behaviour – it is a 
pathway to be walked – understanding is demonstrated in action. 
There is an admonition in Proverbs to avoid wisdom unaided, a purely human wisdom. 
Naturally, this points towards a divine understanding and to God’s wisdom as an external 
guide beyond the limits of human reason: 
Trust in the Lord with all your heart, 
and do not lean on your own understanding. 
In all your ways acknowledge him, 
and he will make straight your paths. 
Be not wise in your own eyes; 
fear the Lord, and turn away from evil (Proverbs 3:5-7, ESV). 
The first part of verse 7 – ‘Be not wise in your own eyes’ – evokes the advent of corrupted 
wisdom in Genesis 3:7, where Adam and Eve’s eyes were opened. It is a reminder of the 
potential self-deception inherent in human wisdom. The second part – ‘fear the Lord, and turn 
away from evil’ – is found in almost identical form in Job 28:28, ‘Behold, the fear of the Lord, 
that is wisdom, and to turn away from evil is understanding.’ The act of turning the mind from 
human wisdom unaided is completed in the turning towards God’s wisdom. The ‘fear of the 
Lord’ is something we shall return to later. 
In Proverbs wisdom is given a unique identity: ‘She is a tree of life to those who lay 
hold of her; those who hold her fast are called blessed’ (3:18, ESV). In Hebrew, the phrase ‘tree 
of life’ is עץ חיים (etz hayyim), and it is an expression found only here and in the creation 
narrative of Genesis: ‘The tree of life was in the midst of the garden, and the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil’ (2:9, ESV). This would suggest that the author of this proverb is 
connecting the tree of life in Eden with divine wisdom; and, by implication, all other wisdom – 
human and corrupt – is embodied in the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The 
distinction is perhaps between wisdom that instructs one how to live ethically and righteously, 
and mere knowledge that does not. The words ‘those who lay hold of her’, remind us that Eve 
reached out for the other fruit – thus, choice must always be made. A blessing comes with the 
right choice, just as surely as a curse came to those who chose wrong. There is a promise of 
longevity and peace (Proverbs 3:16-17), the outcome is different to that of Eden. Immediately 
after this reference to wisdom as the tree of life, as if journeying backward through time, we 
are told that wisdom was utilised by God in the creation: ‘The Lord by wisdom founded the 
earth; by understanding he established the heavens; by his knowledge the deeps broke open, 
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and the clouds drop down the dew’ (Proverbs 3:19-20, ESV). This concept is later developed in 
a cosmological parenthesis, where wisdom speaks in the first person: 
The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his work, 
the first of his acts of old. 
Ages ago I was set up, 
at the first, before the beginning of the earth. 
When there were no depths I was brought forth, 
when there were no springs abounding with water. 
Before the mountains had been shaped, 
before the hills, I was brought forth, 
before he had made the earth with its fields, 
or the first of the dust of the world. 
When he established the heavens, I was there; 
when he drew a circle on the face of the deep, 
when he made firm the skies above, 
when he established the fountains of the deep, 
when he assigned to the sea its limit, 
so that the waters might not transgress his command, 
when he marked out the foundations of the earth, 
then I was beside him, like a master workman, 
and I was daily his delight, 
rejoicing before him always, 
rejoicing in his inhabited world 
and delighting in the children of man (8:22-31, ESV). 
The opening verse states that wisdom was ‘possessed’ by God, but an alternative reading in 
the footnote to the translation offers ‘fathered’ and the Septuagint translates it as ‘created’. 
Wisdom has moved back through time, past Eden, to the very beginning of creation: God’s first 
act is the creation of wisdom, and every subsequent act is fashioned with it. It is unclear 
whether the creation of wisdom is an event prior to the creation of the cosmos or the first part 
of it. We are told that wisdom is brought forth before the earth is formed. In the Genesis 
account, the first creative act recorded is the coming (יהי, yehi – ‘come into being’) of light 
(1:3). Is this account in Proverbs an equation between wisdom and light – wisdom as 
illumination? From God’s perspective, this would be consistent – as a craftsman opening his 
workshop and switching on the light before setting to work. The account does not go as far as 
calling wisdom co-creator, but it is a shaping tool in God’s hand. Or is wisdom the tree of life, 
not springing up ‘out of the ground’ as the other trees of Eden, but fully formed as if it had pre-
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existed? Either way, wisdom speaks as the voice of one well-qualified to teach ‘the children of 
man’. 
We turn now to the Book of Job – the story of one man’s suffering – his loss of 
children, wealth, health, honour and friendship, because Satan challenges God to see if Job will 
still maintain his upright integrity if he loses all he has. Job’s three friends come to comfort 
him, but then accuse him of having erred somewhere in his life for all this calamity to come 
upon him. His wife is even less sympathetic: ‘Do you still hold fast your integrity? Curse God 
and die’, she goads him (2:9, ESV). The conversation between God and Satan takes place in the 
prologue of the book (over chapters one and two), and Job and his friends seem quite unaware 
of what is going on in the heavenly realm. Indeed, Satan is never mentioned by any human 
character in the book. Towards the end of the story, God enters into the human realm for the 
first time, addressing Job with a series of rhetorical questions that humbles all of his thinking. 
Finally, God restores more to Job in wealth and livestock than he first lost and he and his wife 
have ten children (presumably to compensate for the ten who were destroyed). Job is 
exonerated before his friends, who are told to make sacrifices for speaking incorrectly 
concerning God. Moreover, the humiliation is turned upon them, when God tells them that Job 
will pray for them in order to avert their due judgement. 
As a Wisdom book, Job specifically focuses on the problem of evil and suffering, but 
does so on a wider human scale, encompassing the sufferings of Jews and non-Jews alike, as 
Robert Gordis explains: 
Wisdom is the most secular branch of ancient Hebrew literature, being concerned with 
broadly human rather than with specifically Jewish problems. Job actually treats the 
problem of human suffering through a gallery of non-Israelitish characters.154 
Gordis believes that the Book of Job embodies a philosophical angst that is existentially rather 
than intellectually based, but it is an angst that gives way to peace in the context of the 
cosmos: 
For Job, the agonizing riddle of life is the suffering of the righteous and the prosperity 
of the wicked, and the challenge it poses to faith in a God of righteousness and power. 
For the poet, the Angst is existential, not intellectual. Indeed, the mystery and the 
beauty of the cosmos constitute the response and the remedy expressed in “the 
Speeches of the Lord out of the Whirlwind”.155 
Yet, as has been mentioned already, the role of Satan is never discussed by mortals, suggesting 
that either they were unaware of his existence or his involvement in human affairs, or that 
they ruled that God presided over all, therefore God was ultimately responsible. This latter 
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view focuses our attention on the relationship between God and humanity in the area of 
suffering – what God allows rather than what Satan inflicts (and according to the prologue the 
suffering is inflicted by Satan directly): 
And the LORD said to Satan, “Behold, he is in your hand; only spare his life.” So Satan 
went out from the presence of the LORD and struck Job with loathsome sores from the 
sole of his foot to the crown of his head (2:6-7, ESV). 
For Carmy and Shatz it is Job’s relationship to God that brings closure and makes sense of the 
suffering: ‘The idea that Job’s experience of God is the key to his reconciliation suggests the 
primacy of the human drama in Job, and this insight leads us to a distinct philosophical 
appropriation of the book; we discover in Job’s ordeal a “theodicy of soulmaking”.’156 Thus, the 
suffering has a purpose: to make Job’s soul complete: 
Take the problem of God’s wager with the Satan. God’s rationale is theologically 
problematic, to say the least. Can God justifiably make Job a pawn in order to prove a 
point? If Job is, at bottom, an exploration of what people make of suffering, then the 
dispute between God and the Satan becomes less capricious. The Satan holds that 
suffering inexorably corrupts; faithfulness is a luxury only the prosperous can afford. 
God says that suffering can ennoble; faithfulness can be forged in the crucible of 
anguish.157 
God wins the wager – he predicts the outcome correctly and, along with Job, is ‘vindicated by 
the process of suffering’. Moreover, through the process of suffering, Job develops the ‘ability 
to perceive that which previously he could not perceive’; he grows ‘through crisis’. Ultimately, 
then, ‘God was right … Satan was wrong’.158 
The Book of Job chronicles a journey of faith. Firstly, it could be said, the faith of God. 
From the outset God’s belief in Job is rock-solid: ‘And the LORD said to Satan, “Have you 
considered my servant Job, that there is none like him on the earth, a blameless and upright 
man, who fears God and turns away from evil”’ (1:8, ESV)? By the end of the story, God’s faith 
in Job seems well-founded. Yet, as Carmy and Shatz point out, for the human characters it is a 
journey of faith that changes along the way: 
The book of Job is a veritable phenomenology of faith in a state of challenge. It spans 
moments of commitment (13:15), doubt (23:5), self-pity (19:21), self-confidence 
(13:18?), and defiance (9:22–3). The friends’ rhetoric may evolve – and their temper 
may degenerate – but their faith, in contrast to Job’s, is throughout simple and 
simplistic.159 
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The Jewish thinking voice draws on faith to withstand the buffeting and aporia of suffering. 
Job’s faith is complex – it grows and develops in response to his suffering, while expressing the 
moments that Carmy and Shatz allude to. Thus, his experience affects his thinking and 
subsequent believing; as Carmy and Shatz conclude: ‘We have proposed taking Job’s religious 
growth as the kernel of a compelling explanation of evil, suggesting a perspective that lives 
through the various stages of the poetic portion and emerges at the other side after God has 
spoken.’160 The friends’ faith, as Carmy and Shatz rightly assess, is simplistic – it is based on 
assumptions not ‘forged in the crucible’, not tested in the experience of suffering – it is the 
faith of the bystander, the onlooker, not the sufferer. Like Satan, the friends’ belief proves 
wrong: Satan is wrong about Job, and the friends are wrong about God. 
Another feature of the Book of Job is centred on the subject of wisdom itself. In the 
discussions between Job and his friends, Job delivers a discourse in which he questions where 
wisdom is to be found: 
Surely there is a mine for silver, 
and a place for gold that they refine. 
Iron is taken out of the earth, 
and copper is smelted from the ore. 
Man puts an end to darkness 
and searches out to the farthest limit 
the ore in gloom and deep darkness. 
He opens shafts in a valley away from where anyone lives; 
they are forgotten by travellers; 
they hang in the air, far away from mankind; they swing to and fro. 
As for the earth, out of it comes bread, 
but underneath it is turned up as by fire. 
Its stones are the place of sapphires, 
and it has dust of gold. 
That path no bird of prey knows, 
and the falcon's eye has not seen it. 
The proud beasts have not trodden it; 
the lion has not passed over it. 
Man puts his hand to the flinty rock 
and overturns mountains by the roots. 
He cuts out channels in the rocks, 
and his eye sees every precious thing. 
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He dams up the streams so that they do not trickle, 
and the thing that is hidden he brings out to light (28: 1-11, ESV). 
Job begins by considering various subterraneous ores and metals which are mined, smelted, 
and refined. These are naturally hidden from the eye, but humans have found the means to 
extract them from the deep darkness of the earth. Out of the earth’s surface wheat grows for 
making bread, but beneath the surface lies fire. The earth also conceals precious stones, and 
these are hidden to all creatures, except humans. Birds of prey with keen eyesight are able to 
spot their targets whilst high up in the air, but are unable to see these things. The miner, 
however, knows these metals and jewels are there, and cuts them out of the earth. Yet, Job 
argues that something far more precious than metals and jewels lies beyond human finding: 
But where shall wisdom be found? 
And where is the place of understanding? 
Man does not know its worth, 
and it is not found in the land of the living. 
The deep says, ‘It is not in me’, 
and the sea says, ‘It is not with me.’ 
It cannot be bought for gold, 
and silver cannot be weighed as its price. 
It cannot be valued in the gold of Ophir, 
in precious onyx or sapphire. 
Gold and glass cannot equal it, 
nor can it be exchanged for jewels of fine gold. 
No mention shall be made of coral or of crystal; 
the price of wisdom is above pearls. 
The topaz of Ethiopia cannot equal it, 
nor can it be valued in pure gold (28:12-19, ESV). 
Wisdom eludes human detection. Moreover, humans do not appreciate its value – it is 
priceless, worth more than all the precious metals and stones the earth could yield. However, 
wisdom is not to be found in ‘the land of the living’, or in the earth or the sea. In Proverbs 8, 
wisdom is very present in the creation, but in Job’s reckoning she is altogether absent. Where 
is wisdom to be found then, asks Job: 
From where, then, does wisdom come? 
And where is the place of understanding? 
It is hidden from the eyes of all living 
and concealed from the birds of the air. 
Abaddon and Death say, 
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‘We have heard a rumour of it with our ears.’ 
God understands the way to it, 
and he knows its place. 
For he looks to the ends of the earth 
and sees everything under the heavens. 
When he gave to the wind its weight 
and apportioned the waters by measure, 
when he made a decree for the rain 
and a way for the lightning of the thunder, 
then he saw it and declared it; 
he established it, and searched it out. 
And he said to man, 
‘Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, 
and to turn away from evil is understanding.’ (28:20-28, ESV) 
Wisdom is hidden and concealed from all creatures. It is not to be found in the land of the 
living, said Job, but Abaddon (אבדון, the Hebrew ‘hell’) and Death have heard rumour of it. It is, 
then, perhaps closer in death than in life, thinks Job. Interestingly, he confirms the primacy of 
hearing over seeing, as wisdom is hidden from sight but its rumour is heard. The answer to 
Job’s question is that God alone knows where wisdom is to be found. Now Job’s understanding 
aligns with Proverbs 8, as wisdom is located in the creation. Dor-Shav’s four elements can be 
seen here too: the earth, the heavens the wind and the waters. Wisdom is in the cosmological 
elements – the fabric of existence. The Jewish thinking voice is bound to a cosmological 
understanding. Finally, Job quotes God’s words to man, defining wisdom as ‘the fear of the 
Lord … to turn away from evil’ (see Proverbs 3:7 above). 
The third Wisdom book is Ecclesiastes, which in Jewish and Christian traditions takes 
us back to Solomon as the author, especially because of the very first verse: ‘The words of the 
Preacher, the son of David, king in Jerusalem’ (1:1, ESV). The word translated ‘Preacher’ can 
also be translated as ‘Convener’ or ‘Collector’ (in Hebrew קהלת, Kohelet). Ecclesiastes is the 
Wisdom text that most obviously lends itself to philosophical discourse; as Dor-Shav states: 
Ecclesiastes is a philosophical account of the attempt to find happiness by a man who 
has everything … it is one of literature's earliest encounters between faith and reason: 
The author struggles to believe that life is meaningful despite his experience of the 
world. The book's inclusion in the Hebrew Bible is therefore remarkable, testifying to 
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Judaism's interest not only in divine revelation, but also in man's exploration of the 
meaning of life and mortality.161 
The exploration of Ecclesiastes is different in nature to that of Job: ‘As opposed to the quest of 
Job, Solomon's search for wisdom did not arise from a desire to make sense of either personal 
misfortune or national catastrophe.’162 The anguish of Kohelet lies in the incorporeal realm – 
he did not suffer physically or emotionally as Job did; as Gordis rightly points out: 
While by no means indifferent to the problem of evil (3:16-22; 4:1-3; 9:2), [Kohelet] is 
less concerned with it than with a metaphysical Angst. He is basically obsessed with 
man's inability to discover the ultimate truth about the universe, the purpose of 
creation, the goal of human existence, and the nature of death.163 
Gordis believes that both Job and Kohelet display a ‘fearless use of reason in grappling with the 
most fundamental issues, their unwillingness to pretend to certainty where none is to be had 
and their passionate quest for the truth at all costs.’164 However, unlike Job, Kohelet enjoyed ‘a 
life of unrepentant indulgence: He tempted himself with wine, entertained himself with male 
and female performers, and amassed untold treasures and hundreds of wives and 
concubines.’165 His inquiry commences ‘from the perspective of a life replete with fortune and 
opportunity … his starting point [is] not revelation, but man's personal need for meaning’.166 
The key theme throughout the book is expressed in the word ‘vanity’, which appears 
38 times in the text in various forms, outnumbering all other occurrences in the Hebrew 
Scriptures combined.167 The translation is quite controversial with multiple alternatives coming 
from the Hebrew הבל (hevel), which apart from ‘vanity’ can mean ‘breath’, ‘delusion’, 
‘emptiness’, ‘fleetingness’, ‘futility’, ‘uselessness’, ‘vapour’, ‘fruitlessness’ and ‘worthlessness’, 
amongst others. The message of Kohelet begins: ‘Vanity of vanities, says the Preacher, vanity 
of vanities! All is vanity’ (1:2, ESV). This opening statement – with all its translational 
possibilities – at first appears extremely negative and might easily lead to the conclusion that 
Kohelet was a depressive, and that his ‘search is doomed from the start’.168 In verse 3, he asks: 
‘What does man gain by all the toil at which he toils under the sun?’ He develops this view of 
human labour in the following passage: 
I hated all my toil in which I toil under the sun, seeing that I must leave it to the man 
who will come after me, and who knows whether he will be wise or a fool? Yet he will 
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be master of all for which I toiled and used my wisdom under the sun. This also is 
vanity. So I turned about and gave my heart up to despair over all the toil of my 
labours under the sun, because sometimes a person who has toiled with wisdom and 
knowledge and skill must leave everything to be enjoyed by someone who did not toil 
for it. This also is vanity and a great evil. What has a man from all the toil and striving 
of heart with which he toils beneath the sun? For all his days are full of sorrow, and his 
work is a vexation. Even in the night his heart does not rest. This also is vanity (2:18-23, 
ESV). 
As Dor-Shav observes, Kohelet ‘despairs over what he sees as the futility of life’s [labours]’; he 
is ‘disillusioned with life because he believes it is all in vain; he abhors the idea of leaving his 
life/s work behind for someone else to enjoy or to squander’.169 Systematically, Kohelet tests 
the various experiences of life, finding no more satisfaction with leisure than he did with work: 
I said in my heart, “Come now, I will test you with pleasure; enjoy yourself.” But 
behold, this also was vanity. I said of laughter, “It is mad”, and of pleasure, “What use 
is it?” I searched with my heart how to cheer my body with wine – my heart still 
guiding me with wisdom – and how to lay hold on folly, till I might see what was good 
for the children of man to do under heaven during the few days of their life … And 
whatever my eyes desired I did not keep from them. I kept my heart from no pleasure, 
for my heart found pleasure in all my toil, and this was my reward for all my toil. Then I 
considered all that my hands had done and the toil I had expended in doing it, and 
behold, all was vanity and a striving after wind, and there was nothing to be gained 
under the sun (2:1-3, 10-11, ESV). 
Both work and leisure seem meaningless and appear to paint a nihilistic picture of life, with no 
purpose and nothing to be gained – work, pleasure, and wealth grant no advantage in the final 
analysis. 
Dor-Shav believes that the translation of hevel as ‘vanity’ is ‘not only misleading, but in 
some cases it makes the text impossible to read’. He gives as an example a passage where 
Kohelet discusses the value of love: ‘Enjoy life with the wife whom you love, all the days of 
your vain life that he has given you under the sun, because that is your portion in life and in 
your toil at which you toil under the sun’ (9:9, ESV). Dor-Shav rephrases the text to read: ‘View 
life with a woman you have come to love – all the days of your transitory life [kol yemei hayei 
hevlecha] which he has gifted you under the sun – every fleeting day. For this is your share in 
life … (9:9).’170 The traditional translation of the verse is ‘difficult to parse’, resulting in 
‘something like, Live joyfully … all the days of your vain life’ or ‘Life is vanity, so enjoy love?’ He 
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argues that if hevel is translated as ‘fleeting’ (‘focusing on life's brevity’), then the verse makes 
more sense: ‘Cherish your time together, for life is fleeting, and therefore precious. Then is 
your love that much more meaningful.’171 
Thus, Dor-Shav claims that understanding hevel as ‘fleeting’ or ‘transient’ is crucial to 
understanding the book: ‘It is only through the corrected reading of hevel as “transience” 
rather than “vanity” that we may understand the structure of the book of Ecclesiastes, and 
thereby learn its message.’172 Kohelet begins in the first stage of the book with negative 
references to transience: 
The initial stage, covering the first five chapters of the book (starting at 1:12), is 
characterized by frustration with the transience of life: Kohelet bemoans the fact that 
all achievements are short-lived. He is bitter about the transience of human 
contentment (2:1-3), riches (2:4-11), physical existence (3:18-21), and corrective social 
remedies (Chapter 4). Stylistically, this stage is characterized by the juxtapositions of 
the term hevel with words of despair and tragedy.173 
This first stage explains why Kohelet ‘hated life’ – ‘he has discovered that all one's worldly 
achievements are, like man himself, in the end but dust and ashes’.174 In the second stage the 
negativity of transience gives way to a more neutral acknowledgment: 
Dejection soon gives way to acceptance, however, as the book enters its second stage, 
starting at 6:4 and running through Chapter 7, in which Kohelet begins to view the 
ephemeral nature of reality more philosophically … The neutrality of the six 
appearances of hevel in this stage is typified by the example of temporary flattery … 
the fickle nature of fools’ praise and fleeting popularity.’175 
The shift in Kohelet’s view of the transient is also seen in his reference to a stillborn child, who 
he argues is better off and experiences more peace than a man who lives a long life and 
fathers a hundred children but experiences no pleasure or satisfaction (6:3-6). In the 
traditional translation, the stillborn ‘comes in vanity and goes in darkness’ (4), but Dor-Shav 
rephrases this as ‘for in transience it comes [behevel], in oblivion it departs’. The traditional 
translation creates a contradiction: ‘if the stillborn child comes in “futility” or “vanity,” how 
could his situation in any way be described as better off?’176 By reading ‘behevel to mean “in 
transience,” the passage instead becomes a [sombre] acceptance of the objective fact of 
mortality’, and ‘teaches that, indeed, temporal existence is not an end in itself’.177 
















The third and final stage in the book, covering the last four chapters, sees a reversal in 
the use of hevel, whereby it has ‘lost any trace of the negativity which it carried in the early 
chapters’ and is ‘associated, directly or indirectly, with joy, or simha’.178 
Kohelet refers to the transience of injustice: While evildoers may succeed, their 
success is only temporary. This knowledge, however, is linked directly with Kohelet's 
own happiness at the fact: Therefore, he concludes, I prized joy [hasimha]. The same 
holds true in his statements about the transience of youth. Youth and virility are 
fleeting, he famously declares, yet only after admonishing his reader to “rejoice 
[semah].” A similar point is made in the context of fleeting love: Live with a woman 
you love all the fleeting days of your life, he suggests but only immediately after having 
told his reader to Go, eat your bread with joy [besimha] (8:15, 11:9-12, 9:7-9). Indeed, 
only a few verses before the end of the book, the link between transience and joy 
becomes explicit, even emphatic: Even if one lives many long years, he should rejoice 
[yismah] in them all, heeding the days of darkness, for they shall be many; all that 
transpires is fleeting [hevel] (11:8).179 
The concept of hevel has transformed from ‘tragedy and evil’ to ‘happiness’. Kohelet has 
moved from hating life to affirming life: he ‘has now learned, and seeks to teach, the deeper 
lesson of hevel: Transience as inspiration.’180 The realisation that ‘not only good fortune and 
success, but also sorrow, power, jealousy, and oppression are all, in the end, fleeting … opens 
the doors to redemption.’181 Positive hevel creates an ‘urgency to live, to experience joy, to 
take action, and above all, to learn’, which leads Dor-Shav to the ‘underlying message’ of the 
book: ‘That only in understanding the transience of life do we attain the beginning of wisdom; 
and in turn, only through the wisdom derived from our experience of life may we in some way 
take part in that which is eternal.’182 Thus, the Jewish thinking voice speaks with an 
appreciation and understanding of transience as a necessary prerequisite to wisdom. 
Like Proverbs and Job, Ecclesiastes also discusses the nature of wisdom: ‘Then I saw 
that there is more gain in wisdom than in folly, as there is more gain in light than in darkness’ 
(2:13, ESV); ‘For the protection of wisdom is like the protection of money, and the advantage 
of knowledge is that wisdom preserves the life of him who has it’ (7:12, ESV); ‘Wisdom gives 
strength to the wise man more than ten rulers who are in a city’ (7:19, ESV); and ‘A man’s 
wisdom makes his face shine, and the hardness of his face is changed’ (8:1). Thus, wisdom 
gives advantage in life, it protects and preserves, it gives strength, and it transforms.183 In the 
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face of all that is fleeting, Kohelet’s realisation is that ‘true wisdom is the one thing that is not 
dependent on transient circumstances’, and yet ‘all of the transient circumstances in this world 
serve as the means of acquiring it’.184 For Dor-Shav, the lasting influence of Kohelet is his 
wisdom: 
Everything but wisdom is transient, teaches the king, and history has proven him right. 
Neither Solomon's riches, nor his power, nor even his monumental Temple in 
Jerusalem survived under the sun. What has indeed lasted, however, is the legacy of 
his wisdom, embodied in the Book of Ecclesiastes.185 
As might be expected, there are as many interpretations of the meaning of hevel as 
there are translations of it, and Dor-Shav’s reading is but one. William Staples, for example, 
offered an interpretation where hevel represents the inexplicable rather than the vain: 
…everything under the sun, toil, joy, the inability to understand wisdom fully, the 
relation of man and beast, life, many words, the lack of profit, and evil are all [hevel]. A 
survey of the use of each of these ideas in the book indicates that the author does not 
look upon these things so much as “vain” as incomprehensible. They are mysteries 
which are unfathomable to his finite mind. He recognizes God as the creator of all 
things, as the director of the universe, and that the universe is essentially good.186 
The Jewish thinking voice leaves room in its wisdom for the mysterious and unknowable; it 
recognises the otherness beyond comprehension. Theodore Perry, on the other hand, renders 
hevel as life-affirming ‘breath’; and sees Ecclesiastes as a much misunderstood book, and 
thoroughly positive. He reframes the second verse of the book thus: 
In the context of wisdom, the wisdom message of [Kohelet], here is the Book’s revised 
motto: The breath of life; the life of breath: it is all life/breath. His punctuating refrain, 
which can be applied to the whole of our existence and when anything happens, 
anything at all, then: C’est la vie!187 
Perry’s revision is challenging but appealing nonetheless. Coming close to Dor-Shav’s 
interpretation, it offers a positive philosophy wherein all life experience is good, even when it 
seems otherwise – it is all ‘life’, it is all living. In Ecclesiastes 3:1-8, we are told that everything 
has its due time: 
For everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under heaven: 
a time to be born, and a time to die; 
a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what is planted; 
a time to kill, and a time to heal; 
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a time to break down, and a time to build up; 
a time to weep, and a time to laugh; 
a time to mourn, and a time to dance; 
a time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together; 
a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing; 
a time to seek, and a time to lose; 
a time to keep, and a time to cast away; 
a time to tear, and a time to sew; 
a time to keep silence, and a time to speak; 
a time to love, and a time to hate; 
a time for war, and a time for peace (ESV). 
If we use Perry’s interpretation of hevel, then all these cycles of life are a necessary part of life 
as a whole. There are elements we dislike or would want to avoid, but all can be greeted with 
the same affirming life-breath, in the knowledge that no one state is final – war must give way 
to peace as surely as peace will give way to war, death must give way to life as life gives way to 
death, hate must give way to love as love gives way to hate. A negative reading ends each 
cycle with a negative state, i.e. death, war and hatred. However, this reading is inconsistent 
because some of the cycles end positively, i.e. healing, laughter and dancing. Thus, the cycles 
continue to move – they do not terminate – they are seasons (3:1) and, thus, death turns to 
life as winter turns to spring. Moreover, these cycles take place ‘under heaven’ – they say 
nothing of the divine. The cyclical nature of life is reflected elsewhere in the book: 
A generation goes, and a generation comes, 
but the earth remains for ever. 
The sun rises, and the sun goes down, 
and hastens to the place where it rises. 
The wind blows to the south 
and goes round to the north; 
round and round goes the wind, 
and on its circuits the wind returns. 
All streams run to the sea, 
but the sea is not full; 
to the place where the streams flow, 
there they flow again (1:4-7, ESV). 
The whole cosmos runs on cycles of coming and going, rising and falling – a fluid flowing – 
where even the elements of life are involved in perpetual circuits of sending and returning. The 
Jewish thinking voice is affirming in its view of life, embracing a world-view of cycles and 
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seasons rather than linear time. Through the word hevel, the Jewish thinking voice presents us 
with a balanced variety of outlooks on life: on the one hand, its fleetingness and 
incomprehensibility; and on the other, its affirming breath-like cycles of renewal and hope. 
 
Contemplation and Awe 
 
Strauss defined wisdom as the highest notion conveyed in both the Bible and Greek 
philosophy. However, he also highlighted the divergence in the biblical and Greek claims to 
represent true wisdom: ‘According to the Bible, the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord; 
according to the Greek philosophers, the beginning of wisdom is wonder.’188 If the prerequisite 
for biblical wisdom is therefore theism (in particular, ‘the fear of the Lord’), then does that 
exclude it from philosophical discourse on the grounds of the revelation versus reason debate? 
As we have seen, theism amongst the Greek philosophers did not preclude them.189 
Nevertheless, is it possible to speak of wisdom and ‘the fear of the Lord’ in the dialogue of 
philosophy? Returning to the Book of Proverbs, it is possible to find an affirmative answer. 
In the Book of Proverbs the opposites of ‘wisdom’ and ‘folly’ are presented as two 
women. The corresponding Hebrew nouns חכמה (hokmah) and כסילות (kesiluth) are both 
feminine but the writer personifies these concepts rather than abstracting them. Indeed, 
Roland Murphy claims that wisdom is the ‘most remarkable personification in the entire 
Bible’.190 The Greek noun for wisdom σοφία (sophia) is also feminine and much has been said 
in the comparison between the Hebrew and Greek nouns. Whilst a case could be made that 
Parmenides’ unnamed ‘goddess’ is Sophia, the texts of Plato do not appear to especially 
personify wisdom.191 The Book of Proverbs enjoins the reader to love wisdom as if she were a 
person and not an ideal, giving us a more radical sense of philo-sophia. 
Interestingly, Jane Webster casts the wisdom figure in proverbs as sophia rather than 
hokmah, but why she does so is not clear. Nevertheless, she argues that wisdom is 
‘constructed as a good wife too difficult to resist’.192 Webster notes the ‘parallel’ constructions 
between divine wisdom with the good wife, and the ‘social, legal or religious “other”’ – the 
strange woman – with the evil wife. They are ‘polar’ opposites. Wisdom is ‘[shaped] in wifely 
images … [she] prepares her home (9.1) and offers food and hospitality’.193 Webster believes 
that the good wife described in chapter 31:10-31 is the mirror of the woman wisdom 
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introduced in the first nine chapters. Both are ‘sought and found’; both are ‘more precious 
than jewels’; both bring life, work with their hands, speak wisdom, are concerned with the 
ways of their households and are praised. Moreover, the ‘woman who fears the Lord is to be 
praised’ (31.30) and ’the beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord’ (9.10). These similarities 
convince Webster that wisdom is constructed as a good wife.194 This reading of wisdom dispels 
the goddess idea, in the sense that she is not untouchable or inaccessible. 
The knowledge of wisdom is introduced as the purpose of the book: ‘The proverbs of 
Solomon, son of David, king of Israel: To know wisdom and instruction, to understand words of 
insight’ (Proverbs 1:1-2). Webster argues that ‘Like a woman, the typical ‘other’ in patriarchal 
discourse, wisdom may be drawn into a relationship. Engendering wisdom therefore allows 
connections on a deeper, more relational, level. It is at this level that the texts wish to 
speak.’195 To ‘know’ (ידע, yada`) is something more than just intellectual knowledge – it is 
relational knowledge. Indeed, it is relational knowledge in the intimate and experiential sense, 
as David Lambert asserts: 
…behind the claim that yada` denotes sexual intercourse one could imagine there lurks 
a rather crude objectification, a limited physical knowledge associated with 
uncovering, grasping, or possessing, in short, various forms of mastery. But, all of 
these associations ultimately emerge only if we follow the orthodox image of thought. 
What if we were to understand biblical “knowing” as an act of encounter, a crossing of 
boundaries … that is constitutive of a certain kind of social unit? Indeed, what we may 
have here is not a euphemism for sexual intercourse … but a straightforward way of 
denoting a broader sexual intimacy that would be inclusive of procreative activity. 
After all, the one extensive representation of physical intimacy in the Bible, the Song of 
Songs, includes almost nothing about actual intercourse but a great deal about the 
sensory qualities of the physical encounter, an encounter that is marked by both 
successful and unsuccessful attempts to cross over to the other.196 
Biblical knowledge, then, is not the oppressive mastery of deity over human; it is a mutually 
enjoined relationship. The love of wisdom is relational. 
Wisdom is inseparable from justice, righteousness, equity and love in the Book of 
Proverbs.197 Therefore, the Jewish thinking voice is always identifiable with these qualities. If 
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wisdom is the woman to be sought after, then these are her siblings. Justice, righteousness 
and equity are almost immediately introduced: 
To know wisdom and instruction, 
to understand words of insight, 
to receive instruction in wise dealing, 
in righteousness, justice, and equity; 
to give prudence to the simple, 
knowledge and discretion to the youth (1:2-4, ESV). 
To know wisdom (לדעת חכמה, lada’at hokmah) relationally, one must also become acquainted 
with her brothers, and in the analogy of the courtship, one must gain their approval. Justice 
and equity are displayed in that prudence, knowledge and discretion are not withheld from the 
uneducated or young – there are no barriers of intellectualism or age. The Jewish thinking 
voice does not exclude. 
Yet, the relationship between wisdom and justice has a social dynamic too: she ‘raises 
her voice’ in the marketplace, ‘she cries out’ in the ‘noisy streets’ and speaks out ‘at the 
entrance of the city gates’ (1:20-21). Wisdom’s invitation is to the individual but it is also 
addressed to the wider community. As Phyllis Trible has rightly stated, wisdom’s ‘podium is the 
public arena; there she speaks to all sorts and conditions of people.’198 Trible believes that the 
double parallelism in chapter 1:20-21 emphasises that ‘the call of wisdom is inclusive. All 
people, wherever they are, may listen to her words … [because] … All are unwise when wisdom 
begins to speak.’199 Her cries demand a societal response – the city gate is the judicial seat.200 
Wisdom says, ‘By me kings reign, and rulers decree what is just; by me princes rule, and 
nobles, all who govern justly’ (8:15-16). She implores the wayfarer and commuter, those 
setting out on their journey and those reaching their destination: 
Does not wisdom call? 
Does not understanding raise her voice? 
On the heights beside the way, 
at the crossroads she takes her stand; 
beside the gates in front of the town, 
at the entrance of the portals she cries aloud: 
“To you, O men, I call, 
and my cry is to the children of man. 
O simple ones, learn prudence; 
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O fools, learn sense (8:1-5, ESV). 
There is no discrimination against the foolish – all are addressed, all are invited to learn. It is 
true that ancient Israel had its own exclusive groups, but these include, for example, the 
priesthood tribe and their concern was the House of God, the sacrificial offerings and cultic 
observance. There were the kingly tribes, but their concern was essentially national or tribal 
governance. The prophets formed a distinct group but not along tribal or social lines, as Amos 
the shepherd prophet demonstrates.201 Jewish and Christian tradition holds that Solomon was 
the author of Proverbs, in keeping with 1:1, and so if wisdom had meant to be the preserve of 
the social elite, then Solomon, or someone speaking in his name, could have made wisdom an 
elite pursuit. Instead, the author thinks nothing of social standing, religious pedigree or 
politics, putting wisdom within reach of everyman. Perhaps wisdom’s elite is found in 
everyman – a gender elite – and obviously this issue runs throughout the Hebrew Scriptures, 
as well as in the classical tradition.202 Nevertheless, the person of wisdom is not a man or a 
goddess, but a woman. The Jewish thinking voice is distinctly feminine. 
In the first chapter a warning is given against the enticement of ‘sinners’ to commit 
unprovoked acts of violence and theft (1:10-19). Such unrighteous behaviour carries its own 
penalty, with the loss of life of the perpetrator. Wisdom’s suitors are urged not to heed the 
voice of sinners, and to refrain from walking their paths. In chapter 3 practical examples of 
injustices to avoid are described, and they are all relational: 
Do not withhold good from those to whom it is due, 
when it is in your power to do it. 
Do not say to your neighbour, “Go, and come again, 
tomorrow I will give it”—when you have it with you. 
Do not plan evil against your neighbour, 
who dwells trustingly beside you. 
Do not contend with a man for no reason, 
when he has done you no harm (3:27-30, ESV). 
Deceitfulness and meanness with one’s neighbour, planning evil against an innocent fellow 
citizen, and motiveless contention constitute social injustices. Responsibility and respect 
constitute just human action – constitute the ways of wisdom, constitute the ways of the 
Jewish thinking voice. 
In chapter 2:6-15, we read that wisdom, knowledge and understanding proceed from 
the Lord towards the morally upright and people of integrity. He protects the pathways of 
                                                 
201
 See Amos 1:1; 7:14-15. 
202
 For a discussion of the feminisation of wisdom in Proverbs see Rosemary Radford Ruether, ‘Why Do Men Need 
the Goddess? Male Creation of Female Religious Symbols’, Dialog: A Journal of Theology, 44.3 (2005), pp. 234-236, 
especially p. 235. 
 185
justice, righteousness and equity. The idea of pathways, suggests that to practice justice, 
righteousness and equity requires making deliberate choices, these are ways to be walked 
consciously. Their relationship to wisdom necessitates interdependence – walking the path of 
justice requires wisdom, and following wisdom will naturally lead you along the path of justice: 
‘I walk in the way of righteousness, in the paths of justice’, she says (8: 20). In chapter 8 we 
read that ‘All the words of [wisdom’s] mouth are righteous; there is nothing twisted or 
crooked in them’ (8:8). The choice to walk these paths protects one from the alternative – the 
crooked paths of evil, perversity and darkness – the practice of injustice. Wisdom’s brothers 
keep a watchful eye over her suitors. 
Chapter 2 also introduces us to wisdom’s nemesis, the ‘forbidden’ or ‘strange’ (זרה, 
zarah) woman (2:16-22). Webster believes that the term ‘strange’ connotes a ‘sense of 
separation or “otherness” … she would be separated by religious laws regulating endogamy.’203 
She is the ‘adulteress’ who cannot be legitimately courted, and therefore offers no relational 
future. Rather, she is one ‘who forsakes the companion of her youth and forgets the covenant 
of her God’ (2:17). This forsaking and forgetting manifests in the relationships of marriage, 
friendship and religion – she represents relational destruction. In every sense, she is wisdom’s 
opposite, offering ‘smooth words’ instead of earnest pleading; a house of death and ghostly 
shadows (רפאים, rephaim) instead of life. This pale existence is but a poor imitation of life 
experienced by those who choose the paths of unrighteousness and injustice. However, 
wisdom keeps her suitor safe from the adulteress through the pursuit of the good and 
righteous pathways. 
The righteous (צדיקים, tzaddikim) and the wicked (רשעים, reshaim) are contrasted at 
various points, for example: 
…the path of the righteous is like the light of dawn, 
which shines brighter and brighter until full day. 
The way of the wicked is like deep darkness; 
they do not know over what they stumble (4:18-19, ESV). 
The pursuit of righteousness brings increasing awareness and greater perception with each 
step, whereas wickedness decreases sensitivity and understanding. The ramifications of this 
relationally are that unrighteous and unjust actions blind and eventually narrow human 
interest to self, whilst righteousness and justice illuminate and broadens human interest to the 
other. ‘The hope of the righteous brings joy, but the expectation of the wicked will perish’ 
(10:28) – wisdom’s righteous action has ever-increasing circles of influence; while folly’s 
unrighteous action implodes. ‘The mouth of the righteous brings forth wisdom… but the 
mouth of the wicked, what is perverse’ (10:31-32) – if the outworking of righteous action is 
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wisdom and vice-versa, then the outworking of wicked action is perversity, a twisting and 
distortion of right human action. 
The connection between wisdom and love can be seen on at least two levels. Firstly, 
wisdom’s relationship to justice, righteousness and equity equates to care, compassion and 
responsibility – these are expressions of love which can, for example, extend from one 
individual to another or from one community to another. Secondly, the courtship of wisdom is 
itself couched in the language of love: 
Blessed is the one who finds wisdom, 
and the one who gets understanding, 
for the gain from her is better than gain from silver 
and her profit better than gold. 
She is more precious than jewels, 
and nothing you desire can compare with her. 
Long life is in her right hand; 
in her left hand are riches and honour. 
Her ways are ways of pleasantness, 
and all her paths are peace. 
She is a tree of life to those who lay hold of her; 
those who hold her fast are called blessed (3:13-18, ESV). 
The courtship of wisdom is the pursuit of one without equal. She is of inestimable worth, she is 
incomparable, and everything deemed precious and rare fades in her glory. Wisdom offers 
that which material wealth cannot procure: pleasantness, favour, beauty (נעם, noam), peace 
 ḥayyim). She is to be sought, embraced and held onto. The חיים) shalom) and life ,שלום)
language of love continues in the following chapter: 
Do not forsake her, and she will keep you; 
love her, and she will guard you. 
The beginning of wisdom is this: Get wisdom, 
and whatever you get, get insight. 
Prize her highly, and she will exalt you; 
she will honour you if you embrace her. 
She will place on your head a graceful garland; 
she will bestow on you a beautiful crown (4:6-9, ESV). 
Her fidelity is beyond question. It is within wisdom’s power to keep, guard, exalt, honour and 
beautify her suitors. The counsel is to love (אהב, ahav) her and prize her – this is the language 
of lovers – it is the language of union: ‘I love those who love me, and those who seek me 
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diligently find me’ (8:17).204 She demands right action from those who would embrace her – 
she demands love – she must be courted and is not easily won. Wisdom is relational, and she 
manifests in human relations. The Jewish thinking voice is the voice of love – not erōs, but a 
love expressed in relational care. 
We turn now to awe in the Book of Proverbs, expressed as ‘the fear of the Lord’. But 
what do we mean by ‘fear’ and how can we speak of it philosophically? It is usually 
experienced as a negative reaction – not something easily associated with wisdom, 
understanding and enlightenment. Funkenstein wrote that ‘All major philosophical schools 
since the third century BCE had promised emancipation through knowledge or understanding 
… An adequate knowledge of the cosmos, and a life according to it … were to free the wise 
from the repressive fear of the gods, which was a main source of misery’.205 Knowledge or 
wisdom should free us from fear not enjoin us to it. However, we must make a distinction 
between what we mean – are we speaking of ‘fear’ or ‘anxiety’? Paul Kielholz explains that 
fear is: 
…invariably objective and reflects the magnitude of the threatening danger. Those 
affected can therefore meet the threat by rational and appropriate action. Let us take 
fear of examinations as an example. It is a spur to work, and the better the student is 
prepared the more readily can he master his fear, and even acquire a feeling of 
security through the acquisition of a sufficient stock of knowledge. The position is 
quite different with examination anxiety. In spite of the most assiduous study, the 
anxiety grows more acute as the examination approaches and, on the examination 
day, turns into an examination stupor with total failure as the outcome.’206 
Fear then is rational, whereas anxiety is not. The liberating effects of wisdom may indeed 
dispel irrational anxiety, but we can speak of a ‘healthy fear’ when, for example, considering 
dangerous, risky and life-threatening situations. Mayer Gruber uses Kielholz’s psychological 
understanding to define fear in the biblical context – the fear of God mentioned by Abraham in 
Genesis 20 leads to ‘the avoidance of homicide’. Abraham perceives the absence of such fear 
in Gerar that would consequently lead to his murder: ‘That the motivation not to commit 
homicide is called “fear of God” can be explained as follows: “fear of God” is fright at the 
contemplation of the consequences of transgressing God's prohibitions.’207 Similarly, Job is 
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described as fearing God and avoiding evil: ‘The avoidance of evil is a positive program 
undertaken in response to the rational fear of the real danger that lies in store for him or her 
who arouses the wrath of God by unseemly behaviour.’208 Indeed, even in the Greek tradition, 
we find the fear of God discussed – Thomas Hall comments on Aristotle: ‘Not to fear the gods 
and their works (earthquakes, for example) he regarded as insane and not to fear disgrace as 
ignoble.’209 Moreover, in a statement on fear attributed to Aristotle, we read: ‘For if you make 
a man too fearless, so as not even to fear the Gods, he is not brave but mad’ (1185b24).210 
Walter Kaiser Jr. traces the historical development of the expression, ‘the fear of the 
Lord’, and believes that it is a term that ‘brought law and wisdom together [and] linked both 
law and wisdom to the promise made to the patriarchs.’211 For Kaiser, the fear of the Lord is 
expressed through the patriarchs by their ‘response of worship, knowledge, and obedience … 
[as] seen in Abraham's test of faith (Gen. 22:12), in one of Isaac's names for God (Gen. 31:42, 
53), in Joseph's believing response (Gen. 42:18) and in Job … (Job 1:1, 8, 9; 2:3).’ However, 
within these contexts, he likens the fear of the Lord to the ‘concept of “commitment to” or 
“trust in” God’, and not ‘some emotional or psychical form of experience’. Kaiser follows the 
expression through Exodus, Leviticus and Deuteronomy, where ‘it became a focal point of 
interest … [as a] command and [to be] taught … [involving] service, love, obedience, worship, 
and total surrender’.212 However, it is in the Wisdom Literature that the fear of the Lord, 
according to Kaiser, becomes ‘the essence of knowledge and wisdom of God’, serving in 
Proverbs 1:7 as the ‘motto for the whole book’.213 This motto appears 14 times in Proverbs 
(1:7, 29; 2:5; 8:13; 9:10; 10:27; 14:26, 27; 15:16, 33; 16:6; 19:23; 22:4; 23:17), as well as in 4 
verbal forms (3:7; 14:2; 24:21; 31:30), epitomising and encapsulating the teaching of the book. 
For Kaiser, the understanding of fear as the ‘attitude of total commitment to the Lord was the 
starting point, the inception of any and all real knowledge’, it is only the beginning.214 Fear as 
trust and obedience results in life; ‘to fear God was to turn away from evil and to choose the 
way of life’, a call to turn from ‘pride, arrogance, perverted speech and devious behaviour’.215 
If justice, righteousness, equity and love can be seen as wisdom’s siblings, then I would 
like to suggest that awe represents the relationship between wisdom and her father.216 
Imagine a suitor’s first encounter with the father of the bride – this may engender at the very 
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least a healthy respect, if not reverential fear. Here, we consider a, if not the, central theme of 
Proverbs, ‘the fear of the Lord’. Fear (יראה, yirah) can be seen as an awesome reverence and 
humbling beneath the enormity and beauty of the heavens, rather than the fear of terror: 
The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his work, 
the first of his acts of old. 
Ages ago I was set up, 
at the first, before the beginning of the earth. 
When there were no depths I was brought forth, 
when there were no springs abounding with water. 
Before the mountains had been shaped, 
before the hills, I was brought forth, 
before he had made the earth with its fields, 
or the first of the dust of the world. 
When he established the heavens, I was there; 
when he drew a circle on the face of the deep, 
when he made firm the skies above, 
when he established the fountains of the deep, 
when he assigned to the sea its limit, 
so that the waters might not transgress his command, 
when he marked out the foundations of the earth, 
then I was beside him, like a master workman, 
and I was daily his delight, 
rejoicing before him always, 
rejoicing in his inhabited world 
and delighting in the children of man (8:22-31, ESV). 
The verb קנני (qanani) is translated as ‘possessed’ in the first verse; and in Genesis 4:1 it is used 
by Eve in declaring that she has given birth to Cain; in Deuteronomy 32:6 it is used for God as a 
father making and creating Israel; and in Psalm 139:9 it is used regarding the formation of 
human life in the womb. In this context we see that wisdom is fathered by God. The use of the 
word ‘beginning’ (ראשית, reshith) evokes the creation narrative in Genesis 1. Wisdom is 
brought forth by her father at the very beginning and joyfully participates with him in the 
creative process of the cosmos, the earth and humanity. 
This description of the creative process mirrors God’s challenge to Job, where God asks 
Job: ‘Where were you?’ while God created the cosmos and everything in it (Job 38-41). In awe, 
Job covers his mouth, unable to answer. However, unlike Job or any mortal, wisdom can 
answer the question, and affirms that she was present and actively involved. The act of 
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creation is awesome, and wisdom shares that awe. The fear of the Lord as awe brings about a 
humility in human action, an appropriate estimation of oneself in the face of the cosmos, the 
earth and humanity. At the same time, awe elevates one’s estimation of that created realm, 
giving a healthy respect and reverence for the universe and every creature within it. The 
connection between awe and the cosmos can also be seen in the Prophet Jonah’s description 
of himself: ‘I am a Hebrew, and I fear the Lord, the God of heaven, who made the sea and the 
dry land’ (Jonah 1:9). Jonah makes a natural progression between his fear of the Lord and who 
that Lord is – the creator. This natural progression can also be seen in Psalms 19 and 111, 
between the works of God manifest in the creation and the fear of the Lord. 
The understanding of fear as terror obviously has its place, for example, as a response 
to danger or, in theistic terms, a response to God’s wrath. However, it is the understanding of 
fear as awe which allows a philosophical discourse for theists and non-theists alike, by pointing 
not just to a creator but to the cosmos and life in all its forms. An awesome respect for one 
another, for all life, for the earth and the universe brings about the beginning of wisdom 
evidenced in human actions of justice, righteousness, equity and love. The fear of the Lord is 
also described as ‘the hatred of evil’ (8:13). Again we find a parallel in Job – he is described as 
‘blameless and upright, one who feared God and turned away from evil’ (Job 1:1). Later, Job 
recounts the words of God ‘Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to turn away from 
evil is understanding’ (Job 28:28).This is the shunning of the opposite human actions: injustice, 
unrighteousness, inequity and the opposite to love, which may not be hate as much as 
indifference or heartlessness. Thus, in Wisdom literature we find that the fear of the Lord is 
duel-edged – an acquiring of wisdom and understanding, and a forsaking of evil. In awe, we 
see the human reaction towards the otherness of the universe, and our fellow-human, which 
leads to a desire towards wisdom – to understand the otherness of the universe and our 
fellow-human – and also a shunning of evil action towards them. In Exodus we read of the 
midwives, whose awe of God resulted in an awe towards human life – they defied the king of 
Egypt and let the male children live (Exodus 1:15-21). Jonathan Jacobs notes the place of 
wisdom in human action: ‘Wisdom, along with judgement, righteousness, and loving-kindness, 
is central to the imitation of God in the Jewish understanding.’217 Thus, the fear of the Lord is a 
catalyst for imitating God through acts of justice, righteousness and loving-kindness. 
Rudolf Otto, in his work describing the numinous – the awesome divine presence – wrote ‘To 
“keep a thing holy in the heart” means to mark it off by a feeling of peculiar dread, not to be 
mistaken for any ordinary dread, that is, to appraise it by the category of the numinous.’218 
Wisdom pursued, courted and wed; wisdom – the good and faithful wife – leads us to appraise 
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more of our interactions in the cosmos by the category of the numinous. In other words, she 
raises our estimation of a person, a relationship, of the world; she raises our estimation of the 
absolute necessity for justice, right action, equity and love; we count them all as holy in the 
heart. A human understanding that ‘holiness is indisputable’ is, according to Emmanuel 
Levinas, ‘the beginning of philosophy, this is the rational, the intelligible.’219 Thus, we dread to 
violate one another; we dread to violate justice and omit love. Later, Otto states that: 
The truly mysterious object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only 
because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon 
something inherently wholly other, whose kind and character are incommensurable 
with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill 
and numb.220 
For the theist, the truly mysterious is not an object but God. But what of the non-theist – is 
there an object beyond apprehension and comprehension? For theist and non-theist alike, the 
cosmos should cause us to recoil in wonder, life in all its forms should fill us with awe, and the 
beauty of wisdom and her brothers should cause us to bow, not in worship but humility. 
Worship, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, is reserved for God alone, but not humility. Humility 
is reserved for as many whose kind and character we are willing to see as being worthy of the 
justice, righteousness, love and respect that we would hope to receive ourselves. 
The ‘irremovable limits’ mentioned by Otto, are echoed in Henri Blocher’s argument 
that the fear of the Lord ‘might well invite the wise to modesty, to the confession of the limits 
they cannot trespass: wisdom acknowledges human lowness.’221 Confessing our human 
lowness may be as distasteful as fear to the modern mind, but humility is an essential human 
action, a prerequisite from which justice, righteousness and love flow. For Blocher, the 
‘virtuous woman’ in chapter 31 and ‘Dame Wisdom at the beginning of the book’ stand as ‘a 
personification of the fear of the LORD’.222 To stand in awe of wisdom; to fear that one might 
not apprehend her, fail to win her over, or worse, to fear that having gained her hand one 
might lose her. Wisdom is an awesome woman. Proverbs seeks to raise our estimation of her, 
to count her as holy in the heart. If wisdom can lead us to justice, righteousness and love, then 
she not only commands our respect, but we humble ourselves before her in acknowledgement 
of our need. Ultimately, then, the Jewish thinking voice leads us to wisdom through humility 
and awe. It is not the contemplation of self-examination, but the contemplation of the other in 
awe and humility. 
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Hebrew Wisdom as the Jewish Thinking Voice  
 
How can Hebrew wisdom help us to think? Can thinking even be helped? Yes, according to 
both the ancient Greek and Hebrew traditions. As Gordis points out, in the Greek sophistic 
schools and the Wisdom schools of the ancient sages: ‘Greek sophia and Hebrew hokmah are 
strikingly parallel in their concern with the education of the youth for practical life and in their 
culmination in philosophical scepticism.’223 The way we think is, to some degree, learnt from 
one source or another – our thinking knowingly or unknowingly utilises a variety of tools from 
different traditions, both ancient and modern. The invitation from the ancient Greek tradition 
is to examine your life, to question every assumption. From the Jewish tradition, the Prophet 
Jeremiah records the divine counsel: ‘Stand by the roads, and look, and ask for the ancient 
paths, where the good way is; and walk in it, and find rest for your souls’ (Jeremiah 6:16, ESV). 
Both traditions begin with a cosmological context – how we relate to the universe and 
what part we play in it. From Thales’ proposal that all things originated from water, we can 
think of a cosmos that is fluid; and existence as fluid not static. This comes to us also from a 
reading of the Jewish tradition, in which the world is made out of water. We are encouraged to 
think in a context of change and flow, and to relate ourselves to the very elements of the 
cosmos. Both traditions enumerate the elements of water, earth, wind and fire – philosophy 
can easily veer towards the abstract, but the relationship between cosmos and soul in the 
Hebrew Scriptures draws our thinking to connect us with the very substance of our existence; 
to think within the context of our universe; and to step back from our thumbnail image of our 
immediate situation to view the infinite canvas of creation. The result is that our thinking is 
overwhelmed by a sense of wonder and awe. This response demonstrates that both traditions 
are closer than Strauss believed; both lead us to an awestruck appreciation of our place and 
responsibility in the universe – Athens with Jerusalem. 
Philosophy helps us to think with clarity: to define our terms, to establish causes and 
principles and, thus, to articulate our knowledge more clearly. Analogies make knowledge 
accessible, by connecting ideas, images, stories and thoughts. Biblical wisdom, through riddles, 
parables and proverbs, likewise help us to think with clarity and interpret the world we live in. 
Ancient Geek philosophy and ancient Hebrew wisdom both require us to think with our senses 
– to both see and hear. We see conceptually, we visualise ideas, we are illuminated by the light 
of knowledge. Yet the Jewish thinking voice values hearing. The discipline of rhetoric in the 
Jewish tradition of the spoken voice requires the ear be as active in hearing as the mouth in 
speaking, and no less the Jewish thinking voice requires the ear to hear. We give our ear to 
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wisdom, remembering and recalling the words and voices of ancient wisdom, and then 
relaying it from those who have gone before us to those who will follow. 
Effort is required in the pursuit of wisdom – no less than with philosophy – wisdom will 
cost us: to give up our preconceived positions, to move out of our comfortable assumptions, to 
journey into unknown places, to experience the pain of loss and suffering, to experience 
uncertainty and bewilderment, to be challenged, to be humbled, to be transformed. But the 
effort is repaid – there is freedom – the journey moves us upward, affirming us and guiding our 
steps with understanding. Our suffering is not in vain, it tutors us and enriches us; and we 
grow in response. Wisdom is not a passive pursuit – it involves, interacts and engages the 
thought-life – it must be received by the ear, the head and the heart; it must be treasured 
above all else; it must be given our full attention and inclination; it must be heeded; sought, 
searched for and found. However, this is not the effort of one enslaved, rather the effort of a 
lover – a suitor courting their loved one. Wisdom is the woman calling to her lover, she is 
utterly relational: from the divine to the human, from one human to another, from humanity 
to the cosmos and all it encompasses. This is not an exclusive relationship for all are called, all 
are welcome to heed her voice – all have something to learn. But she, in return, demands right 
action, love and fidelity – wisdom must be won.  
This ancient wisdom helps us to think of our existence in useful, practical ways – we 
understand that life is fleeting, we live appropriately as those whose appearing and 
disappearing upon this earth is as a vapour. We live fully in the now and fully in the eternal, so 
that we consequently appreciate all that we have – the little or the much, our neighbour, our 
friend, our loved ones. This transience helps us to value and make sense of all that is passing, 
be it our toil or pleasure, our joy or sorrow. We understand that life is in so many ways 
unfathomable; there are unsolvable mysteries and we will often reach an impasse in the 
journey. But the very voice that brings us to the impasse will also see us through it, eventually, 
to the other side. We understand that though our life is but a breath, it is nonetheless life. All 
our experiences – good and bad – are part of life’s cycle. Even death is a part of life, and, in 
turn, life is a part of death. We live in seasons with ebb and flow, beginnings and endings with 
no final state. Life is affirmed in all the cosmos: if nothing lives forever, then nothing dies 
forever. The cosmos is imbued with life-breath. 
We are called by the ancient Greek philosophers to ‘Know thyself’, to examine our 
lives through contemplation. In our thinking we are to leave the world of appearances and 
question everything. Our unexamined lives are not worth the living, we will only discover our 
purpose in the quest. Our thoughts must be shaped by asking, answering, questioning – a 
dialogical argument with ourselves in self-reflection or with others in cooperative participation 
and joint inquiry. Our quest is a shared journey – we do not exist in isolation and we cannot 
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understand in isolation. This requires honesty in stating our position (right or wrong); but the 
Jewish thinking voice reminds us to be humble in the universe – to seek a truth that is wed to 
justice, righteousness and love. 
The model of humility in Hebrew wisdom is expressed in an awesome reverence for 
life, a realisation that the creation is awesome from the simplest to the most complex life-
form, from the smallest part of the cosmos to the greatest. To think aright is to see ourselves 
within the universe – not to be crushed by it but neither to exalt ourselves – to stand beneath 
the enormity and beauty of the heavens with humility and an appropriate estimation of 
ourselves. Wisdom responds to the cosmos with an awe that manifests in our human actions. 
Awe elevates our estimation of the cosmos, the earth and humanity; we respond with respect 
and reverence for the universe we inhabit, the elements from which it is constructed, the 
various life-forms we share it with, and for one another. Our thinking must be ethical; our 
wisdom is worth little apart from the actions it leads to. Our understanding must be 
demonstrated by our actions. Wisdom instructs us how to live, knowledge alone does not. 
Wise thinking will manifest in wise action – in justice, righteousness, equity and love. 
Wise thinking will shun the opposite actions – wisdom cannot be unjust, unrighteous, unequal 
or indifferent. Wise thinking will raise our estimation of one another, so that we will afford the 
other justice, right action, equity and love; we will fear to violate one another because we 
stand in humility, awe and wonder. Our wrongdoing and injustice blinds us and diminishes our 
field of vision, so that we only see ourselves and our self-interest. Whereas, love, 
righteousness and justice work for the interests of others, where we see ourselves as 
belonging to one another – to become our ‘brother’s keeper’. The Jewish thinking voice 
involves thinking with responsibility, humility, care and compassion – wisdom is thus manifest. 

















In the preceding chapters we have considered the Jewish voice in written, spoken and thinking 
contexts; as a voice that offers a valuable counterpart to the Western classical tradition. The 
Hebrew Scriptures, Talmud and Midrashim form the foundational core of Jewish Great Books; 
while midrashic exegesis brings an alternative and authentic method to reading biblical texts. 
Indeed, as Geoffrey Hartman has boldly asserted, ‘A knowledge of Midrash will prove more 
interesting for the literary critic than a knowledge of literary criticism for the scholar of Jewish 
texts.’1 The midrashic method may prove to be an invaluable tool for the reading of all Great 
Books, not just Jewish ones. As a spoken voice, the Jewish rhetorical tradition beckons us to do 
more than simply speak well – more than the learning of mere persuasive techniques – it 
beckons us to speak up for the outcast and the outsider: ‘the poor, the widow and orphan’. 
The Jewish spoken voice cannot support the status quo for the sake of expediency; instead it 
teaches us that if we are given a voice, then it is to be used on behalf of the voiceless. And 
even if that places us outside the gates, we will stand with and identify with the outsider and 
the outcast. We may learn to speak well, but we must speak up. The Jewish thinking voice is 
the voice of wisdom; and to learn that voice is to embrace a wisdom wedded to right action, 
justice and love. In other words, we will know if we are thinking wisely, if our thoughts reflect 
in appropriate actions. The Jewish thinking voice is wisdom rooted in humility and awe – a 
reverence for all life, if not for the creator of all life. It is a wisdom that has learnt to correctly 
estimate our place in the cosmos, and from that place display wisdom in our relationships to 
one another, and to all creation. The fear which wisdom produces awakens us to an awesome 
appreciation for each element, each creature, and each person we encounter. At the same 
time, we fear to violate the wonder. 
In the Western tradition the arts of reading, speaking and thinking are collectively 
grouped as the literary arts, because they are so closely related. The three strands of the 
Jewish voice are likewise related, and inform each other. Thus, the Jewish written voice 
informs the Jewish thinking and speaking voices; Jewish thinking informs writing and speaking; 
and Jewish speaking informs thinking and writing. These are all interdependent, although the 
Jewish tradition would place the written texts in the position of authority. Out of an 
understanding of the Torah, the Nevi’im and the Ketuvim (the Law, the Prophets and the 
Writings) flows right speech and wise thought. The wisdom that the Scriptures teach then 
shapes thinking or speaking which informs further reading and so on, so that the strands 
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continue to feed into one another. The Jewish voice, with the foundational authority of the 
Scriptures, thus provides templates for reading (for example, the Scribal and midrashic 
traditions), speaking (for example, the Prophets) and thinking (for example, the Wisdom 
literature). 
 
The Stranger in Our Midst 
 
It has already been noted that Robert Hutchins deemed the Bible to be so familiar that it did 
not need including in the Great Books. Indeed, it is familiar, but it stands now as a stranger in 
our midst. The scant inclusion of random biblical texts in liberal arts programmes reflects a low 
estimation of the Hebrew Scriptures, and the exclusion of the Talmudic and Midrashic writings, 
speaks of an even lower opinion. Like a stranger, the written Jewish voice is very often 
unwelcome – perhaps seen as a threat – or it is treated with hostility, ridicule or abuse. As a 
stranger in our midst, we have become accustomed to its presence, and so it may be tolerated 
or ghettoised into ‘Jewish Studies’. And unless, we venture into the ghetto, it will have nothing 
to teach us, nothing we want to hear. However, we have forgotten that this stranger is the 
pillar of Judaeo-Christian society: our laws founded on the Decalogue, and our common values 
shaped by the Torah. Our literary history in the west owes so much to the Scriptures, the 
unpaid debt no less than that paid to Athens. Yet as familiar as the Bible is, and as tolerant of it 
as we are, we still struggle to recognise the stranger’s face – we struggle to describe it – 
because we are not on speaking terms. Can we learn from the stranger? Yes, but we must be 
willing to be silent for a time. Athens has spoken, and spoken long. There must be a willing ear. 
In rhetoric too, the Jewish voice appears as a stranger – the voice of the foreigner. 
Margaret Zulick astutely observes the same predicament faced by the Jewish voice in the 
spoken art as faced in the written art: 
However we choose to explain it, the examination of the Hebrew concept of 
persuasion draws our attention to the fact that the Greek elevation and rationalization 
of rhetoric cannot be considered a universal norm, not even in our own culture, which 
is based on both Hebrew and Greek traditions. Instead, it is a particular development 
in a small society at a certain point in history; a development that needs to be heard 
again with newly estranged ears. Hebrew rhetoric is in the paradoxical position, in our 
culture, of being at one and the same time foreign and foundational; an unassimilated 
other at the heart of Western rationality. It is this foreigner's perspective that a new 
encounter with the Hebrew tradition brings to the critical study of rhetoric.2 
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This image of the ‘unassimilated other’ perfectly encapsulates the position of the Jewish voice 
in modern liberal arts education. The foreigner’s perspective is crucial to growing our 
understanding and broadening the liberal arts, so that it represents the education of the truly 
‘free’. Whilst there are unassimilated others there is no real freedom to speak of. The hideous 
plight of the Jew as a stranger in gentile history alone testifies to the abrogation of freedom. 
How we need ‘newly estranged ears’. The Jewish spoken voice persuades us to welcome the 
stranger; to even identify ourselves with the stranger: ‘When a stranger sojourns with you in 
your land, you shall not do him wrong. You shall treat the stranger who sojourns with you as 
the native among you, and you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of 
Egypt: I am the Lord your God’ (Leviticus 19:33-34, ESV). Note that the people of Israel are 
reminded of their condition in Egypt: because they were strangers, they should easily identify 
with the stranger who lives among them. However, this identification with the stranger is not 
to manifest in tolerance, but in love – the love, care and respect you would show to your own. 
Indeed, the word tolerance is used today is if it were a virtue, but can veil an attitude of 
‘putting up with’ rather than an embracing into. Martin Buber explained more fully the extent 
of the commandments to ‘love your neighbour’ and to ‘love the stranger’: ‘I must act lovingly 
toward my rea, my “companion” (usually translated “my [neighbour]”), that is toward every 
man with whom I deal in the course of my life, including the ger, the “stranger” or “sojourner”; 
I must bestow the [favours] of love on him, I must treat him with love as one who is “like unto 
me” … I must love him not merely with superficial gestures but with an essential relationship.’3 
Reciprocation is essential to relationship, as Buber stated: ‘Relation is mutual. My Thou affects 
me, as I affect it.’4 The future of the Western liberal arts tradition in relationship with another 
voice must be built on a mutual respect – it is foundational: ‘In the beginning is relation.’5 The 
Jewish spoken voice calls for parity between the speakers – a reciprocal appreciation of 
traditions and a reciprocal ear. 
The Jewish thinking voice is also estranged. The reason versus revelation dichotomy – 
despite itself being a deeply-flawed and illogical argument – has almost entirely succeeded in 
barring the Hebrew Scriptures and the rabbinic sources from philosophical discourse. Yoram 
Hazony has done a great service in addressing this fallacy,6 and showing that the Bible is as 
much a work of reason as the works of the Presocratics and Plato, whose works, in turn, 
openly include the revelatory. The voices of Parmenides and Socrates are not excluded despite 
divine encounter, commission and guidance. The Scriptures call for the equal treatment of the 
stranger and the native-born, and the Western tradition has much to learn here. The Jewish 
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5
 Buber, I and Thou, p. 18. 
6
 Yoram Hazony, The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
 198 
thinking voice represents the stranger not only in the philosophical world, but represents a 
wisdom that is strange to our Western understanding – it requires action – contemplation is 
not enough. The examined life must be exercised in righteousness, justice and love. Humility is 
not the conclusion at the end of the quest for wisdom; humility is the beginning of the quest – 
awe is not the result of contemplation; awe precedes contemplation. 
The Hebrew Scriptures speak with the voice of the stranger: Abraham, the wandering 
patriarch; Moses, the ‘stranger in a strange land’; Ruth, the Moabitess in Israel; Esther, the 
Jewess in Persia and Ezekiel, the exiled prophet. All express something of estrangement and 
the sense of loss, fear, vulnerability and humility associated with the status of the stranger. 
Whether in writing, speaking or thinking, the Jewish voice stands as the stranger in our midst – 
familiar and yet still unknown – the ‘unassimilated other’. The challenge for the Western 
tradition and, in particular, for modern liberal arts education, is to embrace the other as a host 
embracing a guest – to practice hospitality – and here the Jewish voice is also instructive. 
Richard Kearney asks, ‘When faced with the stranger, do we open or close the door?’7 One of 
the ways he seeks to answer this question is through the ‘Abrahamic’ tradition of hospitality: 
‘In the first Biblical narrative of hospitality [Genesis 18], we find Abraham and Sarah welcoming 
three strangers in the desert. The strangers appear out of nowhere and the hosts accept them 
without asking if they be friend or foe.’ The hospitality of Abraham and Sarah is unconditional; 
welcoming without questions. However, there is always a risk involved in hospitality because 
the stranger’s intentions are not always clear: ‘The ethos of hospitality is never guaranteed; it 
is always shadowed by the twin of hostility.’ Yet, Abraham models a vulnerability as host that 
demonstrates acceptance of the other without prior assurances: ‘instead of reaching for a 
weapon or retreating into his tent, Abraham finds himself running towards the visitors. He 
greets them, bows to the ground and invites them to a meal.’ Abraham risks self-preservation 
and is rewarded with a life-changing encounter with the Other; and the challenge to modern 
liberal arts is to risk the preservation of a singular Western tradition in exchange for an 
education where we identify with the Other through life-changing encounter. With regard to 
cultures, Buber wrote that they ‘enlarge their world … not merely through their own 
experience, but also through the absorption of foreign experience’.8 ‘Only then’, he argues, 
‘does a culture, thus grown, fulfil itself in decisive, discovering expansion.’9 As Buber wrote of 
culture, the same can be applied to the nature of the liberal arts tradition – expanding by 
absorbing the ‘foreign’ voice; it too may reach fulfilment beyond itself. 
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As Kearney so clearly states: ‘Hosting your Other is more divine than protecting your own 
which is arguably why the Hebrew Bible has thirty six commands to "love the stranger" and 
only two to "love your neighbour."’ The liberal arts tradition has been protecting its own for 
too long – it is time to run towards the stranger and be changed. Such action requires ‘risk and 
adventure on our part’, argues Kearney, and the role of the host is to ‘provide a dwelling’ for 
the ‘uninvited one’. Does a liberal arts education have room enough to provide a home for the 
Jewish voice? I believe it does, but the more challenging question involves reversing the roles 
of host and stranger – does the stranger have room for the host? Abrahamic hospitality is a 
nomadic, desert hospitality, forever moving. The danger is in settling, because then the host 
becomes, as Kearney calls it, the ‘guest-master’ or ‘master of the house’. Jacques Derrida’s Of 
Hospitality speaks powerfully regarding the relationship between the master and the stranger 
or ‘Foreigner’: 
The Foreigner shakes up the threatening dogmatism of the paternal logos: the being 
that is, and the non-being that is not. As though the Foreigner had to begin by 
contesting the authority of the chief, the father, the master of the family, the “master 
of the house,” of the power of hospitality.10 
The ‘authority of the chief, the father, the master of the family, the “master of the house,”’ 
well describes the dominant Western tradition, rooted in Greco-Roman grammar, rhetoric and 
philosophy. The outsider voice is able to contest this authority as the non-being that has learnt 
to desist seeking the authority of settlement for itself. Emmanuel Levinas describes this 
contesting or shaking up as ‘the Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself [le chez 
soi]’.11 Abraham was called to leave his home (Genesis 12:1), to become rootless. As a result, 
he is able to welcome strangers – he shares the desert of ‘unknowability’. Thus, there is room 
and breadth in the Jewish voice to host these written, spoken and thinking arts. Indeed, there 
is room to host all the arts. 
 
Beyond the Preliminaries: the Jewish Voice and the Other Liberal Arts 
 
This study has only focused on the Jewish voice in relationship to the preliminary liberal arts of 
writing and reading, speaking and thinking, based in turn on the trivium of grammar, rhetoric 
and logic. The traditional liberal arts education went beyond the preliminaries to the disciplines 
of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. Sure enough, the Jewish voice is not left behind 
here, and has much to say in addressing these disciplines. This study is only an opening in the 
                                                 
10
 Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond; trans. Rachel Bowlby 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 5. 
11
 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969), p. 39. 
 200 
discussion between Athens and Jerusalem regarding the preliminary arts, and I have not 
touched on these further four here. However, future research might address these other 
disciplines in turn: a Jewish approach to arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy will yield 
fascinating insights from the ancient biblical period, the rabbinic period of Antiquity, the 
medieval Jewish flourishing and beyond. 
In the arts of arithmetic and geometry, the Jewish approach to numbers can be seen in 
biblical references to counting (for example, Genesis 13:16; Leviticus 25:8 and Psalm 147:4) and 
numbering (Isaiah 10:19), through to the cabbalistic system of numerology – gematria – in 
medieval Jewish thought.12 One verse from the First Book of Kings has also given rise to a 
fascinating debate regarding the knowledge of pi amongst the biblical authors: ‘Then he 
made the sea [basin] of cast metal. It was round, ten cubits from brim to brim, and five cubits 
high, and a line of thirty cubits measured its circumference’ (7:23, ESV).13 Moreover, the explicit 
and intentional designs of Moses’ tabernacle (Exodus 25-27) and Solomon’s temple (1 Kings 6-
7; 1 Chronicles 22; 2 Chronicles 2-3), as well as the temple envisioned by Ezekiel (Ezekiel 40-43), 
point to a biblical understanding of geometry that invites further exploration in the context of 
the liberal arts.14 
Regarding music, the Hebrew Scriptures dedicate whole books to song – the Book of 
Psalms contains a collection of 150 songs, and the Song of Solomon, a three-voice love story in 
song. Additionally, there are songs scattered throughout various biblical texts, for example, 
‘The Song of Moses’ (Exodus 15:1-21) and ‘The Song of Deborah and Barak’ (Judges 5) appear 
within narrative. One of the most remarkable aspects of music in the Scriptures is where it 
speaks of a musical harmonisation in the cosmos, as in the following example: 
Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? 
Tell me, if you have understanding. 
Who determined its measurements—surely you know! 
Or who stretched the line upon it? 
On what were its bases sunk, 
or who laid its cornerstone, 
when the morning stars sang together 
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and all the sons of God shouted for joy? (Job 38:4-7, ESV) 
Here, God is addressing Job with a series of rhetorical questions, and mentions that at the 
creation of the earth the morning stars (kochvei boker, כוכבי בקר) sang together (beran yachad, 
 There is a link here between the creation of the cosmos and music, and this can also .(ברן־יחד
be seen in Psalm 19:1, ‘The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his 
handiwork’; and in Psalm 148:3, ‘Praise him, sun and moon, praise him, all you shining stars!’ 
It should not be so surprising that music plays such a significant role in the Jewish 
tradition, when we remember that hearing is the primary sense in the Scriptures. The 
prohibition on the visual does not extend to the aural. The written, spoken and thinking voice 
finds accompaniment in a whole variety of instruments and sounds, from the manmade in 
Psalm 150 (this includes, for example, the trumpet; lute; harp; tambourine; strings; pipe; and 
cymbals) to the God-made in Psalm 148 (this includes, for example, angels; the sun, moon and 
stars; the heavens; the seas; sea creatures; the weather; mountains; trees; animals; insects; 
birds; and humans – both young and old, male and female, from the king to the common 
man). 
The Hebrew Scriptures reveal a fascinating and sophisticated knowledge and 
understanding of astronomy, beginning with the creation narrative in Genesis: 
And God said, “Let there be lights in the expanse of the heavens to separate the day 
from the night. And let them be for signs and for seasons, and for days and years, and 
let them be lights in the expanse of the heavens to give light upon the earth.” And it 
was so. And God made the two great lights – the greater light to rule the day and the 
lesser light to rule the night – and the stars. And God set them in the expanse of the 
heavens to give light on the earth, to rule over the day and over the night, and to 
separate the light from the darkness (1:14-18, ESV). 
This description indicates that the heavenly bodies serve not only as sources of light, but also 
as ‘signs’ and markers of time. Soon after, God gives Abraham (known at this time as ‘Abram’) 
the following invitation: ‘Look towards heaven, and number the stars, if you are able to 
number them’ (Genesis 15:5, ESV). God then promises him that his offspring will be as 
numerous. This has even led to the idea that Abraham may have been one of the earliest 
astronomers in Scripture.15 The promise is later reiterated to Abraham using the same example 
of the stars (Genesis 22:17), and repeated to his son, Isaac (Genesis 26:4). 
In the Book of Job we have more detailed accounts of the stars – in the following 
passage Job describes God’s wisdom and power: ‘He is wise in heart and mighty in strength – 
who has hardened himself against him, and succeeded? – he who removes mountains, and 
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they know it not, when he overturns them in his anger, who shakes the earth out of its place, 
and its pillars tremble; who commands the sun, and it does not rise; who seals up the 
stars; who alone stretched out the heavens and trampled the waves of the sea; who made the 
Bear and Orion, the Pleiades and the chambers of the south; who does great things beyond 
searching out, and marvellous things beyond number’ (Job 9:4-10, ESV). The ‘Bear’ 
constellation is translated from the Hebrew עש (Ayish), while Orion is translated from כסיל 
(Kesil) and Pleiades from כימה (Kimah).16 That these constellations were known and named in 
Hebrew suggests an early interest in astronomy within biblical literature. 
David, too, appears to show interest in astronomy, as the following quote from Psalm 
8:3-4 demonstrates: ‘When I look at your heavens, the work of your fingers, the moon and the 
stars, which you have set in place, what is man that you are mindful of him, and the son of 
man that you care for him?’17 Moreover, the Psalms tell us that God is an astronomer: ‘He 
determines the number of the stars; he gives to all of them their names’ (147:4, ESV). 
The Hebrew Scriptures provide a rich source for the study of arithmetic, geometry, 
music and astronomy commensurate with the classical traditions of ancient Greece. In a 
fascinating article, David Curzon has written of the connection between modern science and 
the Hebrew Scriptures – he boldly concludes that ‘beliefs derived from the opening chapters of 
Genesis are active, if unacknowledged, religious principles underlying and operating in all the 
discoveries of modern science’.18 
 
Beyond the Ancient Jewish Voice 
 
The focus of this study has been on the foundational Jewish voice: the biblical mainly, and the 
rabbinic to a lesser degree. There is clearly a rich Jewish tradition that extends from Late 
Antiquity into the medieval period and beyond. It is in the medieval period, for example, that 
Hebrew grammarians and Jewish philosophers begin to emerge as distinct voices in the Jewish 
world (such as Saadia Gaon and Maimonides respectively). Part of their identification as 
grammarians and philosophers is due to their moving closer to Athens, but what they carry 
with them from Jerusalem is worthy of further study. The same is true up to the present day, 
although the Jewish written and spoken voices have faded comparatively, as the Jewish 
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thinking voice has come to the fore in the philosophical world.  This fading is an inevitable 
consequence of the Diaspora, as Franz Rosenzweig so clearly illustrated: ‘…the eternal people 
lost its own language and everywhere speaks the language of its external destinies, the 
language of the people with whom it perchance dwells as a guest; and when it is not claiming 
the right of hospitality, but lives on its own in a closed settlement, it speaks the language of 
the people from which, in leaving it, it received the strength to carry out this settling; it never 
possesses this language in its own right, it never possesses it on the basis of its belonging to 
the same blood, but always as the language of immigrants who came from all over: “Judeo-
Spanish” in the Balkans, and “Yiddish” in Eastern Europe are only the best known cases 
today’.19 Nevertheless, despite the diasporic loss, something distinctive remains in the Jewish 
voice: ‘Whereas all other peoples are consequently identified with their own language and 
whereas the language withers in their mouth the day they cease to be a people, the Jewish 
people never identifies itself entirely with the language it speaks; even where it speaks the 
language of the host that receives it, its own vocabulary or at least a specific selection from the 
common vocabulary, its own word order, its own feeling for what is beautiful or ugly in the 
language in question, all this betrays that this language – is not its own.’20 Derrida notes that 
the ‘Foreigner’ suffers the ‘first act of violence’ when forced to  ‘ask for hospitality in a 
language which by definition is not his own, the one imposed on him by the master of the 
house, the host, the king, the lord, the authorities, the nation, the State, the father, etc’.21 
Nevertheless, the Jewish voice has survived among the nations; among the worldviews; and 
the systems of reading, speaking and thinking into which it has been thrust. Indeed, as Levinas 
points out, ‘the relation between the same and the other – upon which we seem to impose 
such extraordinary conditions – is language’.22 Ironically, as well as causing suffering to the 
stranger in its imposition by the host, language also provides the means of conversation: 
To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each 
instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to 
receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the 
idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught. The relation with the Other, or 
Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is 
welcomed this conversation is a teaching [enseignement]. Teaching is not reducible to 
maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain.23 
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 Through adopting the host language, the Jewish voice enters into a relational conversation 
that becomes instructive for the host – and so the Jewish voice lives on through Saadia Gaon, 
Maimonides, Spinoza, Buber, Rosenzweig, Levinas, Derrida and beyond, to engage in a 
conversation with modern liberal arts. 
 
Athens with Jerusalem 
 
The linking together of Athens and Jerusalem is usually traced back to Tertullian. In his 
Prescription Against Heretics, he asked ‘What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What 
concord is there between the Academy and the Church?’24 As the title of his treatise makes 
clear, Tertullian was primarily addressing the problems of heresy in late second to early third 
century Carthage.25 The phrase has become synonymous with the opposition of faith to reason 
(reason represented by the city of Athens while Jerusalem stands for faith). On this statement 
faith and reason have been forever polarised, but arguably this is a misunderstanding of 
Tertullian, who was highlighting the use of Greek philosophy in heretical teachings, rather than 
negating the value or position of reason amongst people of faith.26 
In liberal arts and philosophy we commonly speak of Athens and Jerusalem,27 but the 
‘and’ separates the two cities, while Athens or Jerusalem polarises them. Whilst for Levinas, 
the ‘conjunction and … designates neither addition nor power of one term over the other’,28 a 
more helpful pairing of the cities may be Athens with Jerusalem – a pairing that directly 
addresses Tertullian’s question of what has one to do with the other. If we are addressing faith 
and reason, then maybe the separation of Athens and Jerusalem holds good, although, as we 
have seen, faith and reason are not mutually exclusive in either tradition. If, instead, we are 
addressing traditions reflected in the liberal arts (in this context, writing, speaking and 
thinking), then Athens has much to do with Jerusalem and vice-versa. This may seem to be an 
insignificant issue – mere pedantry – but it is important because the word ‘with’ forms a bridge 
between the two cities: an association allowing one to cross over to the other. Thus, we do not 
need to perpetuate the mutual exclusivity of one view over the other. Both cities, both 
                                                 
24
 Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum (On the prescription of heretics), 7.9 
<www.tertullian.org/works/de_praescriptione_haereticorum.htm> [accessed 19/03/13]. 
25
 See Ronald E. Heine, ‘The beginnings of Latin Christian literature’ in Frances Young, Lewis Ayres and Andrew 
Louth (eds.) The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 
131-141 (p. 135). 
26
 For a discussion of arguments and diverse views on Tertullian’s statement see Eric Osborn, Tertullian, First 
Theologian of the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 27-47; and David E. Wilhite, Tertullian 
the African: An Anthropological Reading of Tertullian’s Context and Identities (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), pp. 
22-23. 
27
 For example, David Janssens, Between Athens and Jerusalem: Philosophy, Prophecy, and Politics in Leo Strauss's 
Early Thought (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008). 
28
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 39. 
 205
wisdoms and both voices can stand side-by-side, shoulder-to-shoulder: the rooted tiller with 
the wandering shepherd. 
 
Athens with …? 
 
Athens with Jerusalem is just a beginning; where Jerusalem serves as a prototype for the 
twinning or joining in of other voices. Kearney expresses the possibility of opening up 
relationships with all the strangers in our midst and beyond: ‘My hospitable relationship with 
the stranger, in sum, gives meaning to my relations with all strangers, proximate or distant, 
human or divine.’29 Once a dialogue has been brokered, other voices can more easily join. 
These could be two-way discussions: Athens with Istanbul, Athens with Cairo, Athens with 
Nalanda, or Athens with Shanghai. Alternatively, they could open up into two or three-way 
conversations between different voices. With increasing confidence, the Western tradition 
might even risk a conversation where Athens is silent, listening instead to the discourse of two 
or three strangers. For certain, these other traditions have much to teach us about how to 
read, speak and think – the bigger the conversation becomes, the richer our understanding 
and experience will become. Indeed, Derrida believes that the advent of the stranger has the 
potential to liberate the host:   
Crossing the threshold is entering and not only approaching or coming. Strange logic, 
but so enlightening for us, that of an impatient master awaiting his guest as a liberator, 
his emancipator. It is as if the stranger or foreigner held the keys. This is always the 
situation of the foreigner, in politics too, that of coming as a legislator to lay down the 
law and liberate the people or the nation by coming from outside, by entering into the 
nation or the house, into the home that lets him enter after having appealed to him.30 
Thus, the strangers’ voices may also serve to liberate the Western liberal arts tradition, as 
outsiders with keys to unlock the arts of reading, speaking and thinking in different ways. The 
ability to emancipate lies in the freedom of the stranger, as in Levinas’ definition of the 
stranger as ‘the free one. Over him I have no power.’31 Indeed, Levinas goes as far as to state 
that it is the ‘absolutely foreign alone [that] can instruct us’, because the ‘strangeness of the 
Other, [is] his very freedom!’32 When we speak of liberal arts – the education of the 
emancipated – then the outsider voice is one that can bring liberty to a tradition which has 
been so long settled. 
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Writing on the subject of philosophy, Justin Smith argues that attempts to ‘open up the 
discipline to so-called non-Western traditions and perspectives’ have failed: 
The goal of reflecting the diversity of our own society by expanding the curriculum to 
include non-European traditions has so far been a tremendous failure. And it has failed 
for at least two reasons. One is that non-Western philosophy is typically represented 
in philosophy curricula in a merely token way. Western philosophy is always the 
unmarked category, the standard in relation to which non-Western philosophy 
provides a useful contrast. Non-Western philosophy is not approached on its own 
terms, and thus philosophy remains, implicitly and by default, Western. Second, non-
Western philosophy, when it does appear in curricula, is treated in a methodologically 
and philosophically unsound way: it is crudely supposed to be wholly indigenous to the 
cultures that produce it and to be fundamentally different than Western philosophy in 
areas like its valuation of reason or its dependence on myth and religion. In this way, 
non-Western philosophy remains fundamentally “other.”33 
Smith’s reasons for failure echo Kearney’s idea of the ‘guest-master’ – the Western tradition 
dominates the relationship and the guest is contrasted by the standard of the master. This is 
Athens and/or… as opposed to Athens with. The Western tradition always has a seat at the 
table and never has to justify its presence in the conversation. The challenge to the Western 
voice is to give up the seat. I have witnessed a common hospitality in many Mediterranean and 
Middle-Eastern cultures in which a visitor is always welcomed into the house; and if it happens 
to be at a meal-time then the host not only insists that the visitor joins them, but brings them 
from the door to the dining table, giving up their own seat without the visitor having time to 
realise or object. Not that the visitor is naïve, but they are made to feel welcome and find 
themselves in the thick of the conversation rather than the periphery. The host, meanwhile, is 
serving– they will pull up a chair, but not at the centre. Derrida calls this  ‘absolute hospitality’ 
- it ‘requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner … but to the 
absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that 
I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them’.34 Or, in the words of Levinas: ‘I 
welcome the Other who presents himself in my home by opening my home to him.’35 This 
‘welcoming the Other, as hospitality’,36 is a paradigm for hosting the stranger in liberal arts 
education. 
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Smith suggests that one correction to the failure ‘would be to stop describing it as 
“non-Western,” but instead to be explicit about which geographical region, or which tradition, 
we are discussing: Kashmir Shaivism, for example, or Chinese Mohist logic, just as we would 
speak of German Aristotelian Scholasticism or American Pragmatism, without, ordinarily, 
bothering to specify that these are both “Western.” In the context of liberal arts education, we 
could speak of rhetoric, for example, defining where it comes from geographically and from 
what period. Alternatively, Smith advocates treating ‘both Western and non-Western 
philosophy as the regional inflections of a global phenomenon’. Thus, according to this model, 
rhetoric would be taught as a singular phenomenon within a wide variety of traditions, none of 
which takes precedence over the others. Smith argues that the Western voice has no 
privileged right to philosophy: ‘Now it is of course very difficult to define “philosophy,” but if 
we think of it broadly as systematic reflection on the nature of reality and on humanity’s place 
in that reality, then it is clear that Europe can make no special claim to be the home of 
philosophy.’ Thus, the ‘only reason to take European philosophy as the default tradition for 
our curricula is that it just happens to be, for contingent historical reasons, our tradition’. 
Nevertheless, Smith is by no means dismissive of the Western voice; he simply wishes to see it 
as one among equals: 
The West has an extremely rich philosophical tradition … and it is eminently worthy of 
preservation and transmission to future generations. But its richness has always been 
a result of its place as a node in a global network through which ideas and things are 
always flowing. This was true in 500 B.C. and is no less true today.37 
Perhaps a humbling is necessary, a lesson taken from the Jewish voice of Wisdom. Such a re-
evaluation would not only reposition the Western tradition in liberal arts education, but 
simultaneously elevate the estimation of other traditions. 
In the same way that Smith challenges the Western voice in philosophy, Erika Falk has 
challenged the Greek dominance in the study of rhetoric. She argues that ‘the study of Jewish 
rhetoric in particular, and multicultural rhetoric in general, could help create a definition of 
rhetoric that is neither time nor context bound. Such an orientation would suggest a greater 
level of abstraction that encompasses multiple philosophical, cultural, and historical 
approaches to understanding communication systematically.’38 Falk notes a variety of ‘cultural 
approaches to rhetoric’ that have been and are being studied, including Chinese; African 
American; Arabic; and Japanese: 
It is impossible at this point to say exactly how a culturally inclusive definition of 
rhetoric would look. Although such a definition would have to take into account not 
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only the persuasion and logocentric rhetoric of the Greek classics, but also the morally, 
ethically driven Jewish rhetoric, the historically [centred] and contextually driven 
rhetoric of the Saudis … the rhetoric of emancipation found in black churches in 
Alabama during the civil rights movement, which included singing and praying … as 
well as other historical and multicultural perspectives.39 
Falk, like Smith, sees the need for an end to the Western monopoly – to include the classical 
tradition as a voice among many, but not the voice dictating to the rest. As with philosophy, 
the other traditions of rhetoric are as old as the Western tradition, if not older. Indeed, they 
are, in many ways, as old as speech itself. 
The Western monopoly on the arts of reading, speaking and thinking highlights the 
need to hear other voices in liberal arts education. Shermon Cruz draws attention to some of 
the differences between Western and non-Western traditions in the context of the liberal arts: 
the Western traditions emphasise the individual and ‘individualism expressed through 
autonomy and freedom of choice as the primary universal value’; and a ‘linear (progressive) 
view of history and a materialistic view of the real’. Whereas, the non-Western traditions 
emphasise community and ‘social cohesion’; and a view of history with a ‘propensity for cycles 
and the transcendental’. Thus, these ‘differences in inclinations’, he argues, ‘have significant 
implications on liberal arts discourse’.40 The Western voice, then, has limited scope in the 
future of liberal arts education as it represents an increasingly smaller and singular position on 
the global stage of multiple voices. 
Moreover, Cruz details several problems with the Western model of liberal arts in the 
non-Western world. The term ‘liberal arts’, for example, is considered to be inappropriate by 
many non-Western academics: ‘In the Conference Report of the Hollings [Centre] on 
Independent Universities in the Muslim World (2007), the word “liberal” is seen as 
controversial, political, American and Western oriented. A widely noted argument came from a 
Muslim Professor who claimed that cultural and contextual differences will doom the Western 
liberal arts model to failure in many of these non-Western, predominantly Muslim societies.41 
Additionally, if a liberal arts student is typically ‘an individual, a college graduate, a young adult 
speaking one on one with another individual to listen, to empower and to persuade’, then the 
‘community, the tribe and the village are hardly a part of her image’. Yet, from the non-
Western perspective ‘the existence of families and communities is predominant’, so ‘the 
                                                 
39
 Falk, ‘Jewish Laws of Speech’, p. 26. 
40
 Shermon O. Cruz, ‘Peering into the Futures of Liberal Arts’, Journal of Futures Studies, 16.3 (2012), pp. 79-98 (pp. 
81-82). 
41
 Cruz, ‘Peering into the Futures’, p. 82. 
 209
unspoken, unacknowledged emphasis on the individual might well be the biggest challenge in 
translating the concept of liberal education to cultures beyond Western tradition’.42 
Cruz highlights a Chinese perspective, with one of the most enduring civilisations in 
‘space and time’. As a result, ‘the Chinese have developed their own meaning of existence, 
human nature, affairs and society’; while philosophically, ‘they have an optimistic view of 
humanity and believe in their knowledge, wisdom and ability to transform and reshape oneself 
via the rhythms of nature’. Chinese civilisation is ‘solidly grounded in the Confucian, Taoist, and 
Buddhist discourse’, with self-reliance for survival: ‘While the Greek civilization [emphasises] 
public speaking, political leadership, freedom, and the advancement of democratic institutions 
in its liberal arts discourse, the Confucian story [centres] on civic culture, mutual respect and 
complimentary obligations, virtuous [behaviour], self-control, hard work, skills acquisition, 
patience and perseverance and sustained inter-relationships … this type of educational 
tradition stresses duties rather than rights.’43 Thus the goals of a Chinese arts and sciences 
education emphasise ‘the family, the community … the importance of reputation, cultural 
knowledge and heritage, ethical [behaviour], duty and character building’. 
Cruz goes on to consider an Indian ‘construct of the arts and sciences’, as an 
alternative to the Western model: ‘As the Greeks situate freedom in the political, the Chinese 
in the cultural, the Indians saw it in the spiritual.’44 Thus, the ‘understanding of the 
transcendental self is the [centre]-piece of the Indian liberal arts project … the ultimate goal of 
human life’: ‘While the Greeks train their subjects with rhetorical skills, argumentation, and 
debate, and the Chinese train by way of [memorising], writing and reading classical, literature, 
poetry and humanists’ texts, and knowing virtue, the Indian path is through congregating, 
reading scriptural texts, meditating (mantras), and practicing yoga with the guidance of a 
Guru.’45 The Indian model reinterprets and redefines liberal arts ‘in the context of the spiritual, 
which is needed in understanding oneself as well as in advancing the welfare of others to 
reduce human suffering. Thus, creating spiritual leadership, developing rationality in the 
context of the transcendental and the universal, and awakening one’s conscience becomes the 
goal of liberal arts education.’46 
Finally, Cruz offers an Islamic model, where Muslims ‘find their meaning, their 
purpose, [and] their identity in the desert’. Islam ‘provides them with a moral and ethical 
framework, which is the foundation for Muslim education, knowledge, and scholarship’.47 In 
this context, Cruz lists the following prerequisites for an Islamic equivalent to a liberal arts 
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education: ‘Group unity, history, inclusiveness, kinship, respect for parental authority, royal 
authority, Islam, ethics, and choice are essential in the Muslim context of the arts and 
sciences.’48 In the remainder of his article, Cruz notes the development and growth of liberal 
arts programmes across China, India and the Islamic world, but with distinctly relevant 
approaches in the context of each culture: Confucian, Sanskrit, Persian, Hindu and Muslim.49 
This, he argues, is a sign of great hope in the future of liberal arts education as, by necessity, 
the emphasis moves away from the dominant Western voice towards the art of reading, 
speaking and thinking in these other significant traditions. 
But what of the Western voice – can it survive into the future? Established American 
liberal arts education programs alongside resurgent European models continue to promote the 
Western tradition, albeit in modern expressions. Great Books are still read with little more 
than a cursory nod to the Scriptures.  The value of rhetoric is underlined by politicians around 
the world through presidential speeches and the countering of opposition would-bes. Liberal 
arts students are encouraged to take note of political oratory.50 The teaching of Western 
philosophy still baulks at the idea of the Hebrew Scriptures as a legitimate source, and plays 
double-standards when protesting that the Bible is a revelatory book with nothing to offer 
reason. Will the recent interest in liberal arts education from Asia and the Middle East redress 
the balance? 
By embracing the stranger or strangers that dwell in our midst and by becoming – like 
Abraham – the rootless host, I believe that Athens has a future with Jerusalem. In closing, I will 
briefly consider a new initiative in the story of Athens with Jerusalem – in 2013 the first Israeli 
liberal arts college opened its doors: the Shalem College in Jerusalem. The College draws on 
the ‘best practices’ from America’s leading and exemplary liberal arts institutions, and 
positively embraces the Great Books. However, it is here that they begin to make it very much 
their own: 
Given Israel’s unique intellectual and cultural heritage, the Great Books approach at 
Shalem encompasses the Western tradition, the Jewish tradition, and the Islamic 
tradition. Of 23 courses in the Core Curriculum, 13 will be taught in accordance with a 
Great Books approach—including a series of courses on the Western tradition, a 
parallel series on the Jewish tradition, and one course on the Islamic tradition.51 
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Given the sheer volume of rabbinic and Islamic texts, they are treated differently, with a 
selection of works representing themes rather than attempting to present the whole corpus. 
Nevertheless, the Core Curriculum is based on a unique distinctive: ‘Our rationale is that 
Shalem’s students are heirs to the Western and Jewish traditions, and must study both of 
these in-depth, and that their location in the Middle East also requires them to be conversant 
with the Islamic tradition.’52 
Inspiration has also come from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, whose 
Department of Philosophy’s degree program includes ‘Chinese/Eastern Philosophy’ and 
‘Western Philosophy’. Unlike Hutchins’ defence of exclusively Western Great Books, Shalem 
sees this combination of Western and Eastern philosophy serving as ‘an illuminating precedent 
for attempting a similar joint program exploring Western philosophy together with Jewish 
thought’.53 Thus, the Core Curriculum embraces classic texts from the Jewish, Western and 
Islamic traditions: ‘The core curriculum is a reflection of Shalem’s unique approach to “the 
Jewish liberal arts,” which weaves the Hebrew Bible and classical rabbinic texts into the main 
curriculum alongside Western sources in philosophy, political theory, science and literature.’54 
The idea of weaving these world-views together suggests that a close relationship will be 
maintained between the traditions in approaching science, philosophy, art and other subjects. 
Hopefully, Shalem will succeed in creating this intertextual dialogue, forming a truly Great 
Conversation. According to Rebecca Attwood, Shalem has argued that Israel’s higher education 
system ‘neglects the humanities and exposure to the great ideas of the Jewish people’.55 Could 
not this charge be made against most modern liberal arts providers in their neglect of ‘the 
great ideas of the Jewish people’? Jerusalem is looking to her future. It is perhaps fitting that a 
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